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INTRODUCTION
MAGINE that you have been given a scale and the task to use that
scale to derive the values that underlie the division of power
between judge and jury to decide normative issues in the American
common law. You would probably start by putting on the scale the
familiar costs and benefits of rules and standards.' These go on the
* Much of this Article is based on conversations with colleagues, including
David Anderson, Steve Goode, Douglas Laycock, Sandy Levinson, Richard
Markovits, William Powers, Alan Rau, David Robertson, Charles Silver, Steve Smith
(now at McGill), Patrick Woolley, and Charles Alan Wright. An earlier version was
presented at a workshop at Northwestern University School of Law.
1. This article defines rules and standards in the usual way. The following
definition is typical: "Rules are legal norms that are formal and mechanical. They are
triggered by a few easily identified factual matters and are opaque in application to
the values they are designed to serve. Standards, on the other hand, are flexible,
context-sensitive legal norms that require evaluative judgments in their application."
Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, 82 Iowa L Rev. 739, 740
(1997). Some commentators insist on a further division between standards that
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
specify a value or goal and ask the decision-maker to administer the standard
consistent with that value or goal, and those that leave it to the decision-maker to
choose among diverse and sometimes conflicting values or goals. See Richard A.
Posner, Reply to Critics of the Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 Harv. L.
Rev. 1796, 1802-04 (1998) [hereinafter Posner, Reply]. Judge Learned Hand's
definition of negligence (B < PL), see United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d
169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), is an example of a standard that seems predicated upon a
fixed goal, see Posner, Reply, supra, at 1808, while the common form of jury
instruction on the standard of care in negligence (the reasonably prudent person
standard) is an example of a standard that allows the decision-maker to choose moral
criteria. See infra part II.A. Posner's point raises the possibility of a standard that is
administered on a scientific basis, thus calling into question the identification of
standards with moral or value judgments. This raises questions about the meaning of
moral or value judgments. A mechanical standard that leaves the decision-maker no
choice regarding relevant values or their weight might better be labeled a "formula"
to distinguish it from a standard requiring a value judgment. It is a gross
misunderstanding of the law of negligence to claim that the standard of the
reasonably prudent person can be reduced to the Hand formula without losing
something vital.
P.S. Atiyah and Robert S. Summers distinguish highly formal or "hard and fast"
rules and flexible rules, rather than rules and standards. See P.S. Atiyah & Robert S.
Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A Comparative Study of
Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory, and Legal Institutions 71 (1987). There is
considerable virtue in their terminology because it avoids giving the impression that
there is a bright-line distinction between formal and flexible legal commands. By
flexible rules the authors mean those where moral or value judgments-"substantive
reasons"-are made at the point of application. See id. at 5-6, 71, 75.
Distinguishing rules and standards, as I do, by whether they involve factual or
moral/value judgments, rather than by discretion or uncertainty in the judgment, is
problematic for several reasons. First, treating a legal command as a rule that
requires an evaluative, and therefore uncertain, factual judgment (such as a judgment
about credibility) shears the definition of a "rule" from what is thought to be the key
property of rules: that they can be administered in a mechanical fashion thereby
producing predictable results. Cf Neil MacCormick, Institutional Normative Order: A
Conception of Law, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 1051, 1051-53 (1997) (commenting that often
one can say with greater certainty what ought to be than what is). Second, some legal
concepts, such as trade usage, require judgments that cannot strictly be classified as
either factual or moral. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, 111
Harv. L. Rev. 1718, 1733-35 (1998) (distinguishing anthropological inquiries into the
moral beliefs of a group from moral reasoning). The inquiry into trade usage is
sociological rather than moral if it is properly done, though the moral values of the
decision-maker may creep in. The concept of "foreseeability" does not fit
comfortably in either category because while it refers to states of the world (the states
of probability of outcome and the mental capacity of the actor), its extreme vagueness
makes it a natural vessel for moral judgment. Relatedly, views of the morality of the
situation can influence factual judgments, making moral and factual judgments
difficult to separate in practice.
The law is sensitive to the difficulty of compartmentalizing evaluative and factual
judgments. In areas of the law where the jury is given no say on normative issues,
there is a tendency to constrain the jury's power to decide factual issues. Fraud is a
good example. Once the law accepts the concept of promissory fraud (i.e., the
concept that making a promise with the intention to break it is fraudulent) then there
is a possibility of a fraud claim in every suit for breach of contract, creating the risk
that juries will find fraud in order to punish breach. The law responds by prohibiting
the inference of fraud from the mere fact of breach or by requiring proof of fraud by
clear and convincing evidence. See infra note 258 and accompanying text.
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scale because if you want a normative judgment to be made in the
formulation of a common law rule it must be made by a judge.
Conversely, fact-specific normative judgments made at the point of
application of a standard will be made by the jury as an incident to
fact finding. Most literature on the reasons for choosing standards or
rules might lead one to think that these values are all that go on the
scale because that literature pays virtually no attention to the judge-
jury issue3 The implication is that while the choice between a rule or
standard determines whether judge or jury decides a normative issue,
this is a consequence of the choice and not a reason for choosing.
It is clear that other values must go on the scale if we are to give a
proper account of the common law. It is common place in negligence
law that the values of popular judgment factor significantly in the
2. The terms "normative judgment" "moral judgment," and "value judgment"
generally are used interchangeably without regard to the subtle differences between
them. Occasionally I do distinguish among these terms. These terms are used to
denote judgments made on grounds of policy as well as judgments made on grounds
of fairness. This is done mostly for convenience. Classifying policy judgment as a
species of moral judgment does have the welcome side-effect of implying that policyjudgment involves a moral choice. Some proponents of policy analysis would deny
the moral element in policy analysis. In a recent exchange, Ronald Dworkin upbraids
Judge Richard Posner for taking the view that judgments on pragmatic grounds are
any less moral than judgments on other ethical grounds. See Dworkin, supra note 1, at
1718-19; Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 Harv.
L. Rev. 1638, 1638-42 (1998) [hereinafter Posner, Problematics]; Posner, Reply, supra
note 1, at 1802-04.
3. Analyses of the values of rules versus standards that give little or no
consideration to the judge-jury issue include: Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical
Legal Studies 15-63 (1987); Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 42-61
(1990) [hereinafter Posner, Problems of Jurisprudence]; Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke Li. 557, 557-629 (1992); Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L Rev. 1685,
1685-1778 (1976). Understandably, in many instances the authors neglect the judge-
jury issue because they do not focus on the common law (Kennedy's article is the sole
exception). See Kennedy, supra, at 1685-1778. Kaplow includes among the factors
relevant to choosing between a rule and a standard considerations of which institution
best resolves an issue. He says little about the judge-jury issue because he focuses on
judges, legislatures, and specialized bodies as the relevant institutions. See Kaplow,
supra, at 567, 608-611. Kaplow's approach, however, is quite different from that of
this Article. He distinguishes between rules and standards by "the extent to which
efforts to give content to the law are undertaken before or after individuals act." See
id. at 560 (emphasis omitted). He argues that it is an error to assume rules must be
simple while standards must be complex. See id. at 586-96. I take complexity to refer
to the amount of information that must be considered in determining the law's
command in a given situation and the difficulty of processing that information.
Kaplow makes the point that rules need not be less complex than standards by
reasoning that every complex standard can be reformulated as a "rule equivalent." Id
at 586. This seems true to me only if we exclude the possibility of a standard that
allows the decision-maker to choose among different normative perspectives or
different weightings of values within a single normative perspective each time the




choice to evaluate conduct under a standard that the jury administers.,
By the values of popular judgment I mean the values we place on
having small groups of citizens, who are called together for a single
case, decide a normative issue after collective deliberation. These
values best explain some features of negligence law, the most striking
of these features being the rule that the jury decides the
reasonableness of conduct even when no fact is in doubt.5 Conversely,
in contract law there are frequent appeals to the values of professional
judgment: by these I mean the values we place on having normative
determinations made by people with legal training and the perspective
of judges.6 Accordingly, judges make some non-rule-bound decisions
in contract law, even to the point of assuming the role of fact-finder.
These values also help to explain the persistence of rules in contract
law, much as the values of popular judgment help to explain the
persistence of standards in negligence.
This began as an Article on the role of judge and jury in
administering a body of standards lying in the border area between
contract, tort, and restitution that require fair dealing in the
marketplace. The question I sought to answer was what was the role
of the jury in defining inappropriate conduct under these standards. I
discovered that to answer this question I had to attempt to untangle
the jury's role in identifying blameworthy conduct in negligence law,
and to establish that the jury played no similar role in contract law. I
also discovered that the concept of unjust enrichment in the law of
restitution had properties similar to the concept of improper
interference in the law of torts, a subject about which I have written in
the past.7 My topic grew to encompass the role of the jury in making
normative judgments across much of the common law, and even
4. See infra part II.A.; see also infra part III (discussing the role of the judge and
jury in contract law).
5. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
7. See Mark P. Gergen, Tortious Interference. How It Is Engulfing Commercial
Law, Why This Is Not Entirely Bad, and a Prudential Response, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 1175
(1996) [hereinafter Gergen, Tortious Interference].
8. One part of the common law I do not cover is the law of property, though I
suspect the law of nuisance would be a fertile area to investigate. Nuisance has a
negligence-like standard, and nominally the jury decides what is reasonable.
However, if my thesis is correct that the jury plays a small role in resolving normative
issues when economic interests are at stake, then the jury should play a smaller role in
nuisance than it does in negligence. I suspect that a study will show that the jury does
play a limited role because equitable relief is usually sought in a nuisance suit. See
Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules,
106 Yale L.J. 2091, 2102 (1997). There is a deeper issue here that is not explored
regarding the distinction between economic and property interests. Looking at
negligence law, we would say that the jury decides normative issues regarding the
reasonableness of conduct that foreseeably harms property interests but not economic
interests. Many economic interests, however, can be described as property interests.
Indeed, the trope of property is often invoked to describe interests in a job or in
insurance benefits when the speaker wants to afford that interest greater legal
[Vol. 68410
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beyond9
It may seem quixotic to try to give a principled account of the role
of the jury in the American common law. The large role the jury plays
in the American common law may best be explained as a natural
phenomenon that grew out of planting the English common law in the
very different social and political soil of this country. Much of the
value in accounting for the role of the jury lies in giving order to what
may now seem entirely arbitrary. The analysis provides justification
for a rule, proposed in negligence law, that would permit a judge to
take the issues of breach and legal cause from a jury only if he can
express his decision in the form of a rule.10 This rule is best explained
as a product of the balance we strike in negligence between the value
of popular judgment and the value of having rules. If blameworthy
conduct cannot be defined by a rule, then the balance swings
decisively in favor of popular judgment. My analysis also shows that
the field in which this rule applies is limited. Outside of negligence
law little or even negative value is placed on popular judgment.
Positive value is placed on professional judgment that is independent
of the value of having rules." We shall see that in contract law the
value placed on professional judgment is so great that the judge
protection. I also do not discuss the jury's role in calculating damages, though moral
considerations play a role here too, most prominently in the calculation of punitive
damages.
9. I do not discuss equitable doctrines like unconscionability and estoppel,
though they are vital supplements to the common law, because judges have retained
the administration of these doctrines. This can be attributed to historical accident,
though it is tempting to claim something fundamental in the commitment of equity
power to the judge. Equity confers a power to override normal rules of law under
broad standards of justice. It makes a great deal of sense to confine such awesome
power to judges, because judges appreciate better than juries the gravity of overriding
rules.
My approach can be used to buttress Phillip Areeda's argument that the jury ought
to play a minor rule in deciding policy issues under the rule of reason strand of
antitrust law. See Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law:. An
Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application 1 321 (1995). My general
claim, that the jury plays a small role in evaluating conduct affecting only economic
interests, supports Areeda. So, too, does common law doctrine. The rule of reason is
grounded in the common law doctrine of restraint of trade. This doctrine is a part of
the more general contract doctrine refusing to enforce contracts that violate public
policy. Whether a contract violates public policy is a question for the judge. See infra
notes 182-84 and accompanying text. I would be careful in extending the analysis too
far beyond the common law. It is the nature of the common law that the interests on
the defendant's side are primarily economic and private. A common law court cannot
directly deprive people of life, liberty, or property. Nor can a common law court
override the legislature. It is striking that the jury plays the largest role in deciding
normative issues in tort law where interests in physical security are on one side and
economic interests are on the other. Very different considerations may come to the
fore if the public interest or the defendant's physical security or liberty is at stake.
10. See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
11. See infra parts Ill and IV.
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sometimes decides factual issues in making non-rule-based decisions.2
The study of the division of normative power between judge and
jury in the law reveals areas in which power is contested. The most
important of these contested areas is the concept of duty in
negligence. Judges have reacted to a perceived liability explosion in
negligence by using their power to define duty to rein in the jury."
Another less noted contested area is the concept of abuse of a
confidential relationship. The historic power of the jury in this area
has become contested as pressure has been applied to expand the
scope of the concept to cover ordinary business transactions.4 The
standards of fair dealing-by these I mean the standard of good faith
and fair dealing in contract and related standards in the law of duress
and non-disclosure-are yet another contested area.5 So too is the
standard of impropriety in the law of tortious interference. 16 If juries
were to play the same role in defining what conduct constitutes fair
dealing, improper interference, or unjust enrichment that they
historically they have played in defining what is inappropriate conduct
in negligence the consequences would be profound. The power to
define the legal morality of the marketplace would thereby be shifted
from the judge to the jury.
A study of how power is allocated between judge and jury also tells
us a great deal about the structure and substance of particular bodies
of law. I challenge the view of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
that good faith cannot be reduced to rules and that it must be defined
case by case.' 7 While the soul of the concept of good faith may lie in a
standard of fair dealing, its corporeal body consists largely (but not
entirely) of rules. It is through these rules that judges control the
determination of fair dealing in specific circumstances.8 I also
challenge the view of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that the
concept of impropriety in the law of interference is like the concept of
reasonableness in negligence.' 9  I argue that the concept of
impropriety is more like the concept of unjust enrichment in the law
of restitution.2w Both are non-categorical concepts defining
inappropriate conduct and obligations in the economic arena that
supplement bodies of law in which obligations otherwise are defined
in categorical terms.2' Once the concepts are understood in this way it
becomes clear that judges should define them in the first instance,
12. See infra notes 178-85 and accompanying text.
13. See infra part II.
14. See infra part III.
15. See infra part III.B.
16. See infra part IV.A.
17. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a (1981).
18. See infra part III.B.
19. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 cmt. b (1979).
20. See infra part IV.
21. See infra part IV.
THE ROLE OF THE JURY
even in cases where there is no established rule. Finally, this Article
challenges the traditional view that the concept of abuse of a
confidential relationship is an aspect of the law of fiduciary
obligation.? It argues that these concepts are best kept separate and
that abuse of a confidential relationship should cover only the
exploitation of trust for personal gain. Unlike breach of fiduciary
duty, it should not cover mere neglect of the interests of another.
The study of the allocation of power between judge and jury also
provides a glimpse of the deep chasm in the common law between the
economic and personal sphere. Lately there has been a tendency
among scholars to conflate these two spheres, and, in particular, to
argue that non-physical economic interests ought to be afforded the
same protection from injury as physical personal interests because of
the importance of the former in the modem world.Y If economic
interests are to be afforded precisely the same protection as physical
interests, then we would give the jury the power to decide on a case by
case basis what is inappropriate, harmful conduct in the economic
arena. I am confident that few would want to give the jury that
power, although many would at the same time defend the historic role
of the jury as moral arbiter in the personal sphere, as well as defend
the growing use of standards to define obligation in the economic
sphere. What this suggests to me is that we tend to look at moral
issues in these two spheres in fundamentally different ways. While we
are willing to let ordinary intuitive morality define obligation in the
personal sphere, a different, more instrumental morality reigns in the
economic sphere.
Finally, this study provides a glimpse of the common law's deep
ambivalence toward selfishness. 2 Contract law embraces selfishness:s
22. See infra part V.
23. See Jay M. Feinman, Economic Negligence: Liability of Professionals and
Businesses to Third Parties for Economic Loss § 7.1 (1995). Feinman advocates a
"relational approach" that is very fact sensitive to determining liability for purely
economic loss from negligence. See id § 7.1, at 178 & § 7.4, at 199-200. He never
addresses in this 700-page book whether judge or jury will decide the relational issue.
Feinman has good company. Robert L. Rabin provides an excellent analysis of the
problem of economic loss in negligence that also ignores the issue of judge-jury. See
Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery For Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A
Reassessment, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1513,1513-38 (1985). Rabin organizes the law around
a standard of "proportionality between act and responsibility" but does not address
whether judge or jury would administer the standard. Id. at 1534.
24. That the common law harbors such ambivalent views on how people should
behave is not surprising. The Crits called these sorts of things antinomies and
celebrated them because they created the possibility that in the right hands the
common law could be a tool for social reform. Roberto M. Unger's Knowledge &
Politics (1975), is perhaps the classic statement of this view. See id. at 76-100. Oddly,
as far as I know the Crits never addressed the question of whether judge or jury had
the power to define what precisely was inappropriate behavior in the marketplace.
25. For an unusually candid statement of this view, see C.R. Bard, Inc. v.
Wordtronics Corp., 561 A.2d 694 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989). The Bard court
1999]
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while tort law and the law of restitution demand that people respect
the interests of others when their actions might cause injury, and that
they not seek to profit from the mistakes or weaknesses of others.26
The narrow protection afforded economic interests in tort law signals
the law's greater tolerance for selfishness when the interests affected
are purely economic.27 One overlooked area in the law where the
clash between these two attitudes toward selfishness is mediated is in
the law on confidential relationships.28 While a person is free to take
advantage of strangers in commercial dealings (so long as he does not
lie and respects a few other categorical rules of conduct), he may not
take advantage of a confidant by exploiting his trust. Historically, the
jury decides who are confidants. Thus, while the judge defines the
legal morality of the marketplace, historically the jury has decided
what relations rise above that morality.
I proceed on three assumptions. First, that we use different forms
of reasoning to resolve different types of normative issues in the law.
Philip Bobbitt's typology of the forms of legal argument is helpful in
this regard.29 Four of Bobbitt's six modalities of constitutional
stated:
We live, after all, in a society consumed by the desire to acquire wealth,
enamored by entrepreneurship and enthralled by success. Competition is
always the premise, winning always the goal. In such an environment, can
one conclude that the means used by defendant in this case to compete with
plaintiff were wrongful? I think not. Plaintiffs remedy is in the market
place, not in the courts.
Id. at 698. The decision rejects various tort claims brought against a firm for sending
a letter with true harmful statements regarding a competitor to that firm's customers.
See id.
26. Gregory C. Keating makes this point nicely by contrasting the reasonableness
standard of negligence with a rationality standard. See Gregory C. Keating,
Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 311, 311-12
(1996) ("When we act rationally, we pursue our self-interest in an instrumentally
intelligent way. When we act reasonably, we restrain our pursuit of self-interest by
acting in accordance with principles that fix fair terms of cooperation."); see also
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.) ("A constructive
trust is, then, the remedial device through which preference of self is made
subordinate to loyalty to others.").
27. The economic-loss rule in negligence is the most obvious feature of the
common law that has the effect of holding people to a lower standard of conduct
when their actions affect only economic interests. There are many complementary
features. For example, the concept of fiduciary relationship with its high standard of
conduct implies that a lower standard of conduct applies outside fiduciary
relationships, which generally exist only by undertaking.
28. See infra part V.
29. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation 11-22 (1991) (positing a
theory of modalities in constitutional interpretation); see also Dennis Patterson,
Conscience and the Constitution, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 270, 270-307 (1993) [hereinafter
Patterson, Conscience] (reviewing Constitutional Interpretation and showing how
Bobbitt's theory may be relevant to other areas of law); Dennis Patterson, The
Pseudo-Debate over Default Rules in Contract Law, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 235, 235-
87 (1993) [hereinafter Patterson, Pseudo-Debate] (distinguishing "internal-to-law"
arguments from "external-to-law" arguments).
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argument have significant analogs in the common law: doctrinal,
textual, prudential, and ethical reasoning.30 I set doctrinal and textual
reasoning aside because, while these forms of reasoning resolve
normative issues, they do not involve a value judgment at the point of
application. In the terminology of Atiyah and Summers, textual and
doctrinal reasons are formal and non-substantive.3,
My second assumption is that legal education, experience, and the
perspective of a judge make a judge better at some, but not all, forms
of moral reasoning (they also make a judge better at doctrinal and
textual reasoning). Following Fred Schauer and Virginia Wise, we
might say these are forms of legal reasoning, though they also involve
a value judgment.32 Professional training of a non-legal nature (such
as training in economics and statistics) is useful but not essential for
prudential reasoning. Professional training can be essential if an issue
is complex. Training as a lawyer and experience in administering the
30. I put historical reasoning and structural reasoning to the side because their
common law analogs are not clear. Bobbitt's typologies are framed with
constitutional law in mind. According to Bobbitt, structural argument under the
Constitution entails "inferring rules from the relationships that the Constitution
mandates among the structures it sets up." See Bobbitt, supra note 29, at 12-13. The
"structures" in the Constitution are institutional organisms-the states, the federal
government, and the branches of the federal government-that the Constitution
creates or that it assumes exist. See id. at 15-16. Common law structural reasoning
might be concerned with the relation of different bodies of doctrine in the common
law. Or perhaps the relevant structures are the institutions that administer the
common law and not the doctrines within the common law. If structures are thought
of as the latter, then my argument would be a structural one: we may imply from the
assignation to the jury of the issue of breach in negligence that the perspective of
ordinary intuitive morality is appropriate to resolving issues of breach. Historical
reasoning in the common law might be concerned with the history of the common
law, though perhaps not its doctrinal history. An example of a non-doctrinal
historical argument is that the law should be changed to conform with actual practice.
31. See Atiyah & Summers, supra note 1, at 5-8.
32. See Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal
Information, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 1080, 1092 (1997). Schauer and Wise propose a way
to differentiate legal and moral reasoning. They argue that whether there is a
difference is finally an empirical question of a sociological nature, and that if there is a
difference between legal reasoning and moral reasoning it lies in the fact that the
information, education, and acculturation of lawyers cause them to reach different
outcomes than non-lawyers (or, perhaps, to give different justifications for the same
outcome). See id To expand a bit, Schauer and Wise say that whether law or morality
are separate depends on the empirical claim that legal decision-makers decide
questions differently than they otherwise would for one of three categories of reasons.
See id. at 1099-1108. First, a legal decision-maker may believe the law constrains the
domain of reasons for a decision to a set of reasons that is not coterminous with all
moral reasons. See id. at 1102. They call this informational differentiation. See id.
Second, the law may influence how a legal decision-maker evaluates relevant reasons.
This they call methodological differentiation. See id. at 1100. Third, legal processes or
legal culture may alter how a decision is made. This they call procedural and cultural
differentiation. See id. at 1100-01; see also Stewart J. Schwab, Limited-Domain
Positivism as an Empirical Proposition, 82 Cornell L Rev. 1111, 1111-22 (1997)
(discussing the breakdown of the boundaries between law and morality, which is
leading to increased moral reasoning in legal reasoning).
1999]
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law makes judges better at prudential reasoning, and their
institutional position makes them more inclined to want to resolve
issues in a prudent way. Bobbitt defines ethical reasoning in such a
way that it is honed by legal training and perhaps best done with
philosophical training.33 If we instead define ethical argument as an
appeal to the ethos of the community,3 as some have, and if we want
the answer of ordinary intuitive morality,35 as sometimes we do, then
legal training is not necessary and may even be a hindrance. On the
other hand, legal training and the perspective of judges are highly
conducive, and may even be essential to ethical analysis of a more
systematic sort.
My third assumption is that the form of reasoning that we think
ought to be brought to bear in resolving a normative issue should
influence to which decision-maker an issue is allocated. In the area of
factual inquiry, some issues are committed to judges because we think
their legal training and experience are useful to the inquiry. The
judge decides whether there was a reasonable basis for bringing a
lawsuit in the area of abuse of process,36 and the judge decides some
factual issues in a legal malpractice case because they require legal
analysis.37 The United States Supreme Court recently held that the
interpretation of a patent was an issue for the judge because patent
construction "is a special occupation, requiring, like all others, special
training and practice." A rule that judges interpret written
agreements has been justified on similar grounds.3in the rules that
require expert testimony, we can also see an effort to assign issues to
33. See Bobbitt, supra note 29, at 20-21 (defining ethical argument in
constitutional law as deriving rules from moral commitments that are reflected in the
Constitution itself, in particular the concept of enumerated (and so limited)
governmental powers).
34. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, 72 Tex. L. Rev.
1771, 1785 (1994) (describing the ethos-based argument, which rests on "the idea of
an 'ethos' that exemplifies the deep structural norms of a given culture").
35. See Robert P. Burns, The History and Theory of the American Jury, 83 Cal. L.
Rev. 1477, 1488 (1995) (reviewing Jeffrey Abramson, We, the Jury: The Jury System
and the Ideal of Democracy (1994)) (using the term "ordinary intuitive morality").
36. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 673(1) (1977).
37. See Sturgis v. Skokos, 977 S.W.2d 217, 221-22 (Ark. 1998) (stating that the
probable success of an appeal is a question of law to be determined by a judge and not
a jury); Environmental Control Sys., Inc. v. Long, 703 N.E.2d 1001, 1008 (Ill. App. Ct.
1998) (determining that whether an appeal would have been successful involves legal
analysis); Steeves v. Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, P.C., 718 A.2d 186, 190 (Me.
1998) (stating that it is inappropriate for a jury to decide speculative causation issues
in a legal malpractice case); Baker v. Fabian, Thielen & Thielen, 578 N.W.2d 446, 451-
52 (Neb. 1998) (finding that the judge will determine the state of the law when that is
relevant, even to the point of determining that a legal issue was sufficiently unsettled
so that it could not be unreasonable for an attorney to fail to pursue it).
38. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-89 (1996)
(quotation omitted).
39. See Antilles S.S. Co. v. Members of Am. Hull Ins. Syndicate, 733 F.2d 195,
206-07 (2d Cir. 1984).
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people with the appropriate expertise to establish facts that are
beyond the ken of both judge and jury. A qualified expert is
necessary to establish a fact through scientific method" and the
standard of conduct for a professional must be established by the
testimony of a person in that field. ' Assuming there is a similar
correspondence on normative issues, that an issue is put to the jury
indicates that we want (or at least are satisfied with) the answer of
ordinary intuitive morality. That an issue is put to the judge indicates
that we want an answer based on policy or principle."2 That normative
decisions are made case by case should not dictate that they be made
by the jury for sometimes we want even ad hoe decisions to be based
on policy or principle.
I. THE HISTORIC ROLE OF THE COMMON LAW JURY
The federal and many state constitutional provisions that protect
the role of the common law jury tell us to look to tradition to define
the minimum role of the jury. These provisions command that we
preserve the power the jury had at some earlier time, typically the
date of the provisions' enactment." This command cannot be
obeyed." Juries cannot have the power they had in the eighteenth
40. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharin. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993). There is
a raging debate about whether complex issues of science or economics ought to be
taken from the jury entirely. For a balanced review of what little is known on the
issue of jury competence in this regard, see Joseph Sanders, Scientifically Complex
Cases, Trial By Jury, and the Erosion of Adversarial Processes, 48 DePaul L Rev. 355
(1998).
41. See Melville v. Southward, 791 P.2d 383, 389 (Colo. 1990) (holding that
testimony of an orthopedic surgeon does not suffice in suit against podiatrist for
malpractice in foot surgery).
42. In addition to facility, there is another reason for assigning policy issues to
judges. Policy analysis assumes an instrumental conception of the law that usually
measures the value of a decision by its effect on future behavior (I say usually because
there can be instrumental value in the immediate effects of decisions in shifting
wealth or terminating a dispute cheaply). If a decision is to regulate future behavior,
then it must be rendered in a form that is likely to guide people-something that
judges can do much better than juries.
43. The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution has been read as
protecting only the jury's power as fact-finder. See e.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S.
149, 157 (1973) (stating that fact-finding is the essential function of the jury in civil
cases). As a matter of interpretation, this is dubious. The first clause says "the right
of trial by jury shall be preserved" without qualification; the second clause prohibits
re-examination of facts other than in the manner of the common law. Id. at 150 n.2.
As a matter of logic, it is essential, otherwise the Seventh Amendment would freeze
the substantive common law as it existed in 1787. Fleming James, Jr. reports that all
but two state constitutions preserve the right to a jury trial. See Fleming James, Jr.,
Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 Yale L.J. 655, 655 n.2 (1963) [hereinafter
James, Right to a Jury Trial]. For evidence on the depth of the attachment to the civil
jury in the late eighteenth century, see Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional
History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 639, 653-56 (1973).
44. Fleming James, Jr. gives a devastating critique of the historical test for the
right to a jury trial that pays particular focus to the law-equity distinction. See James,
1999]
418 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68
century for the law was very different in its procedure, substance,
institutions, and, it seems, even in its ideology. In the eighteenth
century, legal rules were scant but trial judges had a great deal of
informal power over the jury. The trial judge could comment on the
facts, ask a jury to explain a verdict, argue with the jury, admonish a
jury that erred, and order a jury to re-deliberate. 45 This informal
power over juries disappeared in the early years of the nineteenth
century and was replaced by substantive and procedural laws that
hemmed in both judge and jury.46 Around the same time the power to
decide the law was taken away from the jury. In the eighteenth
century, juries were told that they had the right to "determine the law
as well as the fact in controversy" in both civil and criminal cases.47
This practice ceased around the early years of the nineteenth
century.4
Right to a Jury Trial, supra note 43, at 657-64. One point he makes is that doctrines
have passed from equity to law and vice versa. See id. at 658-60. He adds that "[a]t no
time in history was the line dividing equity from law altogether-or even largely-the
product of a rational choice between issues which were better suited to court or to
jury trial." Id. at 661. Law and equity differed in other respects, including not just the
obvious difference in remedies, but also procedure (parties could be compelled to
testify in equity while evidence was presented orally before a trier of fact in law), and,
on occasion, politics. See id. at 661-62.
45. See John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View
From the Ryder Sources, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1168, 1190-93 (1996). Renee B. Lettow
describes the shift in the first half of the nineteenth century from a practice of judges
informally questioning jurors to decide whether a new trial was in order to the more
formal device of a special verdict or judges ordering a new trial based upon their own
views without inquiring into the jury's reasoning. See Renee B. Lettow, New Trial for
Verdict Against Law: Judge-Jury Relations in Early Nineteenth-Century America, 71
Notre Dame L. Rev. 505,526-47 (1996).
46. The changes were not just procedural. See A.W. Brian Simpson, The Elusive
Truth About Holmes, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2027, 2036-37 (1997) [hereinafter Simpson,
Elusive Truth] (observing that the common law in the nineteenth century was
"expanding at the expense of jury discretion").
47. This famous instruction to the jury is from Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1, 4
(1794). William E. Nelson concludes that the jury's "power to find law was virtually
unlimited" in Massachusetts in the pre-revolutionary period. William E. Nelson,
Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts
Society, 1760-1830, 28 (1975). Edith Guild Henderson argues that questions of law
probably were not routinely put to the jury in civil cases in most states at the end of
the eighteenth century. See Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh
Amendment, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 289, 299-320 (1966) [hereinafter Henderson,
Background]. She bases this conclusion upon the existence of procedural devices that
would have enabled judges to take legal questions from the jury. She finds
Massachusetts to be an exception (along with Virginia). See id. at 318-19.
48. Nelson dates the removal from the jury of the power to decide the law to
around 1805 to 1810. He attributes this to procedural changes, one being a shift from
conducting trials before a panel of three judges (who could give conflicting
instructions) to conducting trials before a single judge, and another being more
frequent grants of a motion for new trial on the ground a verdict was contrary to the
law. See Nelson, supra note 47, at 165-71; see also Kermit L. Hall, The Magic Mirror:
Law in American History 107-08 (1989) (touching on parallel developments in other
states); Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation
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A variety of factors have been said to lie behind these changes,
including a breakdown in what had been a common ethos, a desire for
greater legal certainty, and the rise of a less moralistic view regarding
commerce.4 9 The development I think most closely associated with
the decline in the role of the jury was the growing professionalization
of the law in the United States.' ° In the early colonial era, only a small
percentage of judges had any legal education,51 litigation was usually
handled without lawyersn legal training was haphazard, and legal
literature was scant (even late in the colonial era a law library would
consist of classic English treatises and yearbooks)." The number of
lawyers and their role in litigation grew during the 1700s, it has been
said, in response to a dramatic increase in commercial litigation, which
spurred demand for lawyers.Y
The most thorough study of the legal profession in the colonial
period is by William Nelson of Massachusetts.5 According to Nelson,
in the 1700s, Massachusetts' lawyers and courts began to draw
significantly on the common law. This infusion of law seems not to
have reduced the role of the jury in the 1700s. Nelson finds that in
Massachusetts the effect was mostly procedural; pleadings came to
follow common law forms. Juries, however, retained the ultimate
power to decide the great majority of cases that were not resolved on
the pleadings. The growth of the legal profession bore tangible
institutional fruit in the immediate post-revolutionary period, roughly
from 1780 to 1820, when law schools, a legal professorate, and an
Process-The Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. 15, 30-32 (1990) (providing
further details); Lettow, supra note 45, at 526-47 (echoing Nelson's finding on the
most critical points focusing on the development of power to grant a new trial in the
19th century). Lettow argues that the jury had greater discretion on legal issues in the
colonies than in England, see id. at 508-15, and that the American view that the jury
had the right as well as the power to decide the law crystalized in the period prior to
the revolution in reaction to perceived misdeeds of Crown judges. See id. at 517-18.
49. See Nelson, supra note 47, at 165-71.
50. See Comment, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74
Yale L. J. 170,180-82 (1964) (making this point quite well).
51. See Peter Charles Hoffer, Law and People in Colonial America 3941 (rev. ed.
1998). Three of 33 judges who served in Massachusetts from 1692 to 1776 were
lawyers. See Comment, Changing Role of the Jury, supra note 50, at 171 n.6.
52. See Hoffer, supra note 51, at 44. Some colonies forbade lawyers from
pleading, many limited the fees that could be charged. See id. at 45-46.
53. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 102 (2d ed. 1985).
54. See Hoffer, supra note 51, at 79-85, 93-97. He argues that there was also an
increase in litigiousness, which he attributes to the clash between traditional mores
and those of a burgeoning market. See id. at 83-88; see also Milton M. Klein, The Rise
of the New York Bar: The Legal Career of William Livingston (1958), reprinted in
Essays in the History of Early American Law 394 (David H. Flaherty ed., 1969)
(telling a similar story of the career of a prominent New York lawyer in the colonial
era, William Livingston).
55. See Nelson, supra note 47, at 165-71.
56. See id. at 69-88.
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indigenous American legal literature were created, 7 and it became the
norm for judges to be lawyers.-s It was during this later period that the
power to decide the law was taken from the jury and trial procedure
became formalized.
There was also a change in legal ideology around the same time.
Eighteenth century writers grounded the power of the jury to decide
the law on a theory of a natural law to which an ordinary man had
access and that was preeminent over book law.59 A quite different
vision of law as a science was painted by Issac Parker in 1816. Parker
was Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and
57. See Friedman, supra note 53, at 322-23.
58. See Stephen Botein, "What We Shall Meet Afterwards in Heaven": Judgeship
as a Symbol for Modem American Lawyers, in Professions and Professional
Ideologies in America 49, 55 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983) (making the basic point but
telling a more complex story). For lawyers (at least), Botein says, it was always the
ideal that a judge be a lawyer. See id. at 49. Further, their victory in the early 1800s in
professionalizing the judiciary was compromised in the middle years of the century by
a popular drive to elect judges and in the early twentieth century by a drive for a
power of recall. See id. at 54-55; see also Lettow, supra note 45, at 519-21 (putting
special emphasis on changes in the structure of courts, in particular the creation of
trial courts, that a single judge administered, and the creation of appellate courts).
59. See Comment, supra note 50, at 172, 178-79. Judge Arnold describes the
theory this way:
What kind of world allowed nonprofessionals to have this much power and
authority? It was, I believe, a world in which law was regarded as a
concrete, discoverable, and palpable fact. It was something that was
discoverable by observation and by the application of moral minds to facts.
Law, substantive law, was regarded as something organic and internal, not
imposed from the outside by an external sovereign whose job it was to make
it. Law, in fact, was not made, in the modem sense, not nearly to the same
extent. Law was produced by discovery process, but a discovery process of a
common-law character that could be resorted to, not just by judges, but also
by lay persons-any moral person could do it. In that kind of world with
that kind of concept of law, an untrammeled jury makes a lot of sense.
Morris S. Arnold, The Civil Jury in Historical Perspective, in The American Civil Jury
9, 13 (1987); see also Atiyah & Summers, supra note 1, at 229-39 (1987) (considering
that the American theory of law also adds a belief that the law ought to serve a
purpose and that the law should be interpreted to suit its purpose).
Richard J. Ross ably tells a complex tale of the relationship between arguments over
the printing of law and the rise of popular texts on the common law with
contemporary theological and political debates and the effort by lawyers to establish
professional status. He concludes:
Between the ascension of the Tudors and the Civil War the common law
moved along a continuum, in the realm of perception, from a guild
possession towards a national inheritance.... Changes in the
communication and use of the common law weakened its late medieval
identification as but the course of the royal courts or a national custom
effectively committed to guild custody. For the common law was becoming
"commoned" along the two interlinked dimensions of knowledge (who
knew, could know, and was supposed to know the reasons, fictions, and
judgment of the law?) and of ideology (to whom did the common law
"belong"?).
Richard J. Ross, The Commoning of the Common Law, The Renaissance Debate Over
Printing English Law, 1520-1640,146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 323,450 (1998).
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the first professor to hold a chair of law at HarvardO In a speech he
gave at Harvard upon assuming the chair he described law as a
"science [that was] worthy of a place in the University [and] worthy to
be taught, for it cannot be understood without instruction.'61 The
metaphor of law as a science has multiple meanings all of which imply
that the common man has little or no business in making law. Perhaps
Parker had in mind legal science as the exegesis of legal texts.
Perhaps he had in mind what Robert Gordon describes as Whig legal
science in which lawyers distilled and preserved the customs and
norms of the people.6 Today we might understand this as law as
moral philosophy. Nowadays the metaphor of law as science (when it
is not being used ironically) is likely to stand for an instrumental view
of law as a tool to further the ends of commerce, human welfare, or
some other good. The metaphor may also stand for the view that the
proper way to study law is empirically.
The modem science of law-legal realism-has been hard on the
view of law as doctrinal exegesis or as moral philosophy. At the same
time, the modem scientific outlook has led to an increase in the power
of the jury. The connection between the modem scientific outlook
and the growth of the power of the jury lies in the shift from rules to
standards, a change that legal realists championed.A6 When engaged in
law reform, the legal realists argued that the form and language of the
law should reflect as best they could the substance of the decisions
being made.4 Karl Llewellyn's work in commercial law is a famous
example.65 That one fruit borne from the realists' labors is a growth in
the power of the jury is ironic, for that was not their goal. Indeed,
among the realist numbers are two of the most fervent critics of the
civil jury, Jerome Frank6 and Leon Green.P
The legal landscape continues to change rapidly, so it is dangerous
60. See Albert J. Harno, Legal Education in the United States 35-36 (1953).
Parker's opinion in Mills v. Wyman, Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825), suggests this turn
away from natural law was not complete. Parker invoked "principles of natural
justice" in explaining why a promise to pay a debt barred by the statutes of limitations
was enforceable without consideration. Id. at 209. But he held that a father's promise
to pay for his ill son's emergency care was not binding though this was "a strong
example of particular injustice sometimes necessarily resulting from the operation of
general rules." ld.
61. Friedman, supra note 53, at 321.
62- See Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of
American Enterprise, 1870-1920, in Professions and Professional Ideologies, supra
note 58, at 70, 84-87.
63. See id.
64. See Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism. Toward a Natralized
Jurisprudence, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 267,278-79 (1997).
65. See infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
66. See Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1948);
Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice 108-25 (1949).




to assume that practices and arguments from even as recently as fifty
years ago have the same meaning today. The growth of class actions
and mass litigation put particularly great pressure on the jury because
of the complexity of issues and the magnification of the effects of a
single decision (a concern with the unrepresentativeness of a single
jury is allayed by a belief that it takes the accumulated decisions of
many juries to affect change).6 Other changes include the
liberalization of damages, the expansion of rights, the development of
the plaintiff's bar, and perhaps a growth in litigiousness and a decline
in a common set of values (though complaints about growing
litigiousness and declining morality are not unique to this age).69 The
institution of the jury has itself changed in the last fifty years. Until
the 1960s and 1970s the jury pool was selected through a "key man
system" that was designed to select "men of recognized intelligence
and probity."70  Today the ideal jury is a cross-section of the
community, though the development of the art (some think it a
science) of jury selection cuts against this new ideal as well as the old
one.71 Changes in voting rules and the reduction in the size of the jury
in some states may have changed the way the jury deliberates.7
But, for all these qualms about the relevance of past practices, we
cannot avoid using them as the baseline in defining the role of the
jury. They must be the baseline, in part, by default. As Fleming
James observed forty years ago:
We lack any scientific way of telling what issues are best suited for
jury or for court trial, and there is no general agreement (among
judges, among politicians, within the profession, or in the
community at large) about the matter or even about the underlying
premises that should be assumed in making the evaluation.7
While recent studies have begun to cast light on how juries behave,74
68. See Developments in the Law-The Civil Jury, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1408, 1489-
1513 (1997) (summarizing the debate in a manner sympathetic to the jury).
69. The same has been said about the eighteenth century as well as the late
nineteenth century.
70. See Jeffrey Abramson, We, The Jury 99 (1994).
71. See id. at 100-01.
72. See id. at 180-81.
73. James, Right to a Jury Trial, supra note 43, at 691 (footnotes omitted); see also
9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2302 (2d
ed. 1994) (commenting on the "inevitability" of some historical inquiry given the
"essentially insoluble problems" posed because of changes such as the collapse of law
and equity and the development of unusual kinds of actions).
74. See Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After
Twelve Years, in Verdict Assessing the Civil Jury System 181, 234-35 (Robert E. Litan
ed., 1993) (summarizing a dozen case studies and concluding that juries did a
defensible job in fact-finding in complex cases and that errors were usually
attributable to difficulty in understanding instructions or in evaluating conflicting
expert testimony); see also Valerie P. Hans, The Jury's Response to Business and
Corporate Wrongdoing, 52 Law & Contemp. Probs. 177, 183-86 (1989) [hereinafter
Hans, The Jury's Response] (summarizing the results of studies up to 1989, most
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fundamental questions of value remain. What value do we place on
legal certainty? What value do we place on doing what people feel is
just in a particular case? How much stock do we place on professional
opinion about what is right and wrong? How much do we place on
popular opinion? Ultimately, the balance one strikes between judge
and jury may depend upon whether one thinks of law as social
engineering or as a civil religion. The social engineer wants to limit
the jury's role because of its unpredictability (it is no surprise that
Holmes wanted to reduce the role of the jury);"5 the civil priest
celebrates the jury's role if he is of truly Protestant disposition.
A virtue of the common law method is that it enables us to proceed
without resolving fundamental questions of value by limiting the
issues on which conflicts in values are worked out to a manageable set
that is fluid over time. A useful way to think of the common law is as
a set of institutional mechanisms for resolving private disputes that
attempts to be at once stable and mutable: stable, because of the high
value placed within the system on tradition and conformity; mutable,
because of the ineffable and fluid character of its rules, standards, and
principles. 6 Thus, what we look for from the law is a sense of the
space in which the role of the jury is up for grabs today. What we do
in that space is a matter of choice.
involving criminal trials). Hans concludes that studies of criminal trials generally gave
juries high scores in evaluating evidence but low scores in understanding legal
instructions. See id. at 184-85. Many studies echo these findings. See, eg., Phoebe C.
Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 Law & Contemp. Probs. 205,223-
24 (1989) (finding that a simulation of juries deliberating in a murder trial based upon
filmed trial reveals that juries did a good job of evaluating the facts and a poor job on
the law, and also finding that deliberations influenced only one juror's position on the
law). One case study of a complex antitrust case found that juries had a good grasp of
primary facts but a poor grasp of economic effects. See Hans, The Jury's Response,
supra, at 187 (citing A. Austin, Complex Litigation Confronts the Jury System: A
Case Study (1984)).
75. See Baltimore & Ohio RR. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927) (trying to
lay down rules to define the standard of conduct to no ultimate avail); Lorenzo v.
Wirth, 49 N.E. 1010, 1011 (Mass. 1898) (Holmes, J.) (same); see also Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Common Law 123-29 (1881) (explaining his views on the jury's role in
negligence).
76. See A.W. Brian Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, reprinted in
Legal Theory and Legal History 358, 367 (1987) [hereinafter Simpson, The Common
Law] (describing the common law as a system of customary law in which the relevant
customs are those of a professional elite because "ideas and practices exist only in the
sense that they are accepted and acted upon within the legal profession"). In
England, this way of thinking about the common law has (or, at least, used to have)
conservative implications because there the common law is administered by a




II. PHYSICAL OR PERSONAL TORTS
A. Negligence
Negligence law is the logical place to start in mapping the role of
the jury in deciding normative issues in the common law for it is here
that the jury has the most say. A danger in starting with negligence is
that you will think it the norm. Do not. It is the exception. At the
heart of negligence law is a standard of conduct of the reasonably
prudent person 7 The jury administers this standard by making a
normative determination of what constitutes appropriate conduct in a
given situation along with a factual determination as to whether the
defendant's conduct met the standard.78 The jury has a great deal of
77. One recent study of pattern jury instructions and cases found this standard
used everywhere except Louisiana. See Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand
Formula, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1015, 1023 n.21 (1994) [hereinafter Gilles, The Invisible
Hand]. The continued and near universal use of the reasonably prudent person
standard might be chalked up to inertia. Evidence that there is another factor at work
can be found in the fate of a proposal in 1956 in California to modify the pattern jury
instruction on negligence to a risk-utility standard. See id. at 1049 (citing 1 California
Jury Instructions: Civil No. 101-H, at 236 (4th ed. 1956)). The proposal was dropped
after the trial judges of Los Angeles expressed discomfort with the possible
usurpation of the role of the jury. See id.
78. See Fleming James, Jr., Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58
Yale L.J. 667, 676 (1949) [hereinafter James, Functions of Judge] ("On the whole the
rules of accident law are so formulated as to give the jury considerable scope in
deciding what the parties should have done, in each specific case, as well as what they
did do. The cardinal concept is that of a reasonably prudent man under the
circumstances...."); see also Brian J. Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A
Profile of the Civil Jury in the 1990s, 79 Judicature 233, 234-35 (1996) (summarizing
the types of civil cases juries actually decide). In the period examined by Ostram a
huge percentage of jury trials (approximately 17,000 out of 22,000) were in cases
involving automobile accidents, premises liability, and medical malpractice. See id. at
234.
It is often said that the standard of a reasonably prudent person presents a mixed
question of law and fact. See Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72
U. Pa. L. Rev. 111, 112 (1924). Bohlen defines general standards of conduct, and in
particular the reasonableness standard of negligence, as "mixed questions of law and
fact" because they do not involve finding facts, meaning "something which has
happened or existed;" but neither do they involve declaring law, meaning "a body of
principles and rules which are capable of being predicated in advance and which are
so predicated." Id. at 112. The reasonableness standard of negligence "is more nearly
akin to a declaration of law than to a finding of fact, since it does create obligatory
standards, which, if created by the jury, are, it is true, binding in only the particular
case then before it .... Id. at 114. Bohlen describes this task as "administrative" and
likens it to a ruling by an administrative board. Id. at 115-16; see also James B.
Thayer, "Law and Fact" in Jury Trials, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 147, 171-73 (1890) (treating
this standard as administrative). This label is misleading. A decision about what is
prudent conduct in the circumstances is not law-like in any meaningful respect. Not
only does it not produce an authoritative statement about how people ought to treat
others (Bohlen's point), but it is not law-like in the sense that making a decision about
what is prudent conduct requires the training, knowledge, or perspective of a lawyer
or judge.
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normative discretion in deciding what is reasonably prudent conduct.
Most academic scholarship on negligence law passes over this
feature of the law, I think, because it makes theorizing about how
negligence cases ought to be decided seem academic Stephen Gilles
identifies some of the normative judgments that must be made in
applying the standardu These include judgments about the extent (if
any) to which a person may legitimately prefer his interests over those
of other people, whether to engage in a cost-benefit analysis, and, if
so, what value to assign to injury and avoidance costs.8 The jury must
decide what weight, if any, to give to custom.n It may be swayed by
deontological rules or biases of the sort collected and displayed by
Leo Katz like so many exotic butterflies (for example, rules
distinguishing direct and indirect effects and action and inaction).p
There is evidence that juries hold corporations to a higher standard of
responsibility than individuals.Y Juries may in practice apply a
principle akin to strict liability in which an injurer is liable unless
avoidance is so costly as to be impractical.Logically, there must be
room within the reasonably prudent person standard for every
plausible normative theory of negligence law (otherwise it would not
be a plausible theory), and there are many such theories.86 In practice,
79. See Patrick J. Kelley, Who Decides? Community Safety Conventions at the
Heart of Tort Liability, 38 Clev. St. L. Rev. 315, 379-82 (1990) (offering a theory of
tort law that puts the jury at the center); Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as
Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 Mich. L Rev.
2348, 2386-90 (1990) (giving an account of negligence law that puts the jury at the
center). Kelley's theory is that tort law redresses private injustices by enforcing pre-
existing norms of conduct. See id. at 319. This will not do as a global theory even of
negligence law, where the theory is most accurate. In many negligence cases there is
no pre-existing norm, and when there is a clear pre-existing norm in the form of a
customary rule of behavior it is not conclusive.
80. See Gilles, The Invisible Hand, supra note 77, at 1029-30.
81. See id.
82. Custom is relevant when deciding what is reasonably prudent conduct but it is
not decisive. See T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932). The area of
professional malpractice is an exception. See infra note 139.
83. See generally Leo Katz, Ill-Gotten Gains: Evasion, Blackmail, Fraud and
Kindred Puzzles of the Law 1-264 (1996) (exploring the different features of the basic
rules by which people apportion blame for wrongdoing).
84. See Valerie P. Hans, The Contested Role of the Civil Jury in Business
Litigation, 79 Judicature 242, 244 (1996) [hereinafter Hans, The Contested Role]
(reporting findings of study using mock juries and surveys).
85. See Gilles, The Invisible Hand, supra note 77, at 1021-27; see also Keating,
supra note 26, at 324 (offering a spirited defense of this as a principle of
reasonableness grounded on the proposition that of the two interests at odds in
accident cases--on the plaintiff's side, the interest in personal security and on the
defendant's side, the interest in freedom of action-the plaintiff's interest is
weightier).
86. See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence
and Corrective Justice, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1801, 1802-10 (1997) [hereinafter Schwartz,
Mixed Theories] (presenting a thoughtful argument for a view of tort law with a focus
on accident law that mixes the goal of deterrence (which is historically, but not
necessarily, connected to an economic perspective) and the goal of corrective justice
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the normative discretion of the jury goes beyond that permitted by the
standard. It is said that juries tend to impose the cost of an injury on
whomever can best absorb that cost-on whoever has the deepest
pockets-without regard to whether this person was in any way at
fault or even whether he caused the injury.,, But it is difficult to claim
this as a normative judgment that the jury is entitled to make within
negligence law.
Breach is not the only issue put to the jury in negligence that
requires a normative judgment. Normative judgment is necessary
when the jury decides the harmful consequences from breach for
which the breacher may fairly be held liable under the issue of legal
cause, an issue generally treated as one for the jury.& It is necessary
when the jury apportions responsibility among parties under a system
of comparative fault, for apportionment requires weighting deviations
from the standard and other variablesY9 And a subjective value
judgment is necessary when a jury decides what is fair monetary
compensation for non-economic injury. A judge may take these issues
away from the jury, but only if he believes the answer is not in doubt,
or, in the case of damages for personal injury, if the jury's answer
seems manifestly unjust or a product of passion or prejudice. °
A striking testament to the role of the jury in negligence law is the
(which is concerned with righting wrongs)).
87. See Hans, The Contested Role, supra note 84, at 243; see generally Jennifer H.
Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. Legal Stud. 413 (1992) (arguing that
it should be relevant on economic grounds).
88. See Cruz-Mendez v. ISU/Ins. Servs. of S. F., 722 A.2d 515, 525 (N.J. 1999)
(citation omitted) (treating legal cause as an issue for the jury); Atkinson v. Scheer,
508 S.E.2d 68, 71 (Va. 1998). The judge may play a greater role when the issue is
intervening cause. See Lefthand v. City of Okmulgee, 968 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Okla.
1998) (using a spurious rule of intervening cause to dismiss a claim); Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 453 (1965) (making proximate cause an issue for the judge insofar
as it turns on a determination whether foreseeable intervening conduct absolves an
actor from liability). But see McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 961 P.2d 952,
957 (Wash. 1998) (putting the issue of intervening cause to the jury under a standard
couched in terms of foreseeability).
89. Comparative fault gives the jury greater normative discretion along several
dimensions. One new dimension is apportioning responsibility where a party is
negligent per se because his actions violate state law. See Bailey v. Black, 394 S.E.2d
58, 61 (W. Va. 1990) (asking the jury to allocate responsibility between a patron and a
bar where the patron wrecked his car after leaving the bar drunk). In Bailey, the bar
violated state law by selling the patron liquor, and the patron violated the law by
driving while intoxicated. See id. at 59. The practice in some states of leaving the jury
in the dark about the legal consequences of how fault is apportioned is inexplicable
under a theory that conceives of the jury as moral arbiter as well as fact-finder. See
Dilaveris v. W.T. Rich Co., 673 N.E.2d 562, 565 (Mass. 1996) (holding that instruction
is at the discretion of the trial judge but that it is abuse of discretion not to advise the
jury of the effects of the verdict where the jury seems to be speculating about the
matter).
90. See Berry v. Risdall, 576 N.W.2d 1, 4 (S.D. 1998); Pope v. Moore, 711 S.W.2d
622, 624 (Tex. 1986).
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influence the jury has had on the basic structure of negligence law.9'
Leon Green, Fleming James, and Robert Keeton tell of times in the
history of negligence law when popular values expressed through
repeated jury verdicts have changed the position of the law in
important regards.9 They say that the willingness of juries to reach a
compromise verdict in cases of contributory negligence presaged and
laid the groundwork for the shift to comparative fault. They say that
the juries' sympathy for workers injured on the job led to the demise
of the unholy trinity of doctrines that barred recovery for on-the-job
injuries and the adoption of workers' compensation.4 They also say
that the inclination of juries to ignore the issue of fault and insist that
those with deep pockets compensate the people whom they injure
presaged a shift to strict liability (and perhaps even to a system of
social insurance if juries care little about causation). Perhaps a
future generation of legal scholars will look back to this era and say
that juries changed the legal relationship between employers and
employees by demanding that employers demonstrate good cause for
firing an employee whatever the formal legal rights of the employee.6
Of course, judges are not without power, even in negligence law.
Duty is the most significant issue in the prima facie negligence case
that the judge decides even if he believes the answer is doubtfulY A
91. It is important to not overstate the role of the jury in bringing about these
changes. Juries could not have done these things by themselves. Juries have to act
with the complicity of judges who choose to submit a case to the jury that the judge
might well have decided himself under the law on the books. The presence of the jury
enables judges who question the morality of the law on the books to validate their
moral views by passing the issue to the jury. It also enables judges to undermine laws
they find offensive without challenging them directly. And, perhaps, trial judges learn
from juries or are influenced by the moral views of juries.
92- See Green, Judge and Jury, supra note 67, at 395-417; Robert E. Keeton,
Venturing To Do Justice 74-75 (1968); James, Functions of Judge, supra note 78, at
686-87.
93. See Keeton, supra note 92; see also Frank, supra note 66, at 110-11 (observing
the same phenomenon with a more jaundiced eye than Keeton).
94. See Green, Judge and Jury, supra note 67, at 122-23; James, Functions of
Judge, supra note 78, at 686-87.
95. See James, Functions of Judge, supra note 78, at 687-90.
96. See Mark P. Gergen, A Grudging Defense of the Role of the Collateral Torts in
Wrongful Termination Litigation, 74 Tex. L Rev. 1693, 1726-37 (1996) [hereinafter
Gergen, Grudging Defense] (summarizing studies of outcomes in wrongful
termination litigation and examining outcomes in reported Texas cases, and
concluding that the Texas cases bear out the perception that employees fare much
better with juries than they do with judges).
97. See, eg., Palka v. Servicemaster Management Servs. Corp., 634 N.E.d 189,
192 (N.Y. 1994) ("Unlike foreseeability and causation, which are issues generally and
more suitably entrusted to fact finder adjudication, the definition of the existence and
scope of an alleged tortfeasor's duty is usually a legal, policy-laden declaration
reserved for Judges to make prior to submitting anything to fact-finding or jury
consideration."). The Restatement does not speak much of duty. Rather, it says that
the judge defines the standard of conduct, and, if the conduct required in a given
circumstance can be expressed through a rule, then the judge states the rule. See
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judge may dismiss a negligence claim by finding that the defendant
was under no duty. 8 A judge may also limit the factual or normative
issues put to the jury by defining duty in limiting terms.9 The issue of
duty has been relegated to the margins of tort law to a set of "limited
duty" or "no duty" rules that apply to claims for purely emotionalw or
purely economic injuryu° and claims where the defendant's negligence
lay in failing to control or warn about another person °e or in failing to
act more generally.13 For much of this century, courts pushed out the
boundaries of liability under these limited-duty rules, usually by
crafting new bright-line rules. °4 A few states adopted standards
instead of bright-line rules to define the scope of liability in these
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 285(c) cmt. e (1965).
98. See Kentucky Fried Chicken, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 927 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Cal.
1997).
99. See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 69-70 (1927)
(Holmes, J.) (finding that a highway traveler who came to a railroad had a duty only
to stop, look, and, if the view of the track was obstructed, get out of his vehicle).
100. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 313 & 436A.
101. See Louisiana ex reL Guste v. MNV Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir.
1985); Local Joint Executive Bd. v. Stem, 651 P.2d 637, 638 (Nev. 1982); Stevenson v.
East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200, 201-03 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946) (discussing many of
the leading early cases).
102. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 315-20.
103. See id. §§ 314, 314A & 314B.
104. Consider the law regarding bystander claims for mental anguish experienced
in perceiving an accident. A few decades ago, courts began to recognize such claims
when the bystander was closely related to the victim and near the accident in time and
space. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920-21 (Cal. 1968) (defining the scope of the
new duty by vague guidelines of foreseeability and proximity that the court impliedjudges were to work out in later cases). Later cases tend to define the scope of the
duty by bright-line rules, the most common being a rule that requires that the
bystander be present at the scene of the accident or arrive immediately thereafter.
See, e.g., Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022, 1031-32 (Cal. 1977) (ruling that sensory
and contemporaneous observance of an accident are not necessary to recover
damages for emotional distress as long as observance is almost contemporaneous with
the accident); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Iowa 1981) (stating that to
recover for emotional distress caused by witnessing peril to a victim, the bystander
must be located near the scene of the accident); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d
1295, 1302 (Mass. 1978) (concluding that recovery will be granted where "the parent
either witnesses the accident or soon comes on the scene while the child is still
there"); Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300, 306 (N.H. 1979) (requiring a relatively close
connection in time and geography between the negligent act and the resulting injury);
Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 527 (N.J. 1980) ("[O]bserving the death or serious
injury of another while it occurs is an essential element of a cause of action for the
negligent infliction of emotional distress."); Gabaldon v. Jay-Bi Property
Management, Inc., 925 P.2d 510, 510 (N.M. 1996) (ruling that to recover there has to
be a contemporaneous sensory perception of the accident by the parent of the child);
Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 686 (Pa. 1979) (allowing recovery for a mother who
witnessed the violent death of her small child); Kinard v. Augusta Sash & Door Co.,
336 S.E.2d 465, 465 (S.C. 1985) (ruling that plaintiff bystander must
contemporaneously perceive an accident in order to recover damages for emotional
trauma); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 199 (Wyo. 1986) (stating that in order to
recover damages for emotional distress the person must witness the serious accident
or its aftermath).
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areas of limited duty. Among these, some turned the application of
the standard over to the juryu05 while others kept it as an issue for the
judge.10
Looming behind the limited-duty rules is a general duty to take
reasonable care in conduct that might foreseeably harm other people
or their property.10 The authority for such a general duty is thin,us
105. See Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkian, 727 P.2d 1038, 1045 (Alaska
1986); State v. Eaton, 710 P.2d 1370, 1378 (Nev. 1985); McAllister v. Ha, 496 S.E.2d
577, 582-83 (N.C. 1998). These cases involve bystander liability.
106. See Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 780 P2d 566,576 (Haw. 1989) (involving
bystander liability); Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 443 (Wis.
1994) (characterizing the issue of limitation as one of public policy rather than duty).
107. Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (Eng. C.A. 1883), is the original expression
of this principle. The author (Lord Esher) added in Le Lievre v. Gould, 1 Q.B. 491
(Eng. C.A. 1893), that this principle held only if the defendant engaged in an
affirmative act. Percy H. Winfield explores the history of the concept of duty in
negligence. See Percy H. Winfield, Duty in Tortious Negligence, 34 Colum. L Rev. 41,
51 (1934). Winfield explains that the concept of duty did not appear until the middle
of the nineteenth century. See id. It first appeared and then was developed in cases
where the defendant was under a duty to someone other than the plaintiff by contract
or statute. The question was whether the plaintiff who was injured by mis-
performance had a cause of action. See id. at 49-53. Let me suggest a different
interpretation of the story told by Winfield. In the pre-nineteenth century cases of
liability for inadvertent injury (which involved neglect by inn-keepers, common
carriers, professionals, people in a common calling, public officials, bailees, and
people who controlled dangerous things) there was no need for a concept like that of
duty because it was self-evident that persons in the defendant's class were obligated to
take care to protect people in their charge or to control the thing in their charge. The
concept of duty emerges with claims where it is not so clear whether the defendant
should be under a legal obligation to watch out for the plaintiff's interests. Striking
evidence of a belief that duties to others were limited is found in what Winfield
describes as a seminal case in introducing the concept of duty, Langridge v. Levy, 150
Eng. Rep. (Ex. 1837). The plaintiff pled a general duty to use reasonable care in
handling dangerous instruments, to which the judges responded: "[W]e think this
action may be supported without laying down a principle which would lead to that
indefinite extent of liability ..... Id. at 530; see also Winfield, supra, at 53-55.
Winfield does not explain why the plaintiff in Langridge pled a duty when the
concept was not yet in the law. The answer to this mystery may be found in M.
Prichard's Scott v. Shephard (1773) and the Emergence of the Tort of Negligence.
Prichard argues that the concept of a general duty of care emerged as an artifact of
the rules of pleading. See M. Pritchard, Scott v. Shephard (1773) and the Emergence
of the Tort of Negligence 30-33 (1976). In cases where the claim was neglect in the
performance of an undertaking (Prichard's primary example is claims against
common carriers), the plaintiff would plead that the defendant breached an obligation
that existed under the custom of the realm and not an obligation in contract in order
to avoid the harsh rules of joinder in contract. See id. at 31. Plaintiffs came to plead a
general duty rather than a specific custom because their suit would be dismissed if
they plead the wrong custom. See id.
108. One of the most famous duty cases of the last generation, Tarasoff v. Regents
of Univ. of CaL, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), which held that a psychiatrist was under a
duty to warn a third party of a danger from a patient, found that duty analysis should
begin with the "fundamental principle" stated in Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503
(Eng. C.A. 1883), and that courts should depart from it only upon a careful balancing
of concerns of policy and fairness. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342. The Tarasoff court
followed Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968), which held that "no such
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surprisingly so given its fundamental significance. One consequence
of the "bottom-up" nature of the common law is that fundamental
principles can be left unsaid because they are rarely put in issue. In a
growing number of cases, judges take the evaluation of conduct that
would seem to fall within this general duty away from the jury,
sometimes by announcing a particularized no-duty rule,09 and
sometimes by an ad hoc no-duty decision.11o These cases are part of
the on-going conservative counter-revolution in torts.
Thirty years ago, Judge (then Professor) Robert Keeton observed
that "[o]ne of the current riddles of tort law, of pervasive significance,
is whether any general principle is emerging concerning this problem
of allocating responsibility for evaluative findings as distinguished
from findings of physical facts and events."'M In negligence, to solve
this riddle we must distinguish issues of duty from issues of breach and
legal cause. This is no easy task because duty analysis is said to be a
function of the same broad considerations of policy, fairness, and
reasonableness that guide breach and legal cause-analysis,
exception [to the general principle of duty] should be made unless clearly supported
by public policy." Id. at 564. In Rowland, however, the court formulated the general
duty differently to cover only affirmative acts. See id. at 565-69; see also Stagl v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 52 F.3d 463, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (arguing that under New York law "the
judicial power to modify the general rule [of Heaven v. Pender] ... is reserved for
very limited situations" (citations omitted)).
109. See William Powers, Jr., Judge and Jury in the Texas Supreme Court, 75 Tex.
L. Rev. 1699, 1719 (1997) (observing that the Texas Supreme Court has increased the
role of judges and diminished that of the jury by announcing particularized rules of
duty (or of no duty)). Powers cites Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379 (Tex.
1995), a products liability case involving a front-end loader with a removable
protective cage that the employer detached, leading the plaintiff to be injured. See
Powers, supra, at 1704-05. The plaintiff argued that to have a removable cage was a
design defect, and the jury agreed. See Shears, 911 S.W.2d at 381. The court reversed
by announcing a particularized duty rule: a manufacturer has no duty to design a
multipurpose machine in a way that makes it impossible to use one of its intended
settings (the cage had to be removed to work between decks). See id. at 384-85.
Powers also cites Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Doe, 903 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1995),
where the court ruled that a drug tester had no duty to warn about the risk of false
positives. See Powers, supra, at 1708. Powers notes that the issue would have gone to
the jury had duty been defined broadly as a duty "to refrain from imposing
foreseeable, unreasonable risks." Id. at 1708. Powers relates these developments to a
debate between Leon Green and Page Keeton. See id. at 1719. Keeton defined duty
broadly as a duty to act "reasonably" and relied on the jury to define the scope of the
duty by deciding the issues of proximate cause and breach. See id. at 1701. Green
wanted to give trial judges (not appellate) greater authority by moving more
questions of scope of liability from proximate cause to duty. See id. at 1701-03; see
also Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning of the Possible End of the Rise of Modern Tort
Law, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 601, 659-63 (1992) [hereinafter Schwartz, The Beginning]
(describing the onslaught of no-duty decisions).
110. See Stagl, 52 F.3d at 468; Salazar v. South Suburban Metro. Recreation and
Park Dist., 614 P.2d 910, 911 (Colo. App. 1980); Kenney Mfg. Co. v. Starkweather &
Shepley, Inc., 643 A.2d 203, 206 (R.I. 1994).
111. Keeton, supra note 92, at 72-73.
112. See, e.g., Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43, 46 (Colo. 1987) ("No one
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Indeed, many assume that the law of duty has no useful doctrinal
substance.11 The solution to the riddle identified by Keeton is
important in negligence law. If only the label distinguishes an issue of
duty from an issue of breach or legal cause, then no good argument
exists within negligence law to confront judges eager to cut back on
the jury's role as moral arbiter by recasting issues of breach and legal
cause as issues of duty. Putting the same point less dramatically, the
solution, if one exists, will define the sorts of normative issues that the
jury ought to resolve as a matter of negligence law. A possible
solution to this riddle and two justifications for it follow. To solve the
riddle, we must separate the power to decide normative issues that the
jury enjoys as incident to its role as fact-finder from the power that it
enjoys because we believe that it has something useful to say on a
normative issue.
The best distinction I know of between duty determinations and
breach and legal-cause determinations is a rule requiring that a duty
determination take the form of either a general standard or of a
factor is controlling, and the question of whether a duty should be imposed in a
particular case is essentially one of fairness under contemporary standards-whether
reasonable persons would recognize a duty and agree that it exists."); Hopkins v. Fox
& Lazo Realtors, 625 A.2d 1110, 1116 (NJ. 1993) ("The actual imposition of a duty of
care and the formulation of standards defining such a duty derive from considerations
of public policy and fairness."). Furthermore, in Palka v. Serviceinaster Management
Servs. Corp., 634 N.E.2d 189 (N.Y. 1994), the court held that:
[D]uty is not something derived or discerned from an algebraic formula.
Rather, it coalesces from vectored forces including logic, science, weighty
competing socioeconomic policies and sometimes contractual assumptions of
responsibility. These sources contribute to pinpointing and apportioning of
societal risks and to an allocation of burdens of loss and reparation on a fair,
prudent basis.
Id at 192.
On the laundry list of considerations relevant to these issues administrative
considerations appear on the duty list but not on the breach and proximate cause list.
See D'Ambra v. United States, 338 A.2d 524,527-28 (RI. 1975). This follows from an
elusive difference between judge and jury. Judicial decisions can have a legal effect
beyond the immediate case so judges ought to consider how their decision will
influence future behavior by judges and other actors within the legal system. The
actions of a jury have no legal effect beyond the immediate case and so do not seem
to raise the administrative concerns. The difference is elusive because a jury's
decision may affect people's behavior. Indeed a jury counts on this when it tries to
"send a message" through a verdict.
113. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 53, at
357-58 (5th ed. 1984). Other scholars of the era when Prosser first wrote, who treated
the law more carefully than Prosser, were equally disdainful of the concept of duty.
See Buckland, The Duty to Take Care, 51 L.Q. Rev. 637, 639 (1935) (concluding that
the concept of duty is "an unnecessary fifth wheel on the coach, incapable of sound
analysis and possibly productive of injustice"); see generally Winfield, supra note 107,
at 41-66 (reviewing the history and uses of the concept of duty in negligence and
concluding that we would be better off without it though it was probably too
engrained at that point to eliminate). Winfield and Buckland assume that an action
for negligence lies only for conduct causing an injury to person or property. They do
not address the question of what concept limits the negligence action other than duty.
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categorical rule that applies beyond the immediate case., 4 This rule
does not require that statements of duty take the form of rules.
Duties can be expressed in the form of a standard, the most famous
such standard being the duty of reasonable care under the
circumstances. Nor is the rule an absolute prohibition on ad hoc no-
duty determinations by a judge under a standard. A judge could
dispose of a claim under a standard without formulating a rule or a
more precise standard if he thought there was no factual or normative
doubt regarding the answer under the existing standard. The rule can
be restated as follows: for a judge to dispose of a negligence claim by
finding no duty, he must state a rule or a standard that applies beyond
the immediate case and that contains no factual or moral element that
is open to doubt.115 The precise degree of doubt at which an issue
must go to the jury is a function of the general standard for summary
judgment, directed verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The federal standard is reasonable doubt. Some states have a lower
114. See David W. Robertson et al., Torts, 186-88 (2d ed. 1998) (focusing their
definition on the need to frame no-duty rules to facilitate summary judgment,
Robertson concludes that to serve this purpose, a no-duty rule must take the form of
a "rule of law of enough breadth and clarity to permit the trial judge in most cases
raising the problem to dismiss the complaint or award summary judgment for the
defendant on the basis of the rule"); see also Stagl, 52 F.3d at 469 (Calabresi, J.,
dissenting) ("where, as here, the applicable duty relationship is well established, we
do not believe New York law condones the limitation of a familiar liability rule simply
to avoid placing a disproportionate burden on a defendant in a particular case");
Bolieu v. Sisters of Providence, 953 P.2d 1233, 1241 (Alaska 1998) (responding to
dissenting argument that hospital should have duty to protect spouses of staff from
infectious diseases only in the case of unusual and severe diseases and concluding that
"such fact-intensive inquiries pertain to the issues of breach, causation, and damages,
not the threshold legal question of whether a duty exists."); Hopkins, 625 A.2d at
1116 ("The analysis is both very fact-specific and principled; it must lead to solutions
that properly and fairly resolve the specific case and generate intelligible and sensible
rules to govern future conduct."); Peterson v. Spink Elec. Coop., Inc., 578 N.W.2d
589, 592-93 (S.D. 1998) (arguing that it was inappropriate to deny a claim for lack of
duty on grounds that risk was not foreseeable because the determination is fact
intensive); Nivens v. 7-11 Hoagy's Comer, 943 P.2d 286, 294 (Wash. 1997) (Sanders,
J., dissenting) ("The majority confuses the general duty of care with the plaintiff's
specific theory of liability.").
115. A no-duty rule would take the form "If n,, n,... n., then no duty," where n is
the presence or absence of a fact that usually can be resolved on the basis of the
pleadings. It is a mistake to tie the definition of duty rule exclusively to summary
judgment for a duty rule might resolve the issue of breach without disposing of other
issues in a negligence claim. Such a rule would take the form "If n, , .. . n, then
breach." See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 69-70 (1927)
(Holmes, J.) (finding that a highway traveler who came to a railroad had a duty to
stop, look, and, if the view of the track was obstructed, get out of his vehicle). What a
duty rule cannot contain is a standard-like element that asks for an evaluative
judgment. Thus, the standard of "reasonably prudent care under the circumstances"
cannot properly be described as a duty rule because it contains the element of
reasonableness, which requires an evaluative judgment. To be more precise, a duty
rule cannot on its face require an evaluative non-factual judgment, and, in particular,
it cannot on its face require a normative judgment.
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standard, requiring only a "scintilla" of evidence al6 to establish factual
doubt. One problem with the scintilla standard is that it is not an
intelligible measure of normative doubt.
Under this rule, while similar normative considerations bear on a
judge's analysis of duty and a jury's analysis of breach and legal cause,
in duty analysis these considerations bear (or at least ought to bear)
on the formulation of a rule or standard, while in breach and legal
cause analyses they bear directly on the decision of the case. Put in
such naked terms the argument seems unrealistic (judges are likely to
have the case at hand foremost in mind in formulating a duty rule)
and at odds with the common law method (in which rules are always
provisional). But these seem to me quibbles. If we thought that
normatively doubtful claim-disposing duty determinations ought to be
cast in rule form, then we would dishonor a judge who made up a rule
to dispose of a case knowing that the rule was good only for the
specific case.
The concern to preserve the role of the jury as fact-finder coupled
with the procedural difficulty of separating issues of fact from
normative issues in administering a standard is the most obvious
justification for this rule.117 The special verdict and the general verdict
with special interrogatories are the devices available to obtain specific
factual findings from the jury in advance of the normative
determination by the judge. (If the judge is to make the normative
determination of what is inappropriate conduct in advance of the
jury's factual findings we are back to where we started, for he must
formulate a rule or standard that the jury can apply, ) But these
devices are not well suited to getting the information that is necessary
to evaluate conduct into the hands of a judge. The usual reasons for
evaluating conduct by a standard rather than a rule is that the
judgment is fact-dependent, meaning that there are a large number of
potentially relevant variables, the relation among these variables is
complex, and/or important variables cannot be specified in
advance.119A standardized special verdict form or special
116. See, e.g., Cobo v. Robo, 195 S.E.2d 362 (N.C. 1998) (stating North Carolina
standard on efficiency of evidence to support verdict); Stafford v. Stafford, 726
S.W.2d 14,16 (Tex. 1987) (stating Texas standard).
117. See Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54
Cal. L. Rev. 1867,1922 (1966) (arguing that the jury should administer reasonableness
standards).
118. On the use of these devices in federal court and a description of the mixed
success of states with special verdicts, see 9 Wright & Miller, supra note 73, at § 2502.
See also Edmund M. Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special
Interrogatories, 32 Yale LJ. 575, 576-77, 588 (1923) (concluding that "the special
verdict had its origin in the desire of the jury to avoid the responsibility of
determining questions of law" because it originated in a time when the jury could be
punished for rendering a false verdict even when the error went to an obscure point of
law).
119. Some of the literature is collected. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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interrogatories would have to be of Byzantine complexity to account
for all possible variables and their relation in the usual negligence
case, and the form still would not be complete. Counsel and the trial
judge might try to winnow out questions about irrelevant variables
and add questions, but this process would be cumbersome. It would
invite side arguments and create opportunities for strategic behavior
by counsel, and opportunities for reversible error. This point should
not need belaboring because it seems self-evidently desirable to keep
together the task of fact-finding and the task of evaluating conduct
when the evaluation of conduct is intensely fact-dependent. 120
But the concern to preserve the role of the jury as fact-finder does
not quite justify the proposed rule and is not sufficient to explain how
power is allocated between judge and jury in negligence law. This
concern requires putting the issue of what is reasonable conduct to the
jury only in cases where normative doubt is coupled with factual
doubt. Where there is only normative doubt about what is reasonable
conduct, a judge could decide the issue without intruding on the role
of the jury as fact-finder. This possibility most clearly arises in a case
where the facts are undisputed but breach is contested. In negligence
law, the issue of breach goes to the jury in such a case.'
There are more far-reaching implications to justifying the power of
a jury to administer a standard solely on the principle that the jury
should decide doubtful facts. Consistent with this principle a judge
could dispose of a claim without specifying how precisely he resolved
a doubtful normative issue so long as he was confident that his answer
did not depend on a doubtful fact. The significance of allowing judges
such a power can be seen in a Washington case involving a customer
120. One way to deal with this problem would be to have the judge and jury
deliberate together under ground rules that allow the jury to take the lead in
constructing a narrative about what occurred, with the judge advising the jury about
what points to address in the narrative and stating the legal conclusion.
121. See Rail Road Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 663-65 (1873) (involving the question
whether a railroad was negligent in maintaining a turntable that children could play
on, and answering it with one of the most famous eulogies to the moral wisdom of
juries); see also Ellington v. Tolar Constr. Co., 227 S.E.2d 336, 338 (Ga. 1976) ("Even
where there is no dispute as to the facts, it is, however, usually for the jury to say
whether the conduct in question met the standard of the reasonable man." (citation
omitted)); Mitchell v. Ankney, 396 N.W.2d 312, 313 (S.D. 1986) (stating that a jury
should determine whether defendants breached any duty of reasonable care);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328(c) (1965) (considering the determination of "(a)
the facts [and] (b) whether the defendant has conformed to the standard of conduct
required by the law" to be separate functions of the jury). But see Smith v. Kems, 931
P.2d 717, 719 (Mont. 1997) ("A district court is only to determine whether a
defendant is negligent when evidence is undisputed or susceptible to only one
conclusion by reasonable people."); O'Connor v. Corbett Lumber Corp., 352 S.E.2d
267, 270 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) ("What is negligence is a question of law and when the
facts are not disputed, the court must say whether negligence does or does not
exist.").
[Vol. 68
THE ROLE OF THE JURY
robbed and hurt outside a store.ln The customer claimed that it was
unreasonable for the store not to post a security guard.'13 The
majority held that there was no duty on the facts, but it did not lay
down a bright-line rule, recognizing that prior experience at the store,
the character of the neighborhood, the time of day, and the character
of the clientele might make it reasonable to post a guard.11f the
decision is questionable, it is so on normative grounds: people might
well disagree about how much responsibility merchants have to
protect their customers from danger from outside elements. But once
the majority decided that the degree of responsibility was slight, there
was no factual doubt regarding the outcome in the specific case
because it seems to have been undisputed that there had been no
prior incidents near the store.12 If our only concern was that judges
not infringe on the role of the jury as fact-finder in making duty
determinations, then this sort of ad hoc no-duty determination would
be appropriate given the absence of factual doubt.
That the issue of breach is put to the jury even when facts are free
of doubt shows that in negligence law independent value is put on the
jury deciding what is reasonable conduct when the normative issue is
open to debate. This is where what I call the values of popular
judgment come into play. The many celebrations of the jury's role in
negligence focus more on the jury's role in deciding normative issues
than the jury's role in deciding factual issues.u6 The civil jury's virtues
are said to include (with considerable overlap):' zl (1) keeping the law
122. See Nivens v. 7-11 Hoagy's Corner, 943 P.2d 286, 294 (Wash. 1997) (Sanders,
J., dissenting).
123. See if. at 288.
124. See id. at 293-94
125. See id. at 288.
126. Many observers have concluded that the institution of the jury is difficult to
explain as a product of a desire for accuracy in fact-finding. Instead, they find the
value of the jury in securing popular judgment. See Atiyah & Summers, supra note 1,
at 174-75; see also Wolfram, supra note 43, at 671-72 (arguing that this was also the
view of the anti-federalists who fought for the seventh amendment, and concluding
that "[t]hose who favored the civil jury were not misguided tinkerers with procedural
devices; they were, for the day, libertarians who avowed that important areas of
protection for litigants in general, and for debtors in particular, would be placed in
grave danger unless it were required that juries sit in civil cases." (footnote omitted)).
Wolfram tells a nuanced story drawing on reports from the state constitutional
conventions. He observes that the defense of the right to jury trial was usually joined
with pleas for debtors oppressed by non-local creditors, with no one ever explicitly
arguing that the jury was to protect the creditors. See Wolfram, supra note 43, at 673-
77. He concludes that the speakers were troubled by the prospect of the jury finding
against the law. See i at 704-05.
127. See 9 Wright & Miller, supra note 73, § 2301 (collecting some classic eulogies
to the jury); Leon Green, Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 Yale L.J. 482, 483-88
(1956) [hereinafter Green, Jury Trial] (stating eloquently many of these arguments).
Of course, there are corresponding vices to giving the jury a large role, including cost,
the accompanying formalization of trial procedures and restrictions on evidence,
bringing more passion and prejudice into the administration of the law,
unpredictability, and the burden on jurors themselves of service. See Paul D.
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in touch with popular values;t 2 (2) serving as a guard against excessive
rigidity in the law;129 (3) independence; (4) the symbolic value of rule
by the people;' ° (5) the advantage of numbers in decision-making;"'
(6) the expertise ordinary people bring;132 (7) providing judges political
cover for unpopular decisions; 33 (8) education of the people about the
law through jury service;3 and (9) the greater drama a jury trial brings
to the administration of justice.135 The first two virtues rest almost
Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U. Chi.
Legal F. 33, 39-41 (stating well the case against the civil jury).
128. See Abramson, supra note 70, at 2-13 (making an eloquent and thoughtful
non-academic defense of the jury as an institution of deliberative democracy); Green,
Jury Trial, supra note 127, at 483 ("It offers an assurance of judgment by neighbors
who understand the community climate of values.., and a means of softening the
cold letter of the law in cases of hardship."); James, Functions of Judge, supra note 78,
at 685-87 (emphasizing that the jury's virtue is in its ability to keep the law in touch
with popular culture).
129. See Bohlen, supra note 78, at 116; Guido Calabresi & Philip Bobbitt, Tragic
Choices 57-64 (1978) (identifying a related virtue and some accompanying vices that
are a product of the combination of the unexplained nature of jiiry decisions and the
representativeness of the jury). Their basic point is that we as a society are
uncomfortable with the choices among competing values in difficult decisions, and so
we prefer that decisions be unexplained. See Calabresi & Bobbitt, supra, at 57
("[G]iving no reasons, it avoids, or at least mitigates, the conflict between the wish to
recognize differences and the desire to affirm egalitarianism in all its forms."). The
authors argue that this arrangement is unstable if decisions recur because either the
decisions will form a pattern revealing the rationale or they will come to seem
arbitrary.
A related argument is that moral judgments in negligence are given to the jury
because we believe that there are multiple valid moral viewpoints from which to
resolve negligence claims. See Wells, supra note 79, at 2402-03. Wells argues that
through group deliberation and the need for consensus the jury counteracts individual
perceptive biases and diverse moral viewpoints, (hopefully) producing results that
meet a criteria she labels "local objectivity," meaning that people with different
viewpoints will come to agree on the outcome in the specific case. See id. at 2408-10.
Wells focuses on differences in moral viewpoints among individuals. See id. at 2402-
03. Calabresi and Bobbitt consider the conflict internal to the individual. See
Calibresi & Bobbitt, supra, at 17-28.
130. See Green, Jury Trial, supra note 127, at 483 (arguing that the jury is "a
symbol of political freedom, emphasizing the dignity of the citizen and the power of
the local community").
131. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the
Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1147, 1237-39 (1992)
(emphasizing this and the next factor in explaining why "[a] considerable body of
research both on actual juries and in well controlled trial simulations supports the
conclusion that juries make reasonable and rational decisions" (footnote omitted)).
Saks's main point is that we know very little about the operation of the tort system
and much that we think we know is probably wrong. See id. at 1149.
132. See Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664 (1873).
133. See Green, Jury Trial, supra note 127, at 483 ("[T]he trial judge still finds in
jury verdicts relief from making embarrassing judgments and protection against the
criticism that arises from an unpopular outcome of a trial.").
134. See Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. I 291-297 (Henry
Reeves trans., as rev. by Francis Bowen, Vintage Books 1945) (1835).
135. See Green, Judge and Jury, supra note 67, at 395 (making this argument
superbly); Marc Galanter, The Regulatory Function of the Civil Jury, in Verdict:
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entirely on the jury acting as moral arbiter and very little on it acting
as fact-finder; while the next five rest at least partially on the jury
acting as moral arbiter. P.S. Atiyah puts much of this in a nutshell in
observing that the unusual significance of tort law in America and the
large role played by the jury is a product of American anti-statism,
distrust of centralized power, and distrust of rule by elites.'Y
Were we to accept that a commitment to popular judgment requires
that doubtful normative issues be put to the jury in negligence law, the
implications would be significant. It would mean that a judge could
not replace the reasonably prudent person standard with the Hand
formula unless he thought that this was not open to moral debate.
Also, a judge could not decide the issue of breach even though he
could formulate a bright-line rule to justify his decision unless he
thought the underlying normative judgment was not in doubt.
Negligence law does not go this far. A few courts have said that
before a rule of conduct can be laid down there must be a careful
balancing of concerns of policy and fairness, " and that the rule must
be "clearly supported by public policy."' ' But this is as far as courts
have gone in suggesting that judges ought to leave normatively
difficult issues for the jury to resolve, given the intended purposes of
juries. Usually courts seem untroubled by the reduction in the
normative discretion of a jury resulting from the substitution of a rule
of conduct or a less open-ended standard for the reasonably prudent
person standard. There are areas within accident law where the
standard of fault is cast in terms that do ask for a less open-ended
moral inquiry. In professional malpractice the standard is custom.'"
In products liability the dominant standard for design and warning
defects is risk-utiity.140 There has not been a hew and cry that these
Assessing the Civil Jury System 61, 89 (1993) ("Juries impede the collapse of
individualized decisionmaking into the stereotyping, cooperation and trade-offs of
routine processing .... ").
136. See P.S. Atiyah, Tort Law and the Alternatives: Some Anglo-American
Comparisons, 1987 Duke LJ. 1002,1017-18,1043-44.
137. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334,342 (Cal. 1976).
138. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561,564 (Cal. 1968).
139. The practical effect of the standard is that a plaintiff must produce expert
testimony from a person within the defendant's specialty or school of medicine. See
Melville v. Southward, 791 P.2d 383, 391 (Colo. 1990) (holding that testimony of an
orthopedic surgeon does not suffice in suit against podiatrist for malpractice in foot
surgery).
140. See Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 184 (Mich. 1984) (describing
risk-utility as "merely a detailed version of Judge Learned Hand's negligence
calculus"); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 (1998). Oddly,
several cases hold that it is not reversible error to fail to give a negligence instruction
where the plaintiff brings a negligence claim as well as a design defect claim because
the risk-utility instruction covers the same ground. See Lovick v. Wil-Rich, 588
N.W.2d 688, 699 (Iowa 1999); Estate of Hunter v. General Motors Corp., 729 So. 2d
1264,1277 (Miss. 1999); see also St. Germain v. Husqvarna Corp., 544 A.2d 1283, 1286
(Me. 1988) (holding that it was not reversible error to fail to submit design defect
claim to the jury because negligence instruction expressed standard as risk-utility). It
1999]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
standards intrude upon the moral discretion of the jury. And when
judges have tried to formulate rules to define the standard of conduct
in a given situation, the usual complaint is that the rules do not work,
and not that the very enterprise of formulating a rule intrudes upon
the role of the jury as moral arbiter."
To justify this odd pattern-the jury decides fault even when no fact
is in doubt but there is no impediment to a judge taking the normative
issue from the jury by laying down a rule or a more precise standard-
it is useful to think of power being allocated between judge and jury
by weighing competing values on a scale. On one side of this scale are
the values of popular judgment. On the other side are the values of
satisfying what Lon Fuller described as the demands of the "inner
morality of law"-"make the law known, make it coherent and clear,
see that your decisions as an official are guided by it, etc."'142
Once the matter is thought of in this way it makes a great deal of
sense why a judge can decide what is inappropriate conduct in a case
where people could reasonably disagree on the matter only if he can
do so by formulating a rule or standard that applies beyond the
immediate case. The inability to resolve a doubtful normative issue
through a rule or standard that reduces doubt and discretion in future
cases removes Fuller's values from the balance, and so swings the
scale decisively in favor of having the jury decide what is
inappropriate conduct because of the value we place on popular
judgment. Coming at it from the other side, we place such a high
store on Fuller's values that the value of having a rule or a more
certain standard will always swamp the value of popular judgment.
Those courts that go further and insist that a normative issue can be
taken from a jury only if the answer is "clearly supported by public
policy" can be thought of as placing more relative value on popular
judgment on difficult normative issues and less relative value on
making the law known, coherent, and clear.
As we leave negligence law to examine other areas of law we will
find that judges often do make ad hoc decisions regarding culpability
or obligation. This begins right at the boundaries of negligence.
Some courts in replacing one of the traditional no-duty rules with a
standard have left it to the judge to administer the standard.143 These
decisions will seem less idiosyncratic after we examine contract law
is difficult to square these cases with cases holding that it is reversible error to give a
reasonableness instruction in a design defect case because the manufacturer is entitled
to a risk-utility instruction. See Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377, 386-88 (Tex.
1998).
141. See Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 102-03 (1934) (criticizing the
"stop, look, and listen" rule laid down by Justice Holmes in Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 69 (1927), without faulting Holmes for having
infringed on the role of the jury).
142. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 42 (rev. ed. 1969).
143. See supra notes 97-110.
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for in contract law the jury is given virtually no say on normative
issues. Traditionally, this has been so even when an issue is resolved
on an ad hoe basis. I infer from this that in the realm of contract law
professional judgment on normative issues is valued over popular
judgment for reasons that, in some respects, are independent of the
value of having a rule. Juries are also given no say on normative
issues in administering doctrines in tort and restitution that protect
economic interests, with the singular exception of the doctrine of
abuse of a confidential relationship.
B. Intentional Torts
Historically, the jury has had little say on normative issues in
administering the torts of battery, assault, trespass, and conversion-
the primary torts redressing intentional physical injuries-except in
assessing punitive damages (admittedly a rather big exception). This
is because these torts take the form of categorical rules that, on their
face, ask for no normative judgment at the point of application.
Normative considerations can, and probably do, influence decisions
made in the administration of these rules in cases where the terms of
the rule apply ambiguously. It is assumed that judges resolve these
definitional issues. For example, the judge decides whether grabbing
a tray out of a person's hand is a touching of their person that could
be a battery- , and whether emitting light or gas on a person's land is a
sufficient physical invasion to be a trespass."'
When an intentional tort to person or property takes a form that
does ask for normative judgment at the point of application, the
normative issue is given to the jury. For example, one definition of
battery makes the offensiveness of a touching an element.141 This issue
is for the jury.17 The issue of what is outrageous conduct under the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is also given to the
jury in most states.141 The willingness to turn these issues over to the
jury suggests that the small role the jury has played historically in
deciding normative issues under the intentional physical torts is a
product of the law's form, or, more precisely, our desire for rules, and
144. See Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. 1967).
145. See Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 797-98 (Or. 1959);
Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 198 P.2d 847, 858 (Or. 1948). This presents
a bit of a puzzle. How is the determination that an event is a "touching" different
from the determination that an event is "foreseeable," which is assumed to be a
question for the jury? I think the difference is that the term "foreseeability" is vague
through and through while the term "touching" seems to have a determinate meaning
until we are confronted with a doubtful case. We think that in defining touching in
the odd case the judge is refining the rule even though the odd case may not recur.
146. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 18(1) (1965).
147. See Whitley v. Andersen, 551 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976); Snyder v.
Turk, 627 N.E.2d 1053,1058 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
148. See Gergen, Grudging Defense, supra note 96, at 1703-13.
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nothing else. We seem comfortable with ordinary intuitive morality in
this area once we choose to forego rules.
The history of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
has another lesson to teach.149 Before the infliction tort was created
judges stretched the torts of battery, assault, and trespass to provide
redress for outrageous conduct that inflicted severe mental anguish.1o
Advocates of the infliction tort argued that one of its virtues was its
transparency. The decisions stretching the categorical torts had a
spurious quality because judges were seen as manipulating rules based
on moral judgments that had no referent in the terms of the rules.
Transparency seems an unalloyed good. But the law is littered with
spurious rules. Years ago, Leon Green said that the law of fraud had
this characterY Green could have said the same thing about much of
contract law in his day (particularly the parol evidence rule, about
which this can still be said52) or the law of negligence regarding the
obligations of landowners, A sometimes overlooked virtue of
spurious rules is that they enable the judge to decide factual or
normative issues that might otherwise have to go to the jury. If we are
to do away with spurious rules without turning a great deal of power
over to the jury, then we must separate who decides an issue from the
form in which the decision is cast.
III. CONTRACT LAW
In classical contract law, the jury had no normative role in deciding
obligation. Because the key issues of assent, meaning, and damages
149. See Keeton, supra note 92, at 64-69 (discussing the effects of the shift from
"particularized" to "generalized" doctrine).
150. See Gergen, Grudging Defense, supra note 96 at 1704-06.
151. See Green, Judge and Jury, supra note 67, at 311 ("[Tjhe elaborate formula
with its multitude of sub-formulas with their variations which have been evolved,
permit the judge to range as freely as his judgment dictates.").
152. The concepts of integrated agreement, completely integrated agreement, and
inconsistent and collateral terms all have an elastic meaning and are issues for the
judge. See John Henry Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 2426 (1940). Section 2426
states in part:
[T]he rigid control of the jury influenced the judges, indirectly, by leading
them to keep from the jury all alleged oral transactions which might be
misused by them to overturn the words of the writing.... If the parties were
allowed to put in averments extraneous to the writing, it must go to the jury,
and there was no telling what the jury might do; but if the judges took
exclusive charge, they could better control the situation.
See id.
153. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 113, § 62, at 432-34 (commenting that while
the traditional rules were seen as "harshly mechanical, unduly complex, and overly
protective of property interests," the movement to abolish them "came to a
screeching halt" in 1979, in part due to dissatisfaction with the "shifting of the
decisional balance of power to the jury from the judge"); see also James A.
Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51
Ind. L.J. 467, 468-69 (1976) [hereinafter Henderson, Expanding] (warning that
principled decision-making may be replaced with decisions by whim).
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are, at their core, issues of fact, we might have expected the jury to
play a large role in deciding obligation in contract.'$ But everywhere
in classical contract law the jury was hemmed in by rules. The
classical law of offer and acceptance consisted of a set of highly formal
rules that enabled the judge to decide the issue of assent in many
cases. The mirror image rule, which requires that an acceptance
precisely mirror an offer to be effective, was a familiar example of
such a rule.S The doctrine of indefinitenessM and the doctrine
requiring that damages be proven with reasonable certainty," both
enabled a judge to take from the jury the issues of interpretation and
damages when he thought that there was too much uncertainty about
the answer. These doctrines have weakened considerably in this
century m Still, some formal rules persist. For example, the Statute of
Frauds eliminates entire categories of claims that the "common man"
might be sympathetic to, most obviously in the employment area.1
154. Some quasi-factual issues are decided by the judge. One of these is the
existence of consideration to support enforcing a promise. See State v. Larsen, 515
N.W.2d 178, 181 (N.D. 1994); Brownwood Ross Co. v. Maverick County, 936 S.W.2d
42, 45-46 (Tex. App. 1996); Beesley v. Harris, 883 P.2d 1343, 1351 (Utah 1994);
Lloyd's Credit Corp. v. Marlin Management Servs., Inc., 614 A.2d 812, 815 (Vt. 1992);
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Watson, 840 P.2d 851,860 (Wash. 1992). But see Hill
v. Chubb Life Am. Ins. Co., 894 P.2d 701, 707 (Ariz. 1995) (stating that the adequacy
of consideration is a factual question). Under the bargain theory, consideration
should be a factual issue.
Another, more normative, issue decided by the judge is whether reliance is such
that justice requires enforcement of a promise not supported by consideration. See
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 392 (Minn. 1992) (holding that justice
required enforcement of a reporter's promise of confidentiality to source); Hoffman
v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. 133 N.W.2d 267, 275 (Wis. 1965). The historic roots of
promissory estoppel in equity have led some courts to treat the entire matter as an
issue for the judge.
155. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 59 (1979).
156. See Weddington Prods., Inc. v. Flick, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265,278 (C. App. 1998)
(holding that uncertainty was too great to make contract enforceable); Oceanmark
Bank, F.S.B. v. Stubblefield, 496 S.E.2d 465, 467 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (same);
America's Favorite Chicken Co. v. Samaras, 929 S.W.2d 617, 621 (Tex. App. 1996)
(holding that the essential terms were sufficiently definite to enforce the contract);
Shetney v. Shetney, 181 N.W.2d 516, 521-22 (Wis. 1970) (holding that uncertainty was
too great to make the contract enforceable). But see Management Computer Servs.,
Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 557 N.W.2d 67,75 (Wis. 1996) (stating that issue
of indefiniteness may be decided by judge or jury).
157. See Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 Ul1. App. 542, 549-50 (1932)
(holding that a plaintiff was not allowed to use expert testimony to prove lost profits
on a boxing match because the matter was too speculative); Coonis v. Rogers, 429
S.W.2d 709,714 (Mo. 1968) (holding the same for commercial businesses); Cell, Inc. v.
Ranson Investors, 427 S.E.2d 447, 450 (W. Va. 1992) (holding the same for grocery
sales). It is difficult to find a recent decision in which a judge takes the question of
damages from the jury on this ground where there is some evidence of damages.
158. Robert A. Hillman reviews the history of the decline of rules and the
ascendance of standards in contract law this century by tracing the ongoing conflict
between contextualists (proponents of standards) and neo-formalists (proponents of
rules). See Robert A. Hillman, The Richness of Contract Law 125-71 (1997).
159. Courts that follow the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 139 by
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Karl Llewellyn, the principal author of the Uniform Commercial
Code, advocated a less rule-bound and more flexible approach to
determining assent, meaning, and damages, and his views are reflected
in the text and commentary of the Code.160 Llewellyn understood that
such an approach placed greater reliance on the fact-finder and so he
proposed using merchant juries to resolve disputes between
merchants. His proposal was rejected.16, A significant issue facing
contract law in the future is whether the shift from rules to standards
will increase the jury's role so that eventually the jury will play a
significant role in shaping the morality of contract law.162 A related
issue is whether fear of the jury will induce judges to embrace an
overly rule-bound approach.
A. Classical Contract Law
Interpretation is the logical place to start in analyzing the division of
power between judge and jury to decide obligation in contract law, for
it is here that the issue is faced most squarely. While interpretation is
a question of fact, it can be influenced by the values of the interpreter.
Judge Cardozo famously made this point in holding that a term should
not be interpreted as a condition when it would result in
disproportionate forfeiture.3 He observed that "[f]rom the
conclusion that promises may not be [so] treated.., without a
sacrifice of justice, the progress is a short one to the conclusion that
they may not be so treated without a perversion of intention. ' 'I4 The
fact that interpretation can be influenced by the values of the
making an exception to the Statute of Frauds to protect reliance treat the question of
whether justice is furthered by making an exception as for the judge. See, e.g., Steams
v. Emery-Waterhouse Co., 596 A.2d 72, 74 (Me. 1991) (holding that justice is not
furthered by making an exception to protect an employee who alleged an oral
promise of job security).
160. See U.C.C. § 1-106(1) cmt. 1 (1999) ("[Rjeject[ing] any doctrine that damages
must be calculable with mathematical accuracy."); id. § 1-205 cmt. 1 (stating that
courts should look to "commercial context" to "explain and supplement even the
language of a formal or final writing"); id. § 2-202 cmt. 1 (rejecting the "plain
meaning" rule and the "four-comers" rule in interpretation); id. § 2-204(3) (stating
that a contract shall not fail for indefiniteness so long as there is a reasonably certain
basis for a remedy); id. § 2-207 (abolishing the "mirror-image" rule).
161. See generally Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and
Discretionary Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 169, 202-09 (1989) [hereinafter Patterson, Good Faith] (telling
Llewellyn's story); Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn
and the Merchant Rules, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 465, 512-15 (1987) (same).
162 See Atiyah & Summers, supra note 1, at 83-88 (observing the shift from rules
to standards in American contract law); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Responsive
Model of Contract Law, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1107, 1167 (1984) ("[Ijn modem times,
contract theory has evolved away from the rigidities of the classical model, into a
supple instrument consisting of principles that are intellectually coherent but also
responsive to intentions and circumstances.").
163. See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921).
164. Id.
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interpreter is not thought to give the jury the prerogative to impose its
values through interpretation. Quite the opposite. In fact, a concern
that the personal values of jurors may influence interpretation is
thought to be a reason for constraining the role of the jury in
interpretation. 16
The assumption that the jury should not impose its values in
interpreting contracts underlies the distinction Corbin drew between
contract interpretation and contract construction. Corbin defined
interpretation as deciding what the parties actually intended and
construction as deciding what, as a matter of policy or fairness, was
reasonable.166 Thus, he treated gap-filling as contract construction
because terms were implied based on what was reasonable, rather
than on what the parties intended.16 Corbin said that construction is
always a matter for the judge' 61 while interpretation is sometimes for
the jury.16
Power is allocated between judge and jury in contract interpretation
primarily by rules that restrict the evidence used in interpretation and
give the judge power to interpret certain types of evidence. At one
extreme is the infamous "four-corners" rule, which forbids looking
beyond a written agreement when it is not ambiguous on its face,
making the interpretation of an unambiguous writing an issue for the
judge.70 The four-corners rule and its cousin, the "plain meaning"
rule, which holds that words of plain and unequivocal meaning are so
construed without regard to the parties' actual intent, m have fallen
165. See Charles T. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device
for Control of the Jury, 41 Yale LJ. 365,366-69 (1932).
166. See 3 Arthur L Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 534, at 9 (1960) [hereinafter
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts] ("By 'interpretation of language' we determine what
ideas that language induces in other persons. By 'construction of the contract,' as that
term will be used here, we determine its legal operation .... "). Later statements show
that Corbin thought that construction was driven by concerns of social policy. See id. §
534, at 14. The gray zone between interpretation and construction is where the
parties' understanding is determined by imaginatively putting oneself in their position
and asking how one would feel. See id. § 536, at 34-35. Corbin calls this
"interpretation" though he concedes that the meaning chosen was probably "that
[which] some imaginary reasonable, prudent, and intelligent man would have had."
Id. § 536, at 35; see also Lawrence A. Cunningham & Arthur J. Jacobson, Corbin on
Contracts § 554B, at 357 (Supp. 1999) ("Some doctrines of contract interpretation are
not designed to find the intentions of the parties, but to advance social policies which
are in need of judicial protection."); Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and
Construction of Contracts, 64 Colum. I. Rev. 833, 837-38 (1964) [hereinafter
Patterson, Interpretation] (following Corbin in insisting on the usefulness of the
distinction between interpretation and construction). Patterson gives as an example
of construction determining whether a term is unfair, which, he says, is a court's
exclusive function. See id. at 838. Another example of construction is the principle of
contra proferentem. See id. at 835.
167. See 3 Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, supra note 166, § 534, at 11-12.
168. See id. § 554, at 227.
169. See id. §554, at 222-23.
170. See Air Safety, Inc. v. Teachers Realty Corp., 706 N.E.2d 882,884 (11. 1999).
171. See 2 William F. Elliott, Elliott on Contracts, § 1506, at 775 (1913) (giving a
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out of favor in most states.17 Even with the demise of the "four-
corners" rule the role of the jury in interpretation is constrained in
various ways. Some states allow a judge to consider extrinsic evidence
in deciding whether a writing is ambiguous. 173 Broadening the
evidence considered tends to eliminate ambiguity for often doubt
about the meaning of words is eliminated once they are put in context.
Interpretation becomes an issue for the judge on the general principle
that the judge decides factual issues about which there is no doubt.174
Some states make the interpretation of even an ambiguous written
agreement an issue for the judge when extrinsic evidence is not
relevant."7 Other states make interpretation an issue for the judge
strong statement of this rule). Critics of the objective interpretation rule have argued
that the rule was grounded on a naive view of language. See, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin,
The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 Cornell L.Q. 161, 187
(1965) [hereinafter Corbin, Interpretation] (advocating the use of extrinsic evidence
for contractual interpretation). The old treatises do not bear this out. The rule is
justified instead by necessity: there is no better evidence. See Win. L. Clark, Jr., Clark
on Contracts § 240-44, at 564-65 (1894). Pollock develops this argument more fully.
He argues that the rule gets at the parties' actual understanding in nearly all cases and
that it is better to live with the occasional injustice than to open up the issue of
interpretation in all cases. See Frederick Pollock, Pollock on Contracts 260-61 (8th ed.
1911).
172. See U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 1(b) (1999) (rejecting the plain meaning rule);
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 202(1), 214(c) (1979) (same); 3 Corbin, Corbin
on Contracts, supra note 166, at § 542; 4 Samuel Williston & Walter H. E. Jaeger, A
Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 600A, at 299 (3d ed. 1961) ("In interpreting
contracts or clauses set forth in 'clear and unambiguous' language, the courts do not
confine themselves to a mere inspection of the document. Before committing
themselves, the courts carefully examine the surrounding circumstances, nprir
negotiations, and all other relevant incidents bearing on the intent of the parties.").
The First Restatement of Contracts adopted an objective standard for interpreting
unambiguous writings. See Restatement (First) of Contracts § 230 (1932). A writing
was read from the perspective of an intelligent observer even though that reading
diverged from the parties' actual understanding so long as the meaning was
unambiguous. See id. § 230 cmts. b, h. But it rejected the plain meaning rule. See id.
The observer was assumed "to have knowledge of all operative usages [ I as well as of
other accompanying circumstances." Id. § 230 cmt. a. Ambiguous writings were
interpreted under the same standard as unwritten contracts by taking account of the
parties' actual understanding. See id. §§ 231 & 233.
173. See Pesino v. Atlantic Bank of N.Y., 709 A.2d 540, 545 (Conn. 1998);
Freelander v. G. & K. Realty Corp., 258 N.E.2d 786,788 (Mass. 1970); Moller v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 566 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Neb. 1997); Border States Paving,
Inc. v. State, 574 N.W.2d 898, 902 (S.D. 1998); Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393
(Tex. 1983); United Ry. Supply & Serv., Ltd. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 535 A.2d 325,
327 (Vt. 1987); W.J. Schafer Assocs., Inc. v. Cordant, Inc., 493 S.E.2d 512, 515 (Va.
1997).
174. See 3 Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, supra note 166, § 554.
175. Under this rule, the judge interprets an ambiguous written agreement if no
probative extrinsic evidence is introduced. See Schoemer v. Hanes & Assocs., 693
N.E.2d 1333, 1339 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Univ. Nat'l Bank v. Wolfe, 369 A.2d 570, 575
n.7 (Md. 1977); Turner v. Alpha Phi Sorority House, 276 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Minn. 1979).
This seems to be the position of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. See
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212(2) (stating that the interpretation of an
integrated agreement is to be determined as a question of law unless "it depends on
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even if extrinsic evidence is relevant so long as there is no issue of
credibility.'76 Overlaying these rules defining the role of judge and
jury are other rules limiting the interpretive discretion of both judge
and jury. One such rule requires that an obligation implied from trade
usage or custom be fairly specific and that it be proven by objective
evidence.1-
the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable inferences to be
drawn from extrinsic evidence"); see also 4 Williston, supra note 172, § 616, at 663
(taking the same position as the Restatement).
Justice Newman's concurrence in Antilles S.S. Co., v. Members of American Hull
Insurance Syndicate is a thoughtful attempt to justify this rule. See 733 F.2d 195, 204-
05 (2d Cir. 1984). He makes several arguments. According to Judge Newman, the
judge is making law by saying how certain words will be read. See id. Corbin derided
the view that in interpreting contracts judges gave words a legal meaning. See 3
Corbin on Contracts, supra note 166, § 554, at 219 n.60. His view was that legal
precedent was relevant to interpretation only if there was a reason to believe the
parties had that precedent in mind in contracting. See id. Better arguments made by
Judge Newman include the need for certainty in contract, the expertise of judges, and
the non-factual character of many contract disputes. See id. at 220. Judge Newman
notes the contrast of the practice in contract law with that in negligence law, and
justifies it by the greater need for certainty in contract law. In Antilles, he stated that:
On the contrary, rather than wish for the leavening influence of a jury to
decide in tort cases under what circumstances a person's conduct should
render him liable for another's injuries, we should deem it in the public
interest in contract cases to have as much certainty as possible as to the
meaning of contracts, especially those involving terms used by others beyond
the contracting parties. And, unlike most tort cases, the facts of a contract
breach are frequently undisputed, requiring determination only of the
applicable standard to be derived from the words of the contract.
Antilles, 733 F.2d at 206-07. A variation on this rule does not restrict it to the
interpretation of a writing. The judge interprets an agreement whether it is written or
oral when interpretation involves giving meaning to words and the words themselves
are not in dispute. Clear statements of this rule can be found in old treatises. See
Clark, supra note 171, § 240; Elliott, supra note 171, § 1564; 4 William Herbert Page,
Page on the Law of Contracts § 2061 (2d ed. 1920).
176. Under this rule the judge interprets an agreement where all the evidence is
documentary even if extrinsic evidence is relevant. See Parsons v. Bristol Dev. Co.,
402 P.2d 839, 842 (Cal. 1965) (en banc); Jordan v. Patterson, 35 A. 521,522-23 (Conn.
1896); Mallad Constr. Corp. v. County Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 344 N.Y.S.2d 925,932
(1973); see also R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1077
(Utah 1997) (discussing situations where no extrinsic evidence is necessary). This rule
and the preceding rule may differ little in practical consequence from a rule that turns
interpretation over to a jury once a writing is found to be ambiguous. It is natural,
once a writing is found to be ambiguous, to ask the parties what they thought it
meant. The issue then becomes one of credibility, which makes it one for the jury.
177. See Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 806 (9th Cir.
1981) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (making this point succinctly in a concurring opinion
to one of the more liberal decisions in the area). In Nanakuli, Judge Kennedy
warned:
Our opinion should not be interpreted to permit juries to import price
protection or a similarly specific contract term from a concept of good faith
that is not based on well-established custom and usage or other objective
standards of which the parties had clear notice.... In my view, these are
necessary predicates for either theory of the case, namely, interpretation of
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The jury plays an even smaller role in contract construction. It is
well-established that the judge decides whether to excuse a contract
due to changed circumstances under the doctrines of
impracticability,178 impossibility, 79 and frustration of purpose;w
whether a stipulated damages clause is unenforceable as a penalty; " ,
the contract based on the course of its performance or a finding that good
faith required the seller to hold the price.
Id. at 806. The majority opinion echoes this in explaining the role of usage in
interpretation. See id. at 794-805. It laid down two guidelines: "First, the court must
allow a check on usage evidence by demanding that it be sufficiently definite and
widespread to prevent unilateral post-hoc revision of contract terms by one party." Id.
at 803. Second usage may only "qualify" the express terms of the agreement, meaning
to "cut down" express terms although not to negate them entirely. Id. at 805. Some
cases require that usage be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See Joseph H.
Levie, Trade Usage and Custom Under the Common Law and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 40 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1101, 1102 n.5 (1965) (collecting pre-UCC
cases).
178. See Opera Co. of Boston Inc. v. Wolf Trap Found. for Performing Arts, 817
F.2d 1094, 1102-03 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that foreseeability of an event is
determined by the judge); T.S.I. Holdings, Inc. v. Jenkins, 924 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Kan.
1996) ("Whether a party should be excused from its obligations under a written
agreement because of impracticability of performance is a question of law.");
Restatement (Second) of Contracts ch. 11, introductory note, at 309-10 (1979) (stating
that the availability of the defense of impracticability is a question to be decided by
the court); E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 9.6, at 544 (2d ed. 1990) ("Although
these requirements involve questions of fact, courts have sometimes been reluctant to
entrust the granting of excuse on this ground [impracticability] to a jury.").
Some cases give the jury a larger role in deciding mutual mistake. See Inland
Wetlands and Watercourses Agency v. Landmark Inv. Group, Inc., 590 A.2d 968, 971
(Conn. 1991) ("Whether there has been [a mutual] mistake is a question of fact.").
Probably this derives from the large role that subjective understanding plays in the
doctrine of mutual mistake. A contract will be voided on grounds of mutual mistake
only if the parties shared an understanding about a material fact that was not true.
What the jury decides in a mutual mistake case has been cut more finely. See
Thompson-Arthur Paving Co. v. Lincoln Battleground Assocs., 382 S.E.2d 817, 822
(N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that whether party assumed the risk of a mistake
because he knew or had limited knowledge on the matter is a question for the jury).
Davenport Bank and Trust Co. v. State Cent. Bank, 485 N.W.2d 476, 480 (Iowa 1992),
holds that whether a party agreed to bear the risk of a mistake is a question of law.
See id. at 481. This is possible because in Iowa the interpretation of a written contract
is a question for the court. See id. at 480. Matters other than the parties' subjective
understanding tend to be decided by the judge. See Sunshine v. M. R. Mansfield
Realty, Inc., 575 P.2d 847,848-49 (Colo. 1978) (en banc) (stating and applying the rule
that when there is a mutual mistake the determination of the contract's meaning is an
issue of law for the judge and one upon which a court of appeals may freely pass).
179. See Sunflower Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Tomlinson Oil Co., 638 P.2d 963, 969 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the availability of the defense of impossibility is a
question of law). But see Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle Breeders v. Y-Tex Corp., 590 P.2d
1306, 1312 (Wyo. 1979) ("[T]he issue of impossibility of performance is a question
normally most suitable for determination by the trier of fact.").
180. See Mitchell v. Ceazan Tires, Ltd., 153 P.2d 53, 54 (Cal. 1944) ("The excuse of
frustration ... is a conclusion of law."); Washington State Hop Producers, Inc. v.
Goschie Farms, Inc., 773 P.2d 70, 75 (Wash. 1989) (en banc) ("Application of the
doctrine of frustration is a question of law and not a question of fact.").
181. See Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas B. Hartley Constr. Co., 375 S.E.2d 222,
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and whether a contract violates public policy.1a None of these
doctrines take the form of bright-line rules. Indeed some are difficult
to put into words. The jury's role under these doctrines is limited to
finding specific facts when a decision is seen as turning on specific
contested facts. For example, under the doctrine voiding contracts
against public policy, the jury may be asked to determine the motive
behind the contract when the motive is relevant.18 Thus, the jury
223 (Ga. 1989) (holding that the enforceability of liquidated damages clauses is a
question of law; in deciding it, however, the trial court must make a "tripartite
inquiry" which "requires the resolution of questions of fact"); Aurora Bus. Park
Assocs., L.P. v. Michael Albert, Inc., 548 N.W.2d 153, 155 (Iowa 1996) ("Whether a
contract provision is a valid liquidated damages clause or an unenforceable penalty is
a question of law for the court."); Wasserman's Inc. v. Township of Middletown, 645
A.2d 100, 110 (NJ. 1994) ("Although the question is one of law, it may require
resolution of underlying factual issues."); Phillips v. Phillips, 820 S.W.2d 785, 788
(Tex. 1991) (stating that the enforceability of a liquidated damages clause is a
question of law that nonetheless requires the resolution of predicate factual issues,
such as the amount of actual damages); Highgate Assocs. v. Merryfield, 597 A.2d
1280, 1282 (Vt. 1991) (same). Because of the factual nature of the issue, some
appellate courts defer to the judgment of the trial judge. See Illingworth v. Bushong,
688 P.2d 379, 390 (Or. 1984) (en banc) (stating that because the reasonableness of
liquidated damages is a question of fact, the appellate court should defer to the trial
judge's findings on the issue); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 858 P.2d
1363,1367 (Utah 1993) (same); Wassenaar v. Panos, 331 N.W.2d 357, 361 (Wis. 1983)(same).
182. See Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U.S. 657, 672 (1913)
(holding that the reasonableness of provisions for shortened claims periods in
contract of carriage is a question of law); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Mouyal, 422 S.E.2d
529, 531 (Ga. 1992) (discussing the reasonableness of a restrictive covenant in an
employment contract); Steams v. Williams, 240 P.2d 833, 837 (Idaho 1952) (discussing
agreement to give part interest in real estate to a government official); Trotter v.
Nelson, 684 N.E.2d 1150, 1152-55 (Ind. 1997) (discussing validity of alleged referral
fee agreement); Straub v. B.M.T., 645 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ind. 1994) (discussing
mother's prenatal promise to release the father from his child-support duties);
Brignull v. Albert, 666 A.2d 82, 84 (Me. 1995) (discussing reasonableness of non-
competition covenant); Ploen v. Union Ins. Co., 573 N.W.2d 436, 441-42 (Neb. 1998)
(discussing coverage restrictions in a motorist insurance policy); Jewel Box Stores
Corp. v. Morrow, 158 S.E.2d 840, 843 (N.C. 1968) (discussing reasonableness of a
covenant not to compete); Hargrave v. Canadian Valley Elec. Coop., Inc., 792 P.2d
50, 58-59 (Okla. 1990) (discussing rate discrimination by a public utility); Peyton v.
Margiotti, 156 A.2d 865, 868 (Pa. 1959) (discussing validity of a contingent fee
agreement made with an attorney to secure release from prison); Durapin, Inc. v.
American Prods., Inc., 559 A.2d 1051, 1053 (R.I. 1989) (discussing reasonableness of
non-competition covenant); Jasper v. Smith, 540 N.W.2d 399, 403 (S.D. 1995)
(discussing the attachment of an attorney's lien to an alimony award); Littlefield v.
Schaefer, 955 S.W.2d 272, 274 (Tex. 1997) (stating that whether a release is
sufficiently conspicuous to be enforceable is a question of law); Travel Masters, Inc. v.
Star Tours, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex. 1991) (discussing the reasonableness of a
covenant not to compete); Rollins Burdick Hunter of Wis., Inc. v. Hamilton, 304
N.W.2d 752,756 (Wis. 1981) (stating that the reasonableness of a restrictive covenant
is question of law though it is fact-sensitive and not amenable to "per se" rules).
183. See Merchants Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Cotnam, 34 So. 2d 122, 130 (Ala. 1948)(holding that where the consideration must be inferred, the consideration's legality is
a question of fact for the jury); Bell v. Pierson, Morris 29, 32 (Iowa 1839) (holding
that jury decides only on the truth of the facts allegedly constituting illegality); First
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decides the factual question whether a contract between lovers was a
bargain for sex, which would violate public policy (though I suspect in
these cases that judges put the factual question to the jury partly out
of their discomfort with the moral issues raised), l 4 Similarly, when a
contractor seeks to recover additional expenses, the question whether
he had assumed the risk of the overrun by the terms of the contract,
therefore barring recovery, may be put to the jury if the answer to that
question is not apparent from the agreement itself.1e
The law of contract construction looks like the photo negative of
negligence law. The jury has a say only when an outcome flows from
the facts as a matter of rule. Non-rule-based decisions are made by
the judge. That this is not thought to intrude on the role of the jury as
the fact-finder is attributable to the rules on contract interpretation.
Many factual issues, such as the foreseeability of an event, will not
turn on credibility, and so need not be put to the jury. Those that
might turn on credibility, principally issues about the parties'
understanding, often are resolved from objective evidence under the
rules on interpretation.
The jury's role in classical contract law most resembles its role in
negligence law when it is asked to decide whether there is an implied-
in-fact contract.'8 The question of the existence of an implied-in-fact
contract is understood to be highly fact-sensitive and not amenable to
rules.'Y It is well-established that it is a question for the jury.'8 But
Nat'l Bank of Lewis v. Strawn, 67 P.2d 589, 592 (Kan. 1937) (holding that whether a
note was given to stop prosecution of a criminal charge is a question of fact for thejury); Berg v. Plitt, 12 A.2d 609, 614 (Md. 1940) (holding that the legality of
designating one person as a bidder for a group at an auction depends on the group's
intent, which is a question of fact for the jury); Cirulli v. Licata, 77 A.2d 288, 290-91
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1950) (holding that it is a question for the jury to determine
if the motive for making a loan was for a legal purpose); Grover v. Bruere, 9 N.J.L.
319, 321 (1827) (holding that whether payment was made to abandon criminal
proceedings or to adjust other liabilities is a question of fact for the jury); Vodopest v.
MacGregor, 913 P.2d 779, 785 (Wash. 1996) (en banc) (holding that whether
defendant's conduct occurred in furtherance of a medical research project is a
question of fact).
184. See Green v. Richmond, 337 N.E.2d 691, 696 (Mass. 1975) (holding that when
the facts surrounding the making of a contract are in dispute, it is a fact question for
the jury whether a promise to make a will was in consideration for sexual
intercourse); Hill v. Westbrook's Estate, 247 P.2d 19, 21 (Cal. 1952) (en bane) (same);
Stewart v. Waterman, 123 A. 524, 526 (Vt. 1924) (same).
185. See Hensel Phelps Const. Co. v. King County, 787 P.2d 58, 61-62 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that the question of whether the contractor assumed the risk of
the overrun is one for the jury, unless the answer is based on whether it was apparent
on the face of the agreement, in which case the question is for the judge).
186. Another jury issue, similar to the breach issue in negligence, is whether a
person exercised ordinary care in failing to read a written agreement. See Hanson v.
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 865 S.W.2d 302, 307 (Ky. 1993); Cowart v.
Honeycutt, 125 S.E.2d 382, 387 (N.C. 1962) (holding that the question of whether the
failure to read a release that was fraudulently induced was one for the jury); Parks v.
Morris Homes Corp., 141 S.E.2d 129, 132 (S.C. 1965) (same).
187. See Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 688 P.2d 170, 174 (Ariz. 1984)
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even here the jury is given nothing resembling the normative
discretion it has in negligence cases. The question of the existence of
an implied-in-fact contract is not put to the jury in the same general
terms that the question of reasonableness is put to the jury in
negligence. For example, in a claim for payment for services rendered
without an express contract, the judge instructs the jury that it can find
an obligation only if the defendant requested the services or they were
rendered with his consent and it was reasonable for the plaintiff to
believe that the defendant would pay for the services.6 The jury is
not asked whether it would be reasonable or fair for the defendant to
pay for what he received.
The character of the instruction flows from the basis of obligation in
contract. A person's belief that he was under a moral obligation is not
a basis for finding a contract. 190 The basis of contract is the
understanding (actual or apparent) that conduct entails a contractual
obligation.19' The difference between moral and contractual
(en bane) (holding that the question of whether a policies manual was part of an
employment contract is a question of fact for the jury).
188. The most striking cases that endorse this uncontroversial proposition submit
to the jury the issue of whether there was an implied-in-fact term protecting an
employee from an arbitrary firing based on an employment manual and past practice.
See id. at 174; Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P2d 841, 848 (Kan. 1987). Some courts
struggle to avoid giving this issue to the jury. It has been held that no reasonable
person could find a contract when a manual has a disclaimer, even when the
disclaimer is inconspicuous. See Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303, 306
(Utah 1992); see also Garcia v. Uniwyo Fed. Credit Union, 920 P.2d 642, 645 (Vyo.
1996) (treating the issue as one of interpreting the manual and keeping it from the
jury if the manual is not ambiguous on its face). To establish an implied contract by
usage or custom, some cases require proof of clear and convincing evidence of a
regular practice. See Bailey v. Sewell Coal Co., 437 S.E.2d 448, 451 (NV. Va. 1993)
(rejecting claim for severance pay on this basis).
189. See Danforth v. Ruotolo, 650 A.2d 1334, 1335 (Me. 1994).
190. For the moment, I put aside the question whether the inquiry regarding
implied-in-law contracts is similarly morally obtuse. The short answer is that it is not,
but to appreciate that answer and its significance it is useful to consider the general
concept of unjust enrichment in restitution and the specific concept of abuse of a
confidential relationship.
191. It is tempting to substitute "beliefs about legal obligation" for "beliefs about
contractual obligation," but that would not be faithful to contract law. Generally, if
people manifest an intention to enter into an agreement of the type that the law
enforces-that is, a contract-they are obligated without regard to whether they
believed the agreement was legally binding. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
21 (1979) ("Neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is
essential to the formation of a contract, but a manifestation of intention that a
promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the formation of a contract.").
Plainly intention to be legally bound is not sufficient to create a contract. That is the
upshot of the abolition of the seal and the rejection of "peppercorn." If you take the
Restatement at face value, a shared intent not to be bound does not prevent a
contract from arising. But why, then, is a disclaimer effective under the second
clause? If an expressed understanding can negate obligation, why does a shared
subjective understanding fail to do so?
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990), suggests a more subtle
problem in insisting that beliefs about legal obligation are irrelevant. The case holds
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obligations is irrelevant to most implied-in-fact contracts because the
conduct gives rise to both sorts of obligation. But this difference can
be crucial. It is crucial when unmarried mates end a long-term
relationship and one claims a contractual right to assets held in the
name of the other. There is a moral obligation to treat one's long-
time mate fairly, even in ending a relationship. In most states,
however, this belief does not by itself serve as a basis for finding an
implied-in-fact contract.'9 Courts that choose not to throw out such
claims entirely on policy grounds (which they treat as a question for
the judge),193 struggle to say just what is required. A popular
formulation requires a finding of an understanding that services would
be paid for (a hard claim to make out) or property shared (an easier
claim, particularly when the plaintiff contributed money or labor to
the acquisition of the property).19
People criticize as naive the view that contract law is simply about
enforcing the agreements that people make because contract law
supplies terms to fill gaps in agreements and limits the agreements
that the state will enforce. That criticism is apt if we look at what
judges do in administering contracts. But when we look at what juries
do, there is considerable truth in the naive view. Under classical
contract law, the jury makes factual findings to assist in enforcing the
agreements people make. I turn now to the question of whether the
loosening of contract law through the interjection of standards of fair
dealing has altered the picture.
that an agreement between a reporter and his source to keep the identity of the
source confidential is not legally binding, although the agreement was a morally
binding bargain. See id. at 203. The court reasoned that the parties could not have
understood the agreement as legally binding. See id. The case raises the broader
question of what contract law's position should be regarding agreements that
traditionally the law has not enforced but where a legal obligation is not expressly
disclaimed. The early employment manual cases posed the same problem. In an
earlier era, courts dismissed these claims because of indefiniteness, inability to prove
damages, lack of consideration, or lack of a writing. The erosion of these barriers
brings to the fore the question of whether intent to be bound is necessary for the
formation of a contract. Cohen has a checkered history. The United States Supreme
Court reversed it, reasoning that the Minnesota Supreme Court erred in resting its
decision on the First Amendment. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672
(1991). On remand, the reporter prevailed. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479
N.W.2d 387, 388 (Minn. 1992).
192. But see Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 121 (Cal. 1976) (missing the point
when the court held that: "[I]n any event the better approach is to presume ... 'that
the parties intended to deal fairly with each other' (citation omitted)).
193. See Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1155-56 (N.Y. 1980).
194. See Carroll v. Lee, 712 P.2d 923, 927 (Ariz. 1986); In re Estate of Alexander,
445 So. 2d 836, 837-39 (en banc) (Miss. 1984); Beal v. Beal, 577 P.2d 507, 510-11 (Or.
1978); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 314 (Wis. 1987) (pushing the boundary of this
approach by finding an implied-in-fact contract upon a tacit understanding of a vague
nature that the parties would share the property equally); Shaw v. Smith, 964 P.2d
428, 436 (Wyo. 1998).
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B. Standards of Fair Dealing
The standards of fair dealing-the most important of these being
the standard of good faith and fair dealing-might seem to belie the
claim that the jury plays no role in deciding normative issues in
contract law. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts expresses the
dominant view that the standard of good faith is very much like the
reasonableness standard in negligence. The Restatement says that the
meaning of good faith cannot be defined by rules because it varies
contextually with the touchstone finally being "community standards
of decency, fairness or reasonableness."15 While the Restatement
does not say whether good faith is an issue for judge or jury, the
logical implication given this conception of good faith is that it is an
issue for the jury. Several cases draw this conclusion.'9 Other courts,
drawing the same conclusion, reject the doctrine of good faith for the
stated reason that it gives the jury too much power.'1 This same
concern, while unstated, may underlie some of the many decisions
that shear the doctrine of much of its power.,"
This part shows that the jury does not play as large a role in
administering the standard of good faith as is supposed. I expand the
argument to include the doctrines of duress and non-disclosure for
they raise a similar issue. This part demonstrates that while the spirit
of these doctrines may be captured by a standard of fair dealing, their
195. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a.
196. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin, 908 P .d 493,499 (Colo. 1995) (en banc); Sons of
Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 690 A.2d 575,584 (NJ. 1997); Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d
552, 564 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Carmichael v. Adirondack Bottled Gas Corp., 635
A.2d 1211,1217 (Vt. 1993); see also John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, Contracts
§ 11-38(c), at 511 (3d ed. 1987) (drawing the same conclusion); Steven J. Burton,
Breach of Contract and the Connzon Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 Harv. L.
Rev. 369, 370 n.6 (1980) (drawing the same conclusion). But see 3 Corbin, Corbin on
Contracts, supra note 166, at § 654B (stating that while "[g]ood faith always involves
questions of fact. ... it often involves questions of law").
197. See English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983).
198. Some cases insist that the doctrine of good faith may not be used to
supplement or to alter the obligations expressed in a contract. Under this view, the
doctrine exists only to ensure that parties to a contract performed their obligations in
good faith. See, e.g., Comcoa, Inc. v. NEC Tels., Inc., 931 F.2d 655, 665 (10th Cir.
1991) (considering express language and good faith together); Alan's of Atlanta, Inc.
v. Minolta Corp., 903 F.2d 1414, 1429 (11th Cir. 1990) (rejecting claim that implied
covenant was a contract term); Government St. Lumber Co. v. AmSouth Bank, 553
So. 2d 68,73 (Ala. 1989) (finding that a party cannot be required to surrender a right
he possesses in the name of good faith); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A2d 1131, 1143
(Del. 1990) (stating that the implied covenant of good faith "cannot override the
literal terms of an agreement"); Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah
1991) (preventing implied covenant of good faith from substantively limiting
employer's right to discharge); Badgett v. Security State Bank, 807 P.2d 356, 360
(Wash. 1991) (en banc) (finding that requirement of good faith does not inject
substantive terms in the contract); see also Tanner v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc.,
582 So. 2d 449, 452 (Ala. 1991) (refusing to enforce an express good faith clause in a




corporeal bodies consist largely of rules. Judges use these rules in
determining what is fair dealing. The limited role the jury plays in
deciding what is inappropriate conduct under these doctrines can be
explained entirely as a product of the procedural difficulty of
separating factual and normative issues on a case by case basis.
Unlike negligence law, no independent value is placed on popular
judgment regarding what is inappropriate conduct.
The claim that the law of duress is shaped around a set of rules that
define inappropriate conduct in categorical terms should ruffle few
feathers. Unlike good faith, there is as yet no general norm that is
thought to encapsulate all of duress.199 Dawson proposed such a norm
in a justly renowned Article a half century ago when he argued that
duress is best understood as protecting against the extraction of
excessive gain from the exercise of an imbalance of bargaining
power.2 His re-conceptualization of the doctrine never caught on,
though his concept of "economic duress" did.1 The heart and soul of
the law of duress is in the definition of improper threat.2° Most types
of improper threats are defined by rules that do not require a
199. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176 (stating seven rules or standards
to define an improper threat).
200. See John P. Dawson, Economic Duress: An Essay in Perspective, 45 Mich. L.
Rev. 253, 282-90 (1947).
201. See Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 584 P.2d
15, 23-25 (Alaska 1978) (finding duress where buyer withheld amounts due under
contract to coerce seller who was in desperate financial straits to settle for much less).
202. Duress requires an improper threat that leaves the victim no reasonable
alternative but to accept the threat-maker's terms. Whether the victim had a
reasonable alternative is usually treated as a jury question. See Reiver v. Murdoch &
Walsh, P.A., 625 F. Supp. 998, 1013-14 (D. Del. 1985); Totem Marine Tug & Barge,
584 P.2d at 22 ("What constitutes a reasonable alternative is a question of fact,
depending on the circumstances of each case."); Louisville Title Ins. Co. v. Surety
Title & Guar. Co., 132 Cal. Rptr. 63, 77-78 (Ct. App. 1976) ("The determination of
whether there is a reasonable alternative is made by ascertaining as a question of fact
whether a reasonably prudent person would follow the alternative course.");
Blubaugh v. Turner, 842 P.2d 1072, 1074-75 (Wyo. 1992) ("Whether particular facts
are sufficient to constitute economic duress is a question of law.... What constitutes
a coercive act or reasonable alternative is a question of fact depending upon the
circumstances of each case.").
The old psychological theory of duress lingers on in a few places. See In re Marriage
of Baltins, 260 Cal. Rptr. 403, 414 (Ct. App. 1989); Balling v. Finch, 21 Cal. Rptr. 490,
493-94 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Willms Trucking Co. v. JW Const. Co., 442 S.E.2d 197,
202 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994). The psychological theory asks whether the victim was
bereft of the free exercise of his will power. See Willms Trucking, 442 S.E.2d at 202.
Some versions of the psychological theory treat the nature of the threat as irrelevant.
See Central Acceptance Corp. v. Nash Bluefield Motor Co., 139 S.E. 654, 656 (W. Va.
1927). Other versions require in addition that the threat be unlawful. The
psychological theory has been subjected to scathing criticism, most famously by
Holmes and Robert Hale. See Robert Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic
Liberty, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 603, 616-18 (1943). A theory of duress that is pitched
entirely on the state of mind of the victim makes the issue intensely factual and thus,
according to many cases that define duress in purely psychological terms, an issue that
is usually for the jury.
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normative judgment at the point of application. Among these are
rules that cover a threat to commit a crime or tort, a threat to bring
baseless litigation, and a threat to do an act that would inflict a loss on
the victim that is grossly disproportionate to the benefit to the threat-
maker from doing the act (the last rule covers blackmail). m While the
last rule is moralistic in tone, the only non-factual judgment required
in its application is in the determination of whether the balance of
harm and benefit is grossly disproportionate. Only a few of the rules
that define improper threats call for a normative judgment at the
point of application. The most important of these addresses coercive
contract modifications: a bad-faith threat to breach a contract is
improper.ml Another rule defines a threat as improper if the threat-
maker obtained his position of power by a prior course of unfair
dealing.2 Determining whether a threat to breach a contract is in bad
faith (not every threat to breach is improper) and whether a prior
course of dealing is unfair calls for a normative judgment.
The law of fraudulent non-disclosure is similar in form to the law of
duress. There is no general principle defining when disclosure is
obligatory. Rather, disclosure is required in several discretely defined
circumstances.2 No evaluative judgment is necessary in determining
when most of these circumstances exist. Two of the circumstances in
which disclosure is obligatory are defined by open-ended standards
that call for a normative judgment at the point of application. I put
the discussion of one of these standards-a confidential relationship-
off until later because it is of broader significance. The other open-
ended standard requires disclosure when it reasonably might be
expected by the ignorant party. The usual reason for requiring
disclosure under this standard is that the ignorant party could not
feasibly obtain the information on his own. It is upon this standard
203. See Philippine Export & Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. v. Chuidian, 267 Cal.
Rptr. 457, 468 (Ct. App. 1990); Silsbee v. Webber, 50 N.E. 555, 556 (Mass. 1898) (J.
Holmes) (involving a threat by an employer to disclose embarrassing information
about a young employee to the lad's ill father in order to coerce the mother to pay off
the lad's debt).
204. See Totem Marine Tug & Barge, 584 P.2d at 22.
205. See Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916,921-22 (Utah 1993).
206. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161 (1979) (stating four general
circumstances when disclosure is required); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551
(1977) (stating five circumstances where disclosure is required); see also Mattingly v.
First Bank of Lincoln, 947 P.2d 66, 70 (Mont. 1997) (stating even more
circumstances).
207. These include the duty to disclose that the other party has made an error in
interpreting a contract, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161(c), the duty to
correct past assertions that have become untrue, see id. § 161(a), the duty to exercise
reasonable care in communicating or obtaining the correct information, see
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552(1), and the duty of a fiduciary to disclose, see id.
§ 552(2)(a).
20& See infra part IV.
209. See United Jersey Bank v. Kensey, 704 A2d 38, 43-44 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
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and for this reason that sellers and brokers have been required to
disclose hidden defects in what they sell, particularly in the sale of
residential real estate.210
Putting confidential relationships to the side, the common practice
under the law of duress and non-disclosure is that the judge decides
what is inappropriate conduct under the open-ended standards.
Almost universally, the judge decides when disclosure reasonably
might be expected by the ignorant party.211 As for duress, there are
many statements like the following: "[w]hile what constitutes duress is
a question of law, whether duress exists in a particular case is a
question of fact."212  This does not require a judge to ground his
Div. 1997) (posing the question as "one of fairness and policy that 'involves
identifying, weighing, and balancing several factors-the relationship of the parties,
the nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the
public interest in the proposed solution' (citations omitted)); Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 551(2)(e) (stating that where disclosure is required because of "the customs
of the trade or other objective circumstances, [the other] would reasonably expect a
disclosure"); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161(b) (requiring
disclosure if "non-disclosure of the fact amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in
accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing").
210. See Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115, 1118-20 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Reed v. King,
193 Cal. Rptr. 130, 131-32 (Ct. App. 1983); Lynn v. Taylor, 642 P.2d 131, 134 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1982); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d 672, 674-75 (Wash. 1960); Ollerman v.
O'Rourke Co., 288 N.W.2d 95, 100 (Wisc. 1980). But see Swinton v. Whitinsville Say.
Bank, 42 N.E.2d 808, 808 (Mass. 1942) (finding that when acting at arms length or
when there is no fiduciary relationship between the parties then, there is no duty to
disclose non-apparent defect).
211. The Second Restatement of Torts states:
Whether there is a duty to the other to disclose the fact in question is always
a matter for the determination of the court. If there are disputed facts
bearing upon the existence of the duty, as for example the defendant's
knowledge of the fact, the other's ignorance of it or his opportunity to
ascertain it, the customs of the particular trade, or the defendant's
knowledge that the plaintiff reasonably expects him to make the disclosure,
they are to be determined by the jury under appropriate instructions as to
the existence of the duty.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551 cmt. m. See Frazier v. Southwest Say. and Loan
Ass'n, 653 P.2d 362, 368 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (treating this as an issue for the judge);
Mallon Oil Co. v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., 940 P.2d 1055, 1059 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996)
(same); Sinnard v. Roach, 414 N.W.2d 100, 106 (Iowa 1987) (same); Carter Lincoln-
Mercury, Inc. v. EMAR Group, Inc., 638 A.2d 1288, 1294 (N.J. 1994) (same); Delgado
v. Costello, 580 P.2d 500, 503, (N.M. Ct. App. 1978) (same); First Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. of Racine v. Notte, 293 N.W.2d 530, 532 (Wis. 1980) (same). Only Alabama
(which is out of the mainstream on many issues) seems committed to the view that
this is a jury question. See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Parham, 693 So. 2d 409, 422-23 (Ala.
1997) (treating the issue as one for the jury); Ballard v. Lee, 671 So. 2d 1368, 1373-74
(Ala. 1995) (same). But see Union Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Crocker, 667 So. 2d 688, 692
(Ala. 1995) (treating the issue as one for the judge).
212. Clement v. Buckley Mercantile Co., 137 N.W. 657, 661 (Mich. 1912); see also
Meyer v. Guardian Trust Co., 296 F. 789, 792 (8th Cir. 1924) ("What constitutes
duress is a matter of law. Whether such duress exists as to a particular transaction is a
matter of fact."); Slone v. Purina Mills, Inc., 927 S.W.2d 358, 370 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)
("Whether the facts alleged are sufficient to support a claim of duress is a question of
law for the court."); Cheshire Oil Co., Inc. v. Springfield Realty Corp., 385 A.2d 835,
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decision on a rule that applies beyond the immediate case: if the facts
are undisputed he may rule on the factsY1 Judges would do better if
they remembered this, for occasionally they cloak their decisions in
spurious rules, such as the "rule" that a party cannot claim duress
when his tight situation is a product of his own circumstances or
market conditions and not the conduct of the defendant,14 or the
"rule" that the assertion of a contractual right can never be duressy5U
Only a handful of cases put the questions to the jury, under a general
instruction, of whether a threat to breach was in bad faith or whether
there was a prior unfair course of dealing to the jury.216
839 (N.H. 1978) ("The elements to a finding of duress are questions of law, whether
the facts exist to establish those elements in a particular case is an issue for the trial
court, and its findings will not be disturbed unless unreasonable."); Production Credit
Ass'n of Minot v. Geving, 218 N.W.2d 185, 195 (N.D. 1974) ("[Tihe ruling as to what
constitutes duress is one of law and not a finding of fact."); Oregon Bank v. Nautilus
Crane & Equip. Corp., 683 P.2d 95, 103 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) ("Whether particular
facts are sufficient to constitute a defense of economic duress or business compulsion
is a matter of law for the courts, while the question of whether the facts alleged
actually exist is a matter for the jury."); Windham v. Alexander, Weston & Poehner,
P.C., 887 S.W.2d 182,185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1994) ("Although what constitutes duress is
a question of law, whether duress exists in a particular situation is generally a question
of fact dependent upon all the circumstances surrounding the situation."); Galusha v.
Sherman, 81 N.W. 495,498-99 (Wis. 1900) (discussing elements of duress).
213. Decisions granting summary judgment on duress claims are legion.
Sometimes courts characterize the issues of whether there was bad faith or a prior
unfair course of dealing as factual in character but then proceed to decide the issue on
the ground that it was not in doubt. See e.g., Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 986 F.2d
942, 943-45 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the claim of duress when a seller of package
tours relied on an airline for discount tickets, without finalizing the contract, and then
was refused a discount when the airline entered into a price war and ticket prices were
slashed); First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Vinita v. Kissee, 859 P.2d 502, 508 (Okla.
1993) (deciding case on basis that bad faith was not in doubt); Blubaugh v. Turner,
842 P.2d 1072,1074 (Wyo. 1992) (rejecting claim of duress when a fired employee was
given a choice between $31,000 if he refused to sign release and $35,000 with "out-
placement" counseling if he would sign release).
214. See Strickland Tower Maintenance, Inc. v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 128
F.3d 1422, 1426-27 (10th Cir. 1997); Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d
924, 928 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting Johnson, Drake, & Piper Inc. v. United States, 531
F.2d 1037, 1042 (Ct. Cl. 1976)) ("The mere stress of business conditions will not
constitute duress where the defendant was not responsible for the conditions.").
215. See Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass'n v. Wometco Enters., 833 F. Supp. 344,
348 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); see also Dawson, supra note 200, at 287 ("No single formula has
achieved so wide a circulation in the duress cases as the statement that 'It is not
duress to threaten to do what there is a legal right to do.' Certainly no other formula
is anything like so misleading. Its vice lies in the half-truth it contains.").
216. In Applied Genetics Int4 Inc v. First Affiliated Sea Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1242
(10th Cir. 1990), a company that had tried to go public claimed duress to get out of a
release it gave its underwriter. It wanted to sue the underwriter for breach of a "firm
commitment" underwriting agreement, which is a promise by the underwriter to buy
any stock that could not be sold to the public. See id. at 1240. The underwriter had
refused to go forward with the stock offering at the last moment and then offered to
make the company a loan to provide needed capital if the company would sign the
release. See id. The underwriter also threatened to inform the Securities Exchange
Commission of a violation of securities law in the planned offering. The court held
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The pattern in the law of good faith is similar though less clear
because of the misapprehension that there are no rules to go by in this
area but instead only a standard of "decency, fairness, or
reasonableness."2,7 Actually, the great majority of good faith cases
ground on fairly concrete rules. At its most concrete, good faith
means honesty.28 Beyond dishonesty, it is bad faith to feign
dissatisfaction to get out of a contract that is conditioned on
satisfaction.219 More broadly, it is bad faith to exercise a discretionary
power under a contract for an improper purposeno or to fail to fulfill a
condition for a strategic reason. 12 For example, it is bad faith to fire
an at-will employee to avoid paying him a promised year-end bonus,m
and it is bad faith to neglect to apply for a mortgage in order to get
out of a contract that is conditioned on financing.m Even more
broadly, bad faith has been defined as the overreaching interpretation
of a contract termn4 or as acting inconsistently with contract-based
whether the underwriter had acted improperly was a question of fact without
explaining where it thought the bad faith lay precisely. See id. at 1242. The
implication is that the question of bad faith would be put to the jury in general terms.
In Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 917-18 (Utah 1993), a patient sought to void
a release of tort claims he had given to his surgeon before an operation on his hand.
The surgeon had presented the patient with the release immediately prior to the
operation after the patient had been prepared for surgery. See id. at 918. There was
some evidence that delay would worsen the operation's prospects for success. See id.
at 917. The court concluded that there was no contract between the patient and the
surgeon when the release was presented, but that it was a question of fact whether
there had been a prior course of unfair dealing. See id. at 921. Cheshire Oil Co., is
similar though the fact-finder (a special master) ultimately rejected the duress claim.
385 A.2d at 837-40. The plaintiff had jacked up the price of land he offered to
defendant from $5,000 to $25,000 on the day defendant was closing on adjacent land
that he had under option. See id. at 838. The court affirmed a finding of no duress
while characterizing the issue of whether the plaintiff had acted unfairly as factual.
See id. at 840.
In Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. v. Chuidian, 267 Cal. Rptr.
457, 460-61 (Ct. App. 1990) a Philippine corporation sought to set aside a settlement
of a claim that it alleged it had entered into because the other party threatened to
reveal the corporation's connections with Ferdinand Marcos if it did not. The court
concluded that this might be duress because of the disproportionality of harm and
benefit and held that this issue, as well as the fairness of the resulting exchange, were
questions of fact for the jury. See id. at 468.
217. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, cmt. a (1979).
218. See U.C.C. § 1-201 (19) (1995).
219. See Fursmidt v. Hotel Abbey Holding Corp., 10 A.D.2d 447, 450-51 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1960).
220. See Mark P. Gergen, A Cautionary Tale About Contractual Good Faith in
Texas, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1235, 1265-66 (1994) [hereinafter Gergen, Cautionary].
221. See id. at 1266.
222. See Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 438 (7th Cir. 1987); see also
Gergen, Cautionary, supra note 220, at 1266 n.171 (citing similar cases).
223. See Plaisted v. Fuhr, 367 N.W.2d 541, 545 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Gergen,
Cautionary, supra note 220, at 1266 n.172 (listing cases).
224. See Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition
and Conceptualization, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 810, 813 (1982).
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expectations."'
None of these definitions of good faith ask either judge or jury to
evaluate conduct based on their own view (or the community's view)
of what is decent, fair, or reasonable. Under these definitions, the
determination of the meaning of good faith begins with interpretation
of the agreement. Who does this depends on the general rules
governing contract interpretation, which, as stated previously, give a
great deal of power to the judge. Once one identifies the purpose (or
purposes) of a discretionary power, condition, or term, then the
question becomes whether the party exercising that power, invoking
that condition, or asserting that term did so for a reason or in a way
that was consistent with that purpose (or those purposes). This is a
question of fact for the jury.
For example, in a case where the issue is whether a claim of
dissatisfaction with performance was in good faith, the judge will
decide whether the test of satisfaction is objective or subjective and so
instruct the jury. The jury will then decide whether the claim of
dissatisfaction met that test.m In a case where an at-will employee
alleges that his employer fired him to prevent him from collecting a
promised bonus, the judge might determine if the promise of a bonus
limited the employer's discretion in firing, while the jury will
determine the motive for the firingYn
These cases do not exhaust the uses or meaning of good faith.
Occasionally the doctrine is used to imply contractual obligations
based on trade usage or customm Generally, only specific terms that
225. See Burton, supra note 196, at 371-73.
226. Sometimes good faith is used as a performance standard in contracts with
open performance terms. See U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (1995) (stating that under an output
or a requirements contract the quantity supplied or demanded must be in good faith).
Courts have been maddeningly imprecise in how they formulate the good faith
standard in output and requirements contracts. See Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open
Terms In Contract, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 997,1067-71 (1992) [hereinafter Gergen, Use of
Open Terms] (discussing various formulations of this standard). The precise standard
is for the judge's determination. See Kansas Baptist Convention v. Mesa Operating
Ltd. Partnership, 864 P.2d 204,210 (Kan. 1993).
227. See Health Maintenance Group v. Rutledge, 459 So. 2d 889, 892 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1984) (holding that whether there was good faith in claim of dissatisfaction
under a contract with a condition of satisfaction is a question of fact for the jury);
Hamlin v. Steward, 622 N.E.2d 535, 540 (Ind. App. 1993) (holding that whether a
party acted in a good faith attempt to fulfill a condition is a question for the jury);
McKay v. Farmers & Stockmens Bank, 585 P.2d 325, 327 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978)
(holding that whether there was a good faith basis for acceleration of a note is
ordinarily a question of fact); McCabe/Marra Co. v. City of Dover, 652 N.E.2d 236,
245 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (holding that whether a party acted in a good faith attempt
to fulfill a condition is a question for the jury).
228 See Mclravy v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 119 F.3d 876, 882 (10th Cir. 1998)
(affirming summary judgment for employer on claim of bad faith termination by
senior employee because plaintiff had not alleged that firing interfered with any
promised benefits).
229. See Gergen, Cautionary, supra note 220, at 1268-71 (discussing a number of
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can be proven by objective evidence can be introduced as a matter of
trade usage or custom.2° These restrictions prevent both judge and
jury from imposing additional obligations that they believe to be fair
or reasonable under the guise of usage or custom.
In a small number of cases, the determination of good faith
properly turns on the decision-maker's views about what is fair or
reasonable conduct. These cases involve odd circumstances that the
parties would not have addressed in contracting, and on which there is
no established trade practice. Unfortunately these cases are too few
in number to discern a practice regarding whether the judge or jury
should decide the meaning of good faith when good faith is not
reducible to a rule or derived from the parties' likely understanding.
In most cases, the judge decides what good faith means, often by
announcing a spurious standard or rule (such as defining bad faith as
malice).231
To appreciate what is at stake in these cases we need to focus on a
specific case For the starting point for analysis has to be the
recognition that good faith cannot be defined abstractly. Carmichael v.
Adirondack Bottled Gas Corp.3 is the strongest example I know of
the view that the jury should decide what good faith means under a
general standard. Plaintiff Carmichael was a widow.3 Her husband
had been a gas distributor for Adirondack.2m The Carmichaels had
decided to sell the distributorship back to Adirondack, but the parties
had not agreed on a price when the husband was killed in a
snowmobile accident. 2S Under the agreement, the distributorship
terminated upon his death.2 Nevertheless, Adirondack renewed its
these cases).
230. See Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 806 (9th Cir.
1981); supra note 177. The meaning of good faith was resolved by the judge in one of
the more controversial good faith cases of the 1980s. See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust
Co., 757 F.2d 752, 761 (6th Cir. 1985). In KM.C., a bank breached its duty of good
faith by canceling a line of credit without notice, even though adequate security
seemed to exist. See id. at 763. A magistrate decided that good faith required notice
unless the decision to dispense with notice was a "reasonable exercise of its
discretion." Id. at 759. This put to the jury only the factual question of whether the
loan seemed to be insecure at the time. See id. at 761.
231. See Williams v. Jader Fuel Co., 944 F.2d 1388, 1395 (7th Cir. 1991); M/A-Com
Sec. Corp. v. Galesi, 904 F.2d 134, 136 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Van Valkenburgh,
Nooger & Neville, Inc. v. Hayden Publ'g Co., 281 N.E.2d 142, 145 (N.Y. 1972));
Carter v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 744 P.2d 458, 461 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Ellis v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 246 Cal. Rptr. 863, 866-68 (Ct. App. 1988); Edmond's of Fresno
v. MacDonald Group, Ltd., 217 Cal. Rptr. 375, 381 (Ct. App. 1985); Carter v. Adler,
291 P.2d 111, 117 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Ranier v. Mount Sterling Nat'l Bank, 812
S.W.2d 154, 156-57 (Ky. 1991); Roli-Blue, Inc. v. 6970th St. Assocs., 506 N.Y.S.2d
159, 161 (App. Div. 1986).
232. 635 A.2d 1211 (Vt. 1993).
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buyout offer after the husband's death and indicated that it was not
opposed to the widow keeping the distributorship.2 Widow
Carmichael rejected the renewed offer as too low and began to
negotiate with another buyer.nm Adirondack moved preemptively and
without warning, cutting off supplies and closing the businessyg The
plaintiff found a buyer for the equipment at a price slightly below that
offered by Adirondack for the entire distributorship.20 She then
turned the company's records, including the customer list, over to
Adirondack at their insistence.Y4 The issue of whether Adirondack
had acted in bad faith was submitted to the jury by the trial judge
under an instruction detailing what Adirondack's duties were under
the circumstances.2
Rather than analyzing this instruction in detail (there were doubtful
elements), the Vermont Supreme Court held that the trial judge
should have put the issue to the jury under a general instructionY3
The court reasoned that good faith could be defined only by the
general principle that "each party promises not to do anything to
undermine or destroy the other's rights to receive the benefits of the
agreement."24 It added that the highly fact-specific nature of the issue
made it "particularly well-suited for juries to decide" under an
instruction that has "few precise analytical elements."' ' 1
Carmichael is a compelling case because of the combination of
several unusual facts. These include the accidental death of the
plaintiff's husband at a young age, the initial response of the company
to his death that suggested it did not care who ran the franchise, the
company's abrupt and punitive response to the plaintiffs rejection of
its offer, and the pressure the company applied to obtain the





241. See id. at 1214.
242. See id. at 1216-17. The trial judge's instruction was:
While the contracts between the parties provided that they terminated upon
the death of Philip Carmichael, Adirondack was under a duty to treat
[p]laintiffs fairly and in good faith. Adirondack had a duty to advise
[p]laintiffs whether it would agree to enter into a new contract with them or
to allow [p]laintiffs a reasonable opportunity to find a buyer for the
distributorship or to decide to sell their interest in the distributorship to
Adirondack.
Id. at 1217.
243. See Carmichael, 635 A.2d at 1218.
244. Id. at 1216. For a similar instruction, see Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc.,
690 A.2d 575, 585-86 (N.J. 1997) (instructing the jury to answer the question: did the
defendants "observe reasonable commercial practices of fair dealing.... [and] refrain
from doing anything that would destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the
fruits of the contract").
245. Id at 1217.
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any one of these facts4 and one's opinion about the fairness of
Adirondack's conduct might well change. A good way to test the
court's assertion that the question of what is inappropriate conduct in
this circumstance is "particularly well-suited for juries to decide"
under a general standard is to ask whether the issue of good faith
ought to go to the jury had Adirondack forced the widow to take its
original offer by consistently insisting that the distributorship
terminated at her husband's death. My guess is that few judges would
have submitted the issue of good faith to the jury on these facts
though people might well disagree about the reasonableness of
Adirondack's conduct.247
There is no right answer to the question: how should the trial judge
have put the plaintiff's bad faith claim to the jury? None of the easy
answers are satisfactory. One unsatisfactory answer is to avoid the
problem entirely by rejecting the doctrine of good faith or shearing it
of much of its power, as some courts have done.21 Another
unsatisfactory answer is to pretend, as the Carmichael court did, that
there is nothing unusual in giving the jury the power to add
obligations to a contract under a general standard of fairness. 149 The
trial judge's solution to the problem is neither easy nor satisfactory.
The trial judge tried to spell out precisely what good faith meant
under the circumstances of the case but further confused the issue.m
This may explain why the Vermont Supreme Court grounded its
decision upon a general standard. If the court defined good faith
specifically, the trial court would have had to retry the case under the
new rule.
If we put ourselves in the position of the trial judge but with the
246. For example, assume that Adirondack acted in a way that showed that it
thought the husband's death was a material change, or assume that the intangible
assets Adirondack acquired for nothing were clearly worthless.
247. For instance, Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1380 (Mass. 1980),
rejected various contract and tort claims brought upon a franchise termination,
including a claim of breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The court
stressed that the franchisee did not show that it had made any investment that the
franchisor captured by terminating the agreement. See id. at 1377.
248. See English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983); supra note 198 and
accompanying text (listing relevant cases).
249. See Carmichael, 635 A.2d at 1216-17.
250. See supra note 233 and accompanying text. One flaw in the instruction is that
it is inartfully drafted. The trial judge suggested three possible actions that
Adirondack might take to satisfy the obligation of good faith in the disjunctive: (1)
tell Carmichael whether Adirondack would allow her to continue in the business; (2)
allow her to sell the business; or (3) buy the business itself. See Carmichael, 635 A.2d
at 1217. Read literally, this instruction required only that Adirondack have told
Carmichael that she could not continue. Although Adirondack did not do so
promptly it could argue that Carmichael suffered no harm from the delay. A second
flaw is that the instruction can be read as imposing a duty on a franchisor to allow a
franchisee to recoup the value of its investment upon termination by sale to a third
party or to the franchisor. This is novel.
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luxury of time to reflect on the meaning of good faith, it might be
possible to craft an ideal jury instruction or a set of special issues the
jury should consider. To my mind, the key factual issues go to the
weight of Adirondack's interest in enforcing the termination-on-death
clause and the intangible value of the business that Adirondack
destroyed or captured. This disregards, however, the reasons for
putting the issue of good faith to a jury under a general standard. To
demand that a trial judge make a precise determination of what
constitutes inappropriate conduct, in a situation where that issue is in
great doubt, burdens both counsel and the trial judge, and increases
the prospect of an error necessitating a retrial. The ultimate effect is
to increase the cost of vindicating the principle of good faith.
You might think this is a good thing if you are troubled by the
uncertainty created by the principle of good faith. On the other hand,
if you believe that it ought to be easier to vindicate novel good faith
claims, but you also believe that the definition of good faith should
not be determined by the jury, there are two solutions. One is to
redefine the relationship between trial judges and appellate judges.
Appellate judges could defer to a trial judge's resolution of the
question of what constitutes bad faith. This would be a significant
change in the law. Currently, appellate courts do not defer to trial
courts on non-factual issues.21 Leon Green saw the essential point
here years ago. Appellate judges must cede power to trial judges if we
want the law to be flexible while not yielding too much power to the
jury. n The other solution is to take factual issues from the jury.
Appellate judges do defer to a trial judge's resolution of a mixed issue
of law and fact3 But this may be impermissible when a claim of bad
faith turns on credibility, as they often do.
IV. ECONOMIC ToRTS AND RESTITUTION
It is not surprising that the jury usually plays a small role in deciding
what is inappropriate conduct under contract law doctrines such as
good faith. Traditionally, the jury has had little say on obligation in
contract law. The marginalization of the jury in contract law is
facilitated by rules of interpretation that give priority to writings and
other objective evidence. These rules tend to eliminate factual
251. I say this with trepidation because I do not teach procedure. Two colleagues
who do, Charles Alan Wright and Patrick Woolley, tell me they are unaware of any
principle requiring that appellate judges defer to a trial judge's choice of instructions.
Appellate courts do defer to decisions by a trial judge on issues of both fact and law in
matters that are peripheral to a trial, such as decisions regarding discovery abuse.
252. See Green, Judge and Jury, supra note 67, at 393-94 ("Instead of a more or less
preliminary trial and a serious appeal, there should probably be a more serious trial
and an informal checking up of the trial court's work...."). Green attributed the
seizure of power by appellate courts to "the unhealthy ascendancy that the jury had
obtained over the trial judges." Id. at 380.
253. See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234,1244-46 (Utah 1998).
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disputes, particularly disputes that turn on the credibility of witnesses,
and make it possible for judges to administer standards without
having to submit factual issues to the jury.
I now turn to tort doctrines that protect economic interests, along
with the law of restitution (the doctrines of duress and non-disclosure,
examined previously, exist in both contract and restitution), to see
what role the jury plays in these areas. I take issue with the view
espoused in the Restatement (Second) of Torts that the jury
determines what is improper interference.2 I argue that the concept
of improper interference is similar to the general principle of unjust
enrichment. Both concepts are non-categorical principles defining
blameworthy conduct or obligation in bodies of law that are otherwise
composed of rules that define blameworthy conduct or obligation in
categorical terms. Understanding these concepts leads naturally to
the conclusion that judges must decide their meaning in the first
instance.25
Most economic torts have categorical terms. No general tort exists
for negligent or unreasonable infliction of economic loss. Fraud is an
example of a categorical tort. It deals with a subset of lies, those that
induce others to act in a way that harms themselves or enriches the
liar. Defamation in its modem form deals with another subset of lies,
those that injure reputation. The issues put to the jury under these
doctrines are factual, such as: "did the defendant lie?" and "did his lie
have an effect that the law will remedy?" Rules that require a
plaintiff to prove a lie by clear and convincing evidence enable the
judge to limit the jury's discretion in fact-finding256 Rules prohibiting
254. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 cmt. 1 (1977).
255. The implications of my position have already been discussed in the context of
the standards of fair dealing. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text. To
require the trial judge to specify what circumstances would render interference
improper or enrichment unjust in a case where the normative issue is in grave doubt
burdens counsel and the trial judge, and increases the prospect of error necessitating
retrial. This makes it difficult to vindicate novel claims. If you want to ease this
burden but are committed to having the judge resolve the normative issue of what is
improper or unjust, then you have two choices. You can let the trial judge decide the
normative issue and factual issues together in a general ruling, or you can ask
appellate judges to defer to the trial judge's instruction.
256. Many states impose a standard of clear and convincing evidence or substantial
evidence for proof of fraud. See Europlast, Ltd. v. Oak Switch Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 1266,
1272 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying Illinois law); Weisman v. Kaspar, 661 A.2d 530, 537
(Conn. 1995); Smith v. King, 597 P.2d 217, 220 (Idaho 1979); Modem Air
Conditioning, Inc. v. Cinderella Homes, Inc., 596 P.2d 816, 824 (Kan. 1979); Eidson v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 863 S.W.2d 621, 626 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Sauter v. St.
Michael's College, 374 P.2d 134, 138 (N.M. 1962); Tice v. Tice, 672 P.2d 1168, 1171
(Okla. 1983); Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank v. Larson, 507 A.2d 867, 869 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1986). In Arkansas, a clear and convincing evidence standard applies in an action for
deceit only if "alteration of a solemn writing" is involved, meaning when a party seeks
reformation of the contract in equity. Nicholson v. Century 21, Ivy Realty, Inc., 818
S.W.2d 254, 257 (Ark. 1991); see Grendell v. Kiehl, 723 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Ark. 1987);
see also Clay v. Brand, 365 S.W.2d 256, 260 (Ark. 1963) (suggesting that the higher
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the inference of a lie from certain commonplace events (for example,
the rule that fraudulent intent in making a promise cannot be inferred
from breach)2 further hem in the discretion of judge and jury.
Through such rules, the law tries to prevent the values of the jury
from biasing factual findings.
Sometimes these categorically defined torts have particular
elements that require a normative judgment at the point of
application. Typically, these normative issues are decided by the
judge. For example, in a defamation case, the judge determines
whether a communication carries a defamatory meaning l and
whether a privilege exists. TM In disparagement, the judge determines
whether the plaintiff's interest deserves protection and whether the
circumstances of a case give rise to a privilege.2 In negligent
misrepresentation, the judge determines what circumstances create
privity.21 If these categorically defined torts described the entire field
of economic torts, then we could accurately say that it is judges who
define the morality of the marketplace in tort as well as in contract.
They do not, however, and therefore, further inquiry is necessary.
A. Improper Interference
Interference with contract and business relations is the catchall
economic tort.m The prima facie interference case is no more than a
standard might be applied if alleged misrepresentation is inconsistent with a specific
term of the contract). Some cases refuse or fail to apply a high standard. See
International Telecomms. Exch. Corp. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1520,
1542 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (applying Georgia law); V.I.P. Homes, Inc. v. Weader, 454
S.E.2d 548, 550 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); Ciampi v. Ogden Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. 634
N.E.2d 448, 455 (M. App. Ct 1994); Furr v. Thomas, 817 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Okla.
1991).
257. See Turner v. Biscoe, 171 S.W.2d 118, 119 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1943) (judgn't
adopted). A variation on this rule is found in the law of defamation. Malice, which
defeats the privilege of a supervisor to defame an employee, cannot be inferred from
the falsity of a statement. See Davis v. Hearst, 116 P. 530, 538 (Cal. 1911); see also
Gergen, Grudging Defense, supra note 96, at 1719-26 (collecting authority on the
point and exploring the non-constitutional roots of the clear and convincing evidence
standard in defamation).
258. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 614(1) (1977).
259. See id. § 619; 2 Fowler V. Harper et al., The Law of Torts § 5.29 (2d ed. 1986).
260. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(1)(b), (e).
261. See A.T. Kearney, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 73 F.3d 238, 241 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing
Oregon law and providing an excellent review of the Oregon cases); Brown v. North
Cent. F.S., Inc., 173 F.RD. 658, 672 (N.D. Iowa 1997) ("The court, not the jury,
decides whether defendants were 'in the business of supplying information' as a
matter of law, in light of the facts, because the defendants' duty is always a matter for
the court to decide."); Eddy v. Sharp, 245 Cal. Rptr. 211,213 (Ct. App. 1988); Barrie
v. V.P. Exterminators, Inc., 625 So. 2d 1007, 1015 (La. 1993). Some cases interject a
step to preserve an issue for the jury. The judge decides on what facts he would find a
duty and then the jury decides if those facts exist. See Lindstrand v. Transamerica
Title Ins. Co., 874 P.2d 82 (Or. App. 1994).
262. See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 766, 766A, 766B (describing
the torts of intentional interference ith performance of contract by a third person,
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knowing infliction of a fairly concrete economic loss (how concrete
the loss must be is a function of how relations or prospective contracts
that are protected from interference are defined). The tort is limited
by the requirement that the defendant's conduct be "improper."' 3
There are some settled rules regarding what is proper. For example, it
is proper to compete for business that is not secured by contract.2"' It
is also proper for an agent to advise his principal to breach a contract
so long as he has no personal interest in the matter.265 Such rules are
few, however, and they leave many issues unsettled.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts takes the position that in cases
where there is no settled rule, the issue of impropriety is fact-intensive
and turns on a variety of factors, including the nature of the actor's
conduct, his motives, his action's proximity to the harm, and the
parties' relationship.66 Policy concerns are relevant and so too are
"generally accepted standards of common morality 267  or
"[r]ecognized standards of business ethics and business customs and
practices... [and] concepts of fair play .... ,,2" Because of the open-
ended nature of the tort, plaintiffs often use interference claims to
challenge arguably unethical economic conduct that falls outside of
the more categorical economic torts.'6 This is precisely the function
the tort was meant to serve.20 The interference tort descends from
Holmes's and Pollock's work in the late nineteenth century. Holmes
and Pollock argued that the existing torts did not define all wrongs
intentional interference with another's performance of his own contract, and
intentional interference with prospective contractual relation).
263. Id. § 766B cmt. a.
264. See id. § 768 cmt. b (describing the privilege to compete with others in
business).
265. See id. § 770 (describing when an actor, responsible for the welfare of another,
would be liable for improper interference).
266. See id. § 767(a), (b), (f), (g).
267. Association Group Life, Inc. v. Catholic War Veterans, 293 A.2d 408, 415
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971) (citation omitted).
268. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 cmt. j.
269. See Woody v. Tamer, 405 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). In Woody,
the plaintiff owned a country club subject to a bank mortgage. See id. at 214. He sold
the club to a group of buyers taking back a non-recourse note while remaining liable
on the bank mortgage. See id. After several years the buyers ceased payment on the
note, forcing Woody to default on the mortgage. See id. at 215. Threatened with
foreclosure by the bank, Woody gave up his interest in the club. See id. The bank
stepped into his shoes on the non-recourse note letting the buyers retain the club. See
id. Woody claimed a conspiracy between the bank and the buyers to squeeze him out
of the club. See id. He sued the bank for interfering with his contract with the buyers
and the buyers for interfering with his ability to pay the bank mortgage. See id. The
interference claim against the buyers got around the non-recourse provision of their
note. See id. at 217. The interference claim against the bank was analogous to a claim
that the bank breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing under its contract with
him (the mortgagee) by acting to hinder his performance, but the tort claim opened
the door to punitive damages. See id. at 218-19. For my views on how the case should
have come out, see Gergen, Tortious Interference, supra note 7, at 1226-31.
270. See Gergen, Tortious Interference, supra note 7, at 1200-18.
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that could be remedied in tort and they proposed the catchall
principle of prima facie tort, which held that the intentional infliction
of harm was prima facie wrong unless the injurer could justify his
action?'
The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that the question of the
impropriety of interference should be determined by the jury in a case
where there is no settled rule regarding the conduct in question and
where reasonable people might differ on the issue.m This statement is
in a comment added in a late draftPm The statement has been
influential despite its offhand character. A number of courts have
followed it?7 Prior cases tended to go in the other direction-
271. See id. at 1206-09.
272- See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767, cmt. 1.
273. See Restatement (Second) of Torts cmt. k (Council Draft No. 41,1977).
274. See Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., 980 F.2d 171, 211 (3d Cir. 1992)
(holding the issue of propriety to be for the jury); Union Say. Am. Life Ins. Co. v.
North Cent. Life Ins. Co., 813 F. Supp. 481, 492 (S.D. Miss. 1993) (same); Association
Group Life, Inc. v. Catholic War Veterans, 293 A.2d 408,415-16 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1971) (same); American Marble Corp. v. Crawford, 351 S.E.2d 848, 850 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1987) (same); Uptown Heights Assocs. v. Seafirst Corp., 873 P2d 438, 443 (Or.
Ct. App. 1994) (same); Aylett v. Universal Frozen Foods Co., 861 P.2d 375, 379-80
(Or. Ct. App. 1993) (same). Occasional modem cases take the issue of propriety out
of the hands of the jury even though the case does not fall under an established
privilege. See, e.g., Midland Am. Sales-Weintraub, Inc. v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 874 F.
Supp. 164, 167 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (holding that under Ohio law "while a resolution of
each of the factors outlined in the Restatement may require some factual inquiry, the
ultimate question of whether an interference is improper and can, thus, support a
claim for intentional interference is a question of law"); Maynard v. Caballero, 752
S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. App. 1988) (holding that attorney's advice regarding trial
strategy to counsel of co-defendant of his client is privileged as a matter of law).
275. In the early cases the court decided the difficult policy questions that go into
determining whether conduct is privileged, while the jury decided whether the facts
brought the case within the privilege. See 84 A.LR. 81 (1933) (discussing three early
cases that are considered authority for giving the issue of justification to a jury). In
the first case, Berry v. Donovan, 74 N.E. 603 (Mass. 1905), the issue was whether a
union tortiously interfered with the plaintiff's position as an at-will employee when it
induced the employer to fire in order to preserve an all-union shop. See id. at 604.
The court recognized that the central issue in the case was one of policy-did the
privilege of competition extend to efforts by labor to preserve a union shop in order
to better compete with their employer-and the court decided that question without
even suggesting that it might present a jury issue. See id. at 605. In a second case,
Order of Railway Conducters v. Jones, 239 P. 882 (Colo. 1925), the court resolved the
policy question-that a union may induce an employer to fire a worker to preserve its
seniority rules if the worker consented to obey those rules-and left for the jury the
factual question whether the worker had consented to the union rules. See id. at 883.
In the third case, Carnes v. SL Paul Union Stockyards Co., 205 N.W. 630 (Minn. 1925),
the court resolved the policy question-that a stockyard association may bar from
entry a person it thought engaged in unethical practices that would bring the industry
into disrepute-and left for the jury the factual question whether that was the
defendants' true reason for barring the plaintiff. See id. at 632. For a clear early
statement that the issue of justification is for the judge, see Conrad v. Schamitz, 3
N.E.2d 868, 869 (N.Y. 1936) (Finch, J., dissenting) ("It is said that whether there is
justification sufficient to warrant the courts in protecting the rights of the plaintiff
rests upon the individual opinion of the judges as to what constitutes just cause,
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The position of the Restatement is untenable. Two arguments are
made in favor of putting the issue of impropriety to the jury. One
argument is by analogy to the issue of reasonableness in negligence.,6
The other is the statement that it is good "to obtain [the jury's]
common feel for the state of community mores and for the manner in
which they would operate upon the facts in question." rn The analogy
to negligence law is not persuasive for we could as well analogize to
contract law where, as we have seen, the jury has almost no say
regarding what is inappropriate conduct even when that decision is
made on an ad hoc basisY The analogy to contract law also calls into
question the assumption that it is good to give the people a voice. If
this is an unalloyed good, then why are the people given so little say
on normative issues in contract law? If we ask which is the better
analogy-to contract law or negligence law-then contract law wins
hands down because the economic interests at stake in interference
cases are chiefly protected by contract law and not protected at all by
negligence law.
Additionally, the proposition does not sit well with the structure of
tort law. Were the proposition true, the interference tort would
swallow other more categorically defined torts, almost all of which
protect economic interests from knowing injury. It would become a
question for the jury whether conduct that falls on the boundaries of
these other torts is tortious. Consider the tort of "injurious
falsehood," or what Fowler Harper and his co-authors describe as
"nondefamatory, nondisparaging misrepresentations to third
persons."279 For example, the defendant tells the plaintiff's customers
that the plaintiff does not have the capacity to serve them. The
American Law Institute struggled with defining the boundaries of this
tort, ultimately adopting a compromise that held liable a defendant
who knew of the falsity of his representation while taking no position
on the liability of a defendant who spoke with reckless disregard for
the truth out of malice or a desire to harm the plaintiff. ° Almost all
injurious falsehood cases also are cases of tortious interference2' If
the jury decides what is improper interference in a doubtful case, then
the question over which the Institute struggled regarding the
impropriety of speaking in a way that the speaker knows will harm the
economic interests of another with reckless disregard for the truth
sufficient justification or legal justification." (quotation omitted)).
276. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 cmt. 1.
277. Id.
278. See supra part III.
279. Harper et al., supra note 259, § 6.4.
280. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 623A.
281. For an example of an injurious falsehood claim packaged as an interference
claim, see Comstock Silversmiths, Inc. v. Carey, 894 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. App. 1995)
(holding defendant liable for tortious interference where it falsely told plaintiff's
customers that the plaintiff was dying).
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would be for the jury to decide.
The same point can be made using the law of unfair trade practices.
This body of law is composed largely of categorically defined wrongs
having to do with passing off a product as someone else's, and other
forms of misappropriation of intangible property."8" Several courts that
have considered the issue have said that these categorical wrongs do
not exhaust the concept of unfair practices and that other forms of
commercial misconduct can be brought within the tort if concerns of
policy or fairness warrant~m The judge decides what may be an unfair
practice. Novel claims of unfair trade practice almost always can be
formulated as interference claims because it is difficult to imagine an
unfair trade practice that does not involve the knowing infliction of an
282. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 1(a) cmt. g (1993)
(describing these as "[c]ertain recurring patterns of objectionable practices [that]
form the basis of the traditional categories of liability.., these specific forms of unfair
competition do not fully exhaust the scope of statutory or common law liability for
unfair methods of competition, and subsection (a) therefore includes a residual
category encompassing other business practices determined to be unfair.").
283. Some cases find unfair practices that do not quite fit within the established
categories. See American Airlines v. Christensen, 967 F.2d 410, 414 (10th Cir. 1992)
(finding it to be an unfair practice to purchase frequent flier awards and resell them in
violation of the award-holder's contract with airline); Barquis v. Merchants Collection
Ass'n, 496 P.2d 817, 839-40 (Cal. 1972) (finding it to be an unfair practice to file debt
collection actions in improper and inconvenient venues); Twin Falls Farm & City
Distrib. v. D & B Supply Co., 528 P.2d 1286, 1294 (Idaho 1974) (finding it to be an
unfair practice to destroy competitor's sign stating that business had moved to new
location); see also Curtis-Universal, Inc. v. Sheboygan E.M.S., Inc., 43 F.3d 1119, 1124
(7th Cir. 1994) (accepting an expansive definition of unfair competition in holding
that an insurer had a duty to defend a claim under a policy that provided for a defense
of claims regarding "advertising injury").
On the ineffable character of the tort, see Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition section I comment g which states that:
It is impossible to state a definitive test for determining which methods of
competition will be deemed unfair in addition to those included in the
categories of conduct described in the preceding Comments. Courts
continue to evaluate competitive practices against generalized standards of
fairness and social utility. Judicial formulations have broadly appealed to
principles of honesty and fair dealing, rules of fair play and good conscience,
and the morality of the marketplace.
Id.; see also J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition
§§ 1:8-1:11 (1996) (collecting many statements along this line).
284. This is made explicit when the standard is defined as practices that "shock
judicial sensibilities." Margarete Steiff, Inc. v. Bing, 215 F. 204, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1914);
see also McCarthy, supra note 283, § 1:9 n.5 (listing many of these cases). One way
the issue is preserved for the judge conceptually is to characterize unfair competition
"'not [as] a tort with specific elements,' but rather, [as] .. . 'a general category of torts
which courts recognize for the protection of commercial interests'.... [Thus,] to
remain viable, a common law unfair competition claim 'must identify the underlying
tort which is the basis for [the claim]."' LeusCrafters, Inc. v. Vision World, Inc., 943 F.
Supp. 1481, 1490 (D. Minn. 1996) (quoting Zimmerman Group v. Fairmont Foods,
882 F. Supp. 892,895 (D. Minn. 1994)). For a case in which an unusual claim of unfair
competition is put to the jury under a general instruction, see Trinmed, Inc. v.
Sherwood Medical Co., 977 F.2d 885, 889-91 (4th Cir. 1992) (considering a claim of
wrongful termination of a distributorship).
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economic harm on the plaintiff. If the proposition in the Restatement
is true, then whether a tort has been committed in these cases is a
question for the jury.
B. Unjust Enrichment
The picture in restitution is murkier in detail but clearer on the
main point. The picture is murky because the content and structure of
the law of restitution are unsettled. Sometimes restitution operates as
a remedy for a wrong. Most of the wrongs in restitution are also
torts. Fraud is an example of conduct that is considered wrongful that
can be remedied either by restitution or tort compensatory damages.u6
A few wrongs only may be remedied in restitution. Duress generally
is treated as a basis for restitution but not tort compensatory
damages.- Historically, breach of fiduciary duty was a basis for
restitution but not for tort compensatory damages,2 though it has
become commonplace to treat it as a tort. I will argue in the next
part that abuse of a confidential relationship ought to be remedied
only in restitution.29 Abuse of confidential relationship to the side,
these wrongs are defined in categorical terms that do not ask for a
normative judgment about what is inappropriate conduct at the point
of application (fraud is like this).291 Or, when they define
inappropriate conduct in open-ended terms that do ask for a
normative judgment at the point of application, the judge decides
what conduct is inappropriate. We have seen that the law of duress 292
and the law of non-disclosure2 3 are of this character.
285. It is commonplace to divide the law of restitution into multiple parts, one of
which is restitution for wrongs. See Restatement of the Law of Restitution: Quasi
Contracts and Constructive Trusts §§ 3, 121-28 (1936); Peter Birks, An Introduction
to the Law of Restitution, chs. 4 & 10 (1985) [hereinafter Birks, Introduction]
(separating restitution to rectify enrichment at the plaintiffs expense from restitution
for wrongs).
286. See Restatement of the Law of Restitution §§ 28, 55 (considering mistake of
fact and mistake of law induced by misrepresentation).
287. See Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 Tex. L.
Rev. 1277, 1284 (1989) (mentioning duress as the "leading example" of a case where
"defendant may enrich himself by means that we condemn as unjust but for which we
would not impose tort liability in the absence of enrichment"); see also Cimarron
Pipeline Constr., Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 848 P.2d 1161, 1165
(Okla. 1993) (holding that economic duress is not a tort).
288. See In re Evangelist, 760 F.2d 27,29-31 (1st Cir. 1985); Kann v. Kann, 690 A.2d
509, 518-20 (Md. 1997).
289. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 cmts. b, c (1977). Some cases
characterize breach of fiduciary duty as an intentional tort. See, e.g., Klemme v. Best,
941 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (comparing attorney malpractice and
breach of fiduciary duty, which is defined as constructive fraud).
290. See infra part V.
291. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 200-06 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
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Restitution can also operate as a basis for obligation in
circumstances where the obligor did nothing that could be considered
wrongful. The jury plays a small role in deciding obligation here
too. We have already seen that the jury plays a small role in
administering contract law doctrines that lay a basis for a restitution
claim by invalidating a contract. The same is true of the doctrines in
restitution that lay a basis for undoing transfers in non-contractual
settings. Even when the law asks for a value judgment at the point of
application, the judge makes that value judgment.
For example, a gift can be undone if it was induced by a mistake
about the donee's identity or some other "basic fact."'  The
Restatement of Restitution takes the position that a basic fact cannot
be defined in the abstract,m implying that the issue must be decided
294. See, e.g., Lamkin v. Hill, 419 A.2d 1077, 1080 (N.H. 1980) ("[I1t might be
assumed that restitution is appropriate only where the defendant is initially a
wrongdoer. This is not quite correct.... [A] constructive trust arises where the title
to property is acquired through a mistake." (citations omitted)). But see Davidson v.
Davidson, 667 So. 2d 616, 620-21 (Miss. 1995) (holding that restitution will lie only if
the defendant has committed a wrong or abused a confidence). The Davidson case is
an interesting spin-off from the law of insurance bad faith. The beneficiary of a life
insurance policy recovered vastly more than the amount of the benefits on a claim for
bad faith denial against the insurer. See id. The insured's heirs sued to recover the
excess over the amount of the policy proceeds on the theory that it was a windfall and
that the insured had intended to endow the named beneficiary only with the proceeds.
See id The court refused to impose a constructive trust because there was no finding
that the beneficiary abused the insured's confidence. See id. at 621.
295. Factual issues regarding unjust enrichment such as whether the defendant
made beneficial use of the plaintiff's resources are decided by the jury. See St. Paul
Mercury Ins. Co. v. Meeks, 508 S.E?.d 646, 648 (Ga. 1998). Whether the plaintiff
acted gratuitously in rendering services is also treated as a factual issue. See Kershaw
v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Co., 561 P.2d 683, 685 (Utah 1977) (citing Burton v.
McLaughlin, 217 P.2d 566 (Utah 1950)).
296. See supra notes 155-60, 179-83 and accompanying text (discussing the
doctrines of indefiniteness, impracticability, impossibility, frustration of purpose,
mutual mistake, and public policy).
When there is a binding contract not breached by the defendant, the judge usually
decides whether unjust enrichment has occurred. The judge acts as decision-maker in
this instance because of the interaction of the rules in contract law that make contract
interpretation an issue for the judge and the principle in restitution that "[wihere
there exists a valid express contract covering the subject matter, there can be no
implied contract." Woodard v. Southwest States, Inc., 384 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex.
1964). McNeilab, Inc v. North River Insurance Co., 645 F. Supp. 525 (D.NJ. 1986),
illustrates the interaction of the two. See id at 539. The manufacturer of Tylenol sued
its liability insurer to recover its expenses incurred by recalling Tylenol after a
tampering incident. See id at 527-28. McNeilab relied on Leebov v. United States
Fidelity Guaranty Co., 165 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1960), where the insured was allowed to
recover mitigation expenses from its liability insurer. See McNeilab, 645 F. Supp. at
531-32. The district court rejected McNeilab's claim on a motion for summary
judgment primarily on the ground that mitigation expenses were not within the scope
of coverage. See id at 530-47. It rejected a restitution claim, in part, based on the
principle that restitution ought not be awarded to compensate a party who could have
bargained for such protection. See id at 547-49 & n.24.
297. Restatement of the Law of Restitution § 26(1)(b) (1936).
298. See idt cmt. c.
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on the facts of each case. Nevertheless, the existence and nature of a
mistake generally is treated as a question for the judge.299 Another
obligation that arises in restitution is the duty to compensate a
rescuer. 30 The judge decides if a rescuer acted unofficiously and to
protect a sufficient interest.30' The mapped parts of restitution closely
299. Earl v. Saks & Co., 226 P.2d 340 (Cal. 1951), is a colorful illustration. See id. at
342, 244-45. Barbee sought to set aside a gift of his fur coat to Mrs. Earl on the
grounds that the gift was fraudulently induced. Mrs. Earl and Saks had secretly
agreed that Mrs. Earl would pay $1000 of the $5000 purchase price. See id. at 342-43.
Barbee thought, however, that he had bought the coat for $4000. The trial judge
refused to void the gift. See id. at 343. The California Supreme Court reversed, which
implies that it thought that the question of Barbee's motive was not one on which it
had to defer to the fact-finder. See id. at 347.
In not one of the cases collected by George Palmer in Law of Restitution, and
collected by Lawrence Kaplan in the 1999 Supplement, is the question of whether a
mistake is of the type for which the law provides relief put to the jury. See George E.
Palmer, Law of Restitution §§ 18.1-18.6 (1978 & Cum. Supp. No. 1 1999). Still, I
could not find a statement of the proposition that the sufficiency of the mistake is an
issue for the judge. In many of the cases cited by Palmer, the plaintiff is seeking an
equitable remedy so the issue does not arise. See, e.g., Twyford v. Huffaker, 324
S.W.2d 403, 406 (Ky. 1958) (holding mutuality of mistake unnecessary as a basis for
relief to a gift-giving grantor); White v. White, 190 N.E.2d 102, 104 (Mass. 1963)
(relying on the equitable doctrine, the court found no need to decide whether the
mistake was one of fact or law). Even when the plaintiff seeks a legal remedy, the
issue of mistake has been treated as equitable in character. See Fitzgerald v. Nelson,
79 P.2d 254, 256 (Or. 1938). In some cases, the judge decides whether a mistake is of
a type that merits relief by applying a rule. Some of these rules seem valid. Thus,
Palmer states as a rule that, absent detrimental reliance, a donor's mistake about his
or her being married to the donee is sufficient to set aside a gift. See Palmer, supra, §
18.3. Other rules are honored mostly in the breach. The "rule" that mistake of law is
not grounds for relief seems to be of this character. Palmer cites several cases
reversing gifts because of a mistake of law. See id. § 18.6. His treatment of the rule,
however, may be influenced by his disdain for it. A search of mistaken-gift cases
collected in the Appendix to section 26 of the Restatement of the Law of Restitution
revealed only one case where the issue was put to the jury. See Restatement of the
Law of Restitution § 26A (1988); see also Deskovick v. Porzio, 187 A.2d 610, 613 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1963) (submitting to the jury the question whether justice
requires restitution where a son paid the expenses of his father's last illness in the
mistaken belief that his father had no resources). This case belongs in a category of
cases in which restitution is regularly given, according to Palmer. See Palmer, supra, §
18.4. In Yohe v. Yohe, 353 A.2d 417 (Pa. 1976), the majority treated the issue whether
the donor's negligence might bar relief for mistake as a question for the judge, while
stating that it was for the jury to say whether the donee had abused a confidential
relationship. See id. at 420-21.
300. See Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164, 166 (Ark. 1907); Restatement of the
Law of Restitution §§ 112-17.
301. See McNeilab, 645 F. Supp. at 558 (rejecting claim by Tylenol's manufacturer
against liability insurer for mitigation expenses incurred after a tampering incident);
Trott v. Dean Witter & Co., 438 F. Supp. 842, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Scoville v. Vail
Inv. Co., 103 P.2d 662, 667 (Ariz. 1940). There are rules for some situations. For
example, providing necessities to a third person is deemed officious unless the
defendant breached a duty to provide the same. See Restatement of the Law of
Restitution § 113 cmt. f. The question whether there was an emergency or whether an
action was "immediately necessary" has been treated as one of fact. See, e.g., Chase
Manhattan Bank v. T & N PLC, 905 F. Supp. 107,123 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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resemble the economic torts. These mainly consist of categorical rules
that do not ask for a normative judgment at the point of application.
When a normative judgment is asked for, it is usually treated as a
question for the judge.
It is controversial whether the law of restitution is open to novel
claims of unjust enrichment that do not fit within the traditional
categories. A related question is what general principle may cover
such claims. Peter Birks, an English scholar and perhaps the leading
restitution scholar in the common law world, has said that there is no
general principle while not quite closing the door to novel claims.=
Gareth Jones, an English scholar and author of the leading treatise on
the subject, has said that the law of restitution is open to novel claims
but he has not tried to spell out the principle.' American scholars
have yet to address these questions systematically.? American courts
are ahead of the scholars on this point for unjust enrichment has been
found in situations that do not easily fit within the traditional
categories.' Whatever principle best explains these cases, that
302. See Birks, Introduction, supra note 285, at 18-19.
303. See Peter Birks, Misnomer, in Restitution: Past, Present and Future 1, 2-4
(W.R Cornish et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter Birks, Misnomer].
304. See Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 Cal. L Rev. 1191, 1193-95
(1995). Kull is the reporter on a planned new Restatement of Restitution. Kull's goal
in his article is to establish that restitution is an autonomous body of law conferring
rights that should be organized around the concept of unjust enrichment. See id. at
1196-98. He never unpacks the concept of "unjust."
305. See Anderson v. DeLisle, 352 N.W.2d 794, 796 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
Anderson had contracted to buy real estate from the defendant. He made substantial
improvements on the property, expending $25,000, before defaulting. See id. at 795.
The trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the defendant,
reasoning that the plaintiff could not recover absent mistake or fraud by the vendor.
See id. at 796. The court of appeals reversed and reinstated a judgment for the
plaintiff. It reasoned:
Fraud and mistake are not the only grounds for recovery under the theory of
unjust enrichment. An action for unjust enrichment may be based on failure
of consideration, fraud, mistake, and situations where it would be morally
wrong for one party to enrich himself at the expense of another. In this case
there was no mistake or fraud by the vendors. But, DeLisles stood silent
and watched Anderson make extensive improvements to their property.
They contracted to retain those improvements upon default knowing that
because of Anderson's financial problems there was little or no chance that
he could perform under the contract. In such a situation, the jury reasonably
could find that equity and good conscience require DeLisles to compensate
Anderson for the improvements.
Ild. (citations omitted). Numerous cases pose claims that do not easily fit within the
established categories. See Murdock-Bryant Constr., Inc. v. Pearson, 703 P.2d 1197,
1200 (Ariz. 1985) ("[D]efendant [an innocent beneficiary of a contractor's fraud] may
be held liable on a quantum meruit theory to make restitution for benefits received
when defendant was neither a party to the contract under which plaintiff rendered
services nor a party responsible for the wrong which permitted plaintiff to rescind the
contract and seek restitution."); Ninth Dist. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Ed Duggan, Inc.,
821 P.2d 788, 801 (Colo. 1991); In re Estate of Peck, 497 N.W.2d 889, 890 (Iowa 1993)
(considering a claim for restitution by the heirs of a woman against her widower on
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principle will operate much like Holmes's and Pollock's principle of
prima facie tort. The principle will signal that the law is open to novel
claims of unjust enrichment and it will provide a conceptual structure
for addressing the normative issue of injustice.
Whatever that principle may be, it is for the judge and not the jury
to decide what constitutes unjust enrichment in the first instance in a
case for which there is no settled rule. It is well established that the
judge decides whether there is an obligation in restitution when the
facts are not in dispute.3 Some cases go further and hold that, even in
a case where the facts are disputed, it is an error to put the question of
what constitutes unjust enrichment to the jury under a general
instruction.- This position has been justified on the mistaken view
the theory that he reaped a windfall when she died shortly before the dissolution of
their marriage); Stevens v. Stevens, 82 A.2d 418, 422-23 (N.H. 1951) (drawing on the
principle of unjust enrichment to justify compensating a son for his services in
administering his father's assets under a voided transfer); In re Estate of Zent, 459
N.W.2d 795, 800-01 (N.D. 1990) (finding that a claim for a payment for services
rendered should be rejected where it was conceded that the service provider did not
expect to be compensated). Often novel claims are rejected on dubious categorical
principles. See Davidson v. Davidson, 667 So. 2d 616, 621-22 (Miss. 1995) (rejecting a
claim on the principle that to be unjust enrichment must be the product of a wrong);
supra note 294 and accompanying text.
For a strong statement regarding the openness of the law to novel claims of unjust
enrichment, see Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244-46 (Utah 1998); see also H.
Jefferson Powell, "Cardozo's Foot": The Chancellor's Conscience and Constructive
Trusts, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. 7, 14-15 (1993) (concluding that the view that
restitution will lie on general equitable principles has triumphed in the United States,
and attributing this triumph to decisions by Cardozo mediated through the
Restatement of Restitution).
306. There is much authority for this proposition. See, e.g., Bloomgarden v. Coyer,
479 F.2d 201, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[W]here, as here, the essential facts are not in
dispute, the question whether a quasi-contract should be erected is one of law.");
State Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div. v. Wetherelt, 931 P.2d 383,
390 n.11 (Alaska 1997) (finding that where the facts are clearly established the issue
becomes one of law).
307. See U.S. East Telecomms., Inc. v. US West Communications Servs., Inc., 38
F.3d 1289, 1301-02 (2d Cir. 1994). U.S. East involved a claim by a sub-subcontractor
against a general contractor for work done after default by the sub-contractor. See id.
at 1292-94. The sub-subcontractor alleged that the general contractor had
represented that the subcontractor would be paid. See id. at 1294. The trial judge
submitted the case to the jury on the following general charge:
In order to award East damages on the basis of unjust enrichment, you must
find that East has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that
one, West was enriched, two, the enrichment was at East's expense, and
three, the circumstances are such that equity and good conscience required
West pay East for the reasonable value of what it received.
Id. at 1296. The court of appeals affirmed but on the narrow ground that while the
plaintiff could not normally require restitution for the services performed under
contract, New York law made an exception when the party who benefited from the
services made independent representations that the service provider would pay. See
id. at 1298.
For a case endorsing giving the issue of unjust enrichment to the jury under a
general standard, see Gulf Life Insurance Co. v. Folsom, 907 F.2d 1115, 1119-20 (11th
Cir. 1990), and Gulf Life Insurance Co. v. Folsom, 349 S.E.2d 368, 372 (Ga. 1986).
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that unjust enrichment is an equitable principle. And it has been
The issue was whether a mistaken payment could be recovered. See Folsom, 349
S.E.2d at 370. The Eleventh Circuit referred the case to the Georgia Supreme Court
to determine whether a mistaken payment could be recovered because of conflicting
Georgia statutes on the issue. After the case came back to federal court, the Eleventh
circuit stated:
From this discussion we discern that the equities to be considered by the jury
are (1) the degree of negligence on the plaintiff's part in erroneously paying
over the money, (2) the level of good faith with which the defendant acted in
receiving and retaining the money, and (3) prejudice, i.e., whether the
defendant's position has so changed that it would be unfair to require him to
pay the money back. Essentially, what this means is that in an action for
money had and received, where the plaintiff was negligent, the plaintiff is
entitled to get his money back-unless the jury decides that he doesn't
deserve it back or that the defendant deserves to keep it. Under this
extremely flexible equation we find it impossible to say as a matter of law
that a jury could never find that Folsom is entitled to keep the money
wrongfully paid by Gulf.
Folsom, 907 F.2d at 1119.
308. North Dakota cases take the position that "[a] determination of unjust
enrichment is necessarily a conclusion of law because it holds that a certain state of
facts is contrary to equity." Estate of Zent, 459 N.W.2d at 798. In Zent, the court
invoked this principle in reversing a decision of a lower court denying compensation
to a woman who provided unpaid housekeeping services for several years to her
companion while he suffered from Alzheimer's. See id. at 801. The court held that the
woman could recover though she testified that she had not expected her companion
to pay her because of the extraordinary nature of the services. See id at 800-01. In
Albrecht v. Walter, 572 N.W.2d 809 (N.D. 1997), the court invoked the same principle
in reversing a decision that it would unjustly enrich the other guarantors to enforce
the obligation of a co-guarantor to pay his share of a debt because the other
guarantors misled the co-guarantor about the prospects for the business when he
made the guaranty. See id at 813. The North Dakota Supreme Court decided that
there had been no misrepresentation and that the co-guarantor should have known as
well as the others the uncertain prospects of their restaurant. See id. at 813-15. The
guarantors brought the co-guarantor into the venture to run the restaurant and
promised him an equity interest to be purchased out of the profits. See id. at 811. He
was pushed out when the restaurant did not do as well as expected. See id. at 811-12.
He then opened a successful competing restaurant. See id. at 812. Restitution has a
long history on the law side of the docket. Claims in law for restitution of money
using the writ of assumpit and the fiction of an implied promise appear in the early
seventeenth century. See J.H. Baker, The Use of Assunpsit for Restitutionary Money
Claims 1600-1800, in Unjust Enrichment 31, 31-35 (Eltjo J.H. Schrage ed., 1995).
There is an acceptance of the use of the writ of assumpsit to undo unjust transactions
generally in Moses v. Macferlan, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (L-B. 1760) where Lord Mansfield
concluded that a claim for money had and received would lie:
for money got through imposition, (express, or implied) or extortion; or
oppression; or an undue advantage taken of the plaintiffs situation, contrary
to laws made for the protection of persons under those circumstances. In
one word, the gist of this kind of action is, that the defendant, upon the
circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity
to refund the money.
Id. at 681. Baker observes that during this period the trial judge determined whether
a writ might be brought under a fictional promise and he would instruct a jury on
what facts it might rule for the plaintiff. See Baker, supra, at 33-35. Because courts
did not preserve them, judges' opinions did not become book law. Book law on the
subject begins with Moses v. Macferlan where Lord Mansfield, who sat as the trial
judge, decided that the plaintiff had strong claim on the equities and put the legal
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justified on the wooden view that it is a question of duty. A better
argument is that it inheres in the very form and structure of the law of
restitution. The law of restitution is largely composed of categorical
rules that do not require a normative judgment at the point of
application. The judge decides whether a claim may proceed when it
falls on the boundary of one of the established doctrines. Logically,
the judge should also decide wholly novel claims that are grounded on
a more general principle of unjust enrichment.
The Colorado Supreme Court faced the question of whether there
is a general principle of unjust enrichment and the question of the role
of judge and jury in working out that principle in Ninth District
Production Credit Assoc. v. Ed Duggan, Inc. 310 Duggan supplied feed
to a feedlot to which the Association provided credit.31, The
Association had a security interest in the feedlot's receivables.312
Duggan was an unsecured creditor.313 The Association enabled the
feedlot to continue operating though the lot was failing, and no
warning was given to Duggan that there was little prospect he would
be paid for the feed he provided. 31 4 When the feedlot folded, Duggan
sought restitution from the Association for the value of the feed.31,
The trial court submitted the claim to the jury on an instruction that
asked if "the Defendant... accepted the benefit under such
circumstances that it would be inequitable for the Defendant... to
retain the benefit without payment of the reasonable value of the
corn." 36 The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the Association's
argument that no claim could ever lie in restitution by an unsecured
creditor against a secured creditor for the enhancement of the value of
the secured collateral.317 It rejected such a categorical rule, reasoning
that such a claim might well be just if the secured creditor "initiated or
encouraged the transaction.' '18 But the court thought it wrong to
question of whether assumpsit would lie to the full court in Westminister. See id. at
56-57.
309. See Wanaque Borough Sewerage Auth. v. Township of W. Milford, 677 A.2d
747, 752 (N.J. 1996) (reasoning that the duty defines the contract "in the case of quasi-
contract" and "[t]he scope of the duty is a question of law to be decided by the
court").
310. 821 P.2d at 795-98.
311. See id. at 790.
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. See id. at 791.
315. See id. at 792-93.
316. Id. at 799. The instruction is difficult to interpret because parts of it read as if
it were an instruction on an implied-in-fact contract claim. In particular, the judge
stated that to find "an implied contract to pay for goods, you must find ... the
Plaintiff delivered corn... without a specific agreement as to compensation, but with
the reasonable expectation that it would be paid the reasonable value of the corn by
the Defendant .. .." Id.
317. See id. at 795.
318. Id.
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submit the issue to the jury without some guidance.3' 9 The court
reasoned that "[a] jury cannot be presumed to understand the
interrelation of the doctrine of unjust enrichment and the law of
secured transactions and therefore must be apprised of how a seeming
conflict between the two is to be resolved."' ' 0
V. ABUSE OF A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP
The doctrine of abuse of a confidential relationship is at the
periphery of topics that themselves are at the periphery of the modem
common law. Legal treatises tend to address the doctrine under the
law of constructive trustsn, or the law of restitution.-- I close with this
most peripheral of topics because it serves as a counterpoint to, and as
a reinforcement of, some of the central themes of this Article. This is
the only place in the common law where the jury traditionally has
been given significant normative discretion in deciding what is
appropriate conduct affecting only economic interests. I see nothing
objectionable in this in principle. The jury ought to decide what is
appropriate conduct in dealing with close family and friends because it
is a matter of "principles of common honesty." But this useful
doctrine is under assault on two fronts. Plaintiffs have tried to stretch
it to cover ordinary commercial relationships. In response, judges
have imposed categorical limitations, some of dubious merit. A
possible to understanding the limitations of the doctrine is to
understand that, in defining its scope, we are merely defining the field
in which the question of what is inappropriate commercial conduct is
for the jury to decide. Conduct that is found to fall outside the scope
of the doctrine does not foreclose a judicial determination that it is
inappropriate on more general principles.
The traditional definition of a confidential relationship is quite
open-endedm This statement from a 1965 Kansas decision is
319. See id. at 798-801.
320. Id. at 800.
321. See George Gleason Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 482 (2d ed.
1978); see also Scott on Trusts § 2.5 (William Franklin Fratcher ed., 4th ed. 1987)
(discussing fiduciary relationships).
322. See Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law Of Remedies § 10.4, at 668 (2d ed. 1993). In
English civil law, the concept of abuse of a confidential relationship originated in
equity where something like it flowered in the law of constructive trusts in the
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. See Gareth Jones, The Role of Equity in
the English Law of Restitution, in Unjust Enrichment 149, 152-55 (Eltjo J.H. Schrage
ed., 1995).
323. See Farmer City State Bank v. Guingrich, 487 N.E2d 758, 763 (Ul. App. Ct.
1985) (finding that a plaintiff may establish a fiduciary relation by "the degree of
kinship, disparity of age, health, mental condition, education and business experience
between the parties, and the extent to which the allegedly servient party entrusted the
handling of his business and financial affairs to the other and reposed faith and
confidence in him" (citation omitted)). See also Kurti v. Van Horn, 380 N.V2d 693
(Iowa 1986):
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representative:
Whether or not a fiduciary relationship exists and whether or
not it has been abused does, to a great extent, depend on the
particular facts and circumstances of each individual case.
This court has refused, for that reason, to give exact
definitions or fix definite boundaries for that class of human
relations commonly known as fiduciary which, based on
principles of common honesty, require fair dealing between
parties.324
While the statement refers to fiduciary relationships, the factual
context (the issue in the case was the fairness of an exchange between
parent and child) makes clear that the court had in mind abuse of a
confidential relationship. The hallmark of a fiduciary relationship is
an undertaking to act on behalf of or to advise another person.'"
Fiduciaries must be selfless in the tasks they undertake as a fiduciary.
A person may pursue his own interests in dealing with a confidant, it
is just that he may not pursue them too aggressively.
Inappropriate conduct in a confidential relationship also is loosely
defined. A person doing business with a confidant must disclose
Some of the indicia of a fiduciary relationship include the acting of one
person for another; the having and the exercising of influence over one
person by another; the reposing of confidence by one person in another; the
dominance of one person by another; the inequality of the parties; and the
dependence of one person upon another. Because the circumstances giving
rise to a fiduciary duty are so diverse, any such relationship must be
evaluated on the facts and circumstances of each individual case.
Id. at 696 (citations omitted).
The standard of undue influence is similarly open-ended. For instance in Mullins v.
Ratcliff, 515 So. 2d 1183 (Miss. 1987), the court stated:
Undue influence is a practical, non-technical conception, a common sense
notion of human behavior.... [Cjommon sense counsels against rigid,
inflexible multi-part tests, particularly as the parties our law saddles with
proof of the negatives are laymen, not legal technicians. Better that the
scope of equitable principles be imperfectly defined than that justice be
overborne by the weight of artificial rules.
Id. at 1194; see also In re Estate of Gersbach v. Warren, 960 P.2d 811, 816 (N.M. 1998)
(finding that "[sitrict definitions are not necessarily useful analytical tools" in defining
undue influence).
324. Wilkinson v. Cummings, 400 P.2d 729,732-33 (Kan. 1965) (citation omitted).
325. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 cmt. a (1979). First National Bank of
Meeker v. Theos, 794 P.2d 1055 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990), is a fairly well-reasoned
decision focusing on the importance of identifying the defendant's undertaking to act
for or advise the plaintiff as the source of the duty. Unfortunately, this is in reference
to abuse of a confidential relation. Usually, courts define fiduciary relationships in
broader terms. For example, the Kurth court stated:
A 'fiduciary relation' arises whenever confidence is reposed on one side, and
domination and influence result on the other; the relation can be legal,
social, domestic, or merely personal. Such a relationship exists when there is
a reposing of faith, confidence and trust, and the placing of reliance by one
upon the judgment and advice of the other.
380 N.W.2d at 695-96 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 564 (5th ed. 1979).
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material information.3 More generally, a person who does business
with a confidant has the burden of showing the fairness of the
transaction.m A person may not invoke the statute of frauds or insist
upon other legal formalities as a defense when sued by a confidant. 3
An informal understanding between confidants on the sharing of
wealth may lay the basis for a restitution claim.3 Restitution may be
required within a confidential relationship for wealth acquired
through the relationship even in the absence of an understanding on
sharing3-' In addition, a person may not disclose secrets learned from
326. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161(d) (1981).
327. See Murphy v. Wakelee, 721 A.2d 1181, 1183 (Conn. 1998); cf Tidball v.
Hetrick, 363 N.W.2d 414, 417 (S.D. 1985) (noting that due to the high degree of
confidence and trust in an attorney-client relationship, attorney compensation
contracts are to be closely scrutinized by the court).
328. See Cochran v. Murrah, 219 S.E.2d 421, 423 (Ga. 1975). A farm laborer
asserted a claim of confidential relationship in order to overcome a release that he
had signed but not read. See id. at 422.
329. Small v. Badenhop, 701 P.2d 647 (Haw. 1985), illustrates the elasticity of the
concept of confidential relationship in a suit for restitution. The plaintiffs owned two
parcels of land in Hawaii, one large, one small, subject to debt. They discussed
subdividing the combined parcels with the defendants, their long-time friends. See id.
at 650-51. When the plaintiffs were unable to make a balloon payment due on the
debt, the defendants offered to step in and informally promised to protect the
plaintiffs' equity. See id. at 651. The defendants took title to the parcels, paying the
balance due on the note. See id. Later the parties discovered that the property could
not be subdivided. See id. at 652. The defendants built a home on the property that
their son took over. See i. at 653. The parties remained friends for years until the
plaintiffs tried to formalize their understanding and the defendants denied the
plaintiffs' interest in the property. See id. at 652-53. There is a strong statement of the
flexibility of the law in this area:
Where 'confidence has been reposed and betrayed' we have not allowed
technical considerations to stand as barriers to equitable relief.... ITihe
term fiduciary or confidential relation.., is a very broad one. It has been
said that it exists, and that relief is granted, in all cases in which influence has
been acquired and abused-in which confidence has been reposed and
betrayed. The origin of the confidence and the source of the influence are
immaterial. The rule embraces both technical fiduciary relations and those
informal relations which exist whenever one man trusts in and relies upon
another. The only question is, does such a relation in fact exist?
Id. at 655 (citations omitted). Russell v. Douglas, 138 So. 2d 730 (Miss. 1962), is
similar. A nephew and his wife owned property subject to a mortgage that was in
default. See id at 731. His aunt paid off the mortgage, which was approximately one-
third the value of the property, and she took title. See id. at 732. The nephew and his
wife claimed that the Aunt did so to accommodate them. See id. at 732-33. They
explained the lack of documentation by the close relation with the aunt, who came to
Mississippi to help the nephew's mother before she died. See id. The nephew brought
the suit after the aunt tried to evict him. See id. at 732. The court imposed a
constructive trust on the aunt on the basis of a confidential relation. See id. at 733.
330. Sinclair v. Purdy, 139 N.E. 255 (N.Y. 1923), is famous for Cardozo's epigram
"[ilt is not the promise only, nor the breach only, but unjust enrichment under cover
of the relation of confidence, which puts the court in motion." Id. at 258. A brother
had transferred money to his sister to hide it from his creditors. See id. at 256. The
decision imposes a constructive trust on the sister. See id. at 259. A common claim of
this sort often arises between unmarried cohabitants. See, e.g., Bramlett v. Selman,
597 S.W.2d 80, 80 (Ark. 1980) (imposing a constructive trust to fairly divide property
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a confidant.3 1 However, it probably is best to keep the obligation not
to disclose confidential information separate from other obligations in
confidential relationships because it is based more on the character of
the information than the character of the relationship. For example, it
can be a wrong to disclose confidential information about a stranger.
According to the great weight of authority, the questions of the
existence and breach of a confidential, or an informal fiduciary,
relationship are for the jury to decide 332 There is some contrary
authority.33 Some states constrain the discretion of the decision-
maker by requiring that the plaintiff establish the existence of a
confidential or an informal fiduciary relationship by clear and
between gay lovers); Williams v. Lynch, 666 N.Y.S.2d 749, 749 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)
(finding a confidential relationship between unmarried cohabitants in order to justify
the imposition of a constructive trust, allowing the recovery of the value of money and
labor contributed by one of the cohabitants to improving the house and grounds).
For a case rejecting such a claim on the theory that restitution lies only if property is
obtained by commission of a wrong, see Doe v. Roe, 475 S.E.2d 783, 786-87 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1996).
331. See Wilson v. IBP, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 132 (Iowa 1996); see also infra notes 347-
50 and accompanying text. On breach of confidence as a tort, see generally Susan M.
Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for Invasions of
Privacy, 43 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1995) [hereinafter Gilles, Promises Betrayed]
(discussing the meaning of "breach of confidence and whether it will prove a viable
remedy for those who seek to recover for the unwanted publication of private facts").
See also Scott L. Fast, Comment, Breach of Employee Confidentiality: Moving
Toward a Common-Law Tort Remedy, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 431, 431 (1993) (arguing
that aggressive judicial law-making is needed rather than waiting for legislatures to
react to breach of employee confidentiality).
332. See In re Daisy Syst. Corp., 97 F.3d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying
California law and concluding that "the existence of a fiduciary relation is a question
of fact which properly should be resolved by looking to the particular facts and
circumstances of the relationship at issue"); Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d
310, 321 (Colo. 1993) (en banc); Dawson v. Hummer, 649 N.E.2d 653, 663 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that whether a confidential relationship exists, for purposes of a
constructive fraud claim, is a question of fact to be determined by the fact-finder);
Kurth v. Van Horn, 380 N.W.2d 693, 695-96 (Iowa 1986); Kondelik v. First Fidelity
Bank, 857 P.2d 687, 693 (Mont. 1993) (holding existence of a fiduciary relation is a
question of fact while distinguishing a finding of covenant of good faith and fair
dealing); Davis v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 852 P.2d 640, 646
(Mont. 1993) (holding that whether confidential relation existed between church and
member cannot be resolved on summary judgment); Mackintosh v. California Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 935 P.2d 1154, 1160 (Nev. 1997); L.C. v. R.P., 563 N.W.2d 799, 801
(N.D. 1997); Mancini v. Gorick, 536 N.E.2d 8, 10 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); Allen Realty
Corp. v. Holbert, 318 S.E.2d 592, 595 (Va. 1984) (finding an existence of an informal
fiduciary relationship is a question of fact).
333. See Long v. Lampton, 922 S.W.2d 692, 697 (Ark. 1996) (holding that, under
these facts, existence of a fiduciary duty was a question of law on the reasoning that
questions of duty are for the court). Much of the contrary authority involves non-
disclosure, where the issue of duty generally is treated as one for the judge. See
Mallon Oil Co. v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., 940 P.2d 1055, 1059 (Colo. App. 1997);
Garrett v. BankWest, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 833, 839 (S.D. 1990); First Sec. Bank v.
Banberry Dev. Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Utah 1990); In re Estate of Lecic, 312
N.W.2d 773,779 (Wis. 1981).
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convincing evidence.3-' Judges have begun to lay down categorical
rules to preclude finding either an informal fiduciary relationship or a
confidential relationship in certain circumstances. One such rule
precludes finding an informal fiduciary or confidential relationship
when the parties had no relationship prior to the dealings in which the
alleged breach of trust occurred?" Another such rule precludes the
finding of an informal fiduciary or confidential relationship when the
parties' relationship stands entirely on a business footing.
Such decisions respond to a spate of claims that relationships
founded entirely on a business footing are confidential.P They allege
334. This is the rule in Illinois. In Illinois, if a relationship is one which is not
fiduciary as a matter of law, it may still be so as a matter of fact, but only if the party
alleging the relationship presents specific, "clear and convincing evidence" of "the
degree of kinship, disparity of age, health, mental condition, education and business
experience between the parties, and the extent to which the allegedly servient party
entrusted the handling of his business and financial affairs to the other and reposed
faith and confidence in him." Farmer City State Bank v. Guingrich, 487 N.E.2d 758,
763 (IM. App. Ct. 1985) (citation omitted). Earlier cases apply a very high evidentiary
standard indeed. For instance, in Kolze v. Fordtran, 107 N.E.2d 686 (Il1. 1952), the
court stated that:
The relationship may exist as a matter of law between attorney and client,
guardian and ward, principal and agent, and the like, or it may be moral,
social, domestic, or even personal. Where the relationship does not exist as
a matter of law or is sought to be established by parol evidence, the proof
must be clear, convincing, and so strong, unequivocal, and unmistakable as
to lead to but one conclusion.
Id. at 690 (citation omitted). See also Clark v. Clark, 76 N.E.2d 446, 449 (Il1. 1947)
(requiring clear and conclusive evidence to establish a constructive trust); Stewart v.
Sunagel, 68 N.E.2d 268, 271 (Ill. 1946) (establishing a clear and convincing standard
for a fiduciary relationship between parent and child).
335. See Nicholson v. Ash, 800 P.2d 1352, 1355 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990);
Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171,177 (Tex. 1997).
336. See Northeast Gen. Corp. v. Wellington Adver., Inc., 624 N.E.2d 129, 131
(N.Y. 1993) ("If the parties find themselves or place themselves in the milieu of the
'workaday' mundane marketplace, and if they do not create their own relationship of
higher trust, courts should not ordinarily transport them to the higher realm of
relationship and fashion the stricter duty for them.").
337. For successful claims, see Mancuso v. United Bank of Pueblo, 818 P.2d 732
(Colo. 1991). A mother who put money in a joint account with her deadbeat son
successfully brought suit against a bank under a variety of theories, including abuse of"
a confidential relationship, when the bank applied funds in the account against the
son's debts. See id at 735-36; see also Stokes v. Henson, 265 Cal. Rptr. 836, 836 (Ct.
App. 1990) (finding an abuse of a confidential relationship between an investment
advisor and client); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Adams, 718 P.2d 508,
516-18 (Colo. 1986) (discussing extensively the circumstances tending to create a
fiduciary relation between securities broker and customer); Peoples Bank & Trust Co.
v. Lala, 392 N.W.2d 179, 186-89 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) (finding an abuse of a
confidential relationship when bank pressured wife of ill debtor to sign away
homestead rights); Nie v. Galena State Bank & Trust Co., 387 N.W.2d 373, 376 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1986) (finding abuse of a confidential relationship when bank officer failed
to disclose personal interest in property for which borrower was securing financing);
Mackintosh v. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 935 P.2d 1154, 1160 (Nev. 1997):
Mancini v. Gorick, 536 N.E.2d 8, 10 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (finding an abuse of a
confidential relationship when seller of property also served as architect and
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abuse in a decision to breach a contract, sever a relationship, or some
other act showing indifference to the interests of the complaining
party.33 They also seek punitive damages.339 These claims push the
doctrine out in three directions: in scope from personal relations to
business relations; in substance from guarding against self-enrichment
to guarding against neglect; and in remedy from disgorgement of gain
to compensation and punishment in excess of disgorgement.
Categorical limitations on the doctrine are inevitable given the
pressure to expand it. The question is, what limits? An important
first step is to distinguish a confidential relationship from an informal
engineer).
A series of Illinois cases illustrate the evolution of the concept from one of equity
or restitution within the family to something approaching a concept of economic
negligence. A half century ago, plaintiffs usually invoked the concept in suits seeking
a constructive trust or to set aside a conveyance. The relations all arose within the
family. See Kolze, 107 N.E.2d at 690; Stone v. Stone, 94 N.E.2d 855, 858 (Ill. 1950);
Clark, 76 N.E.2d at 449-50; Stewart v. Sunagel, 68 N.E.2d 268, 271 (Ill. 1946). In
Kester v. Crilly, the issue was whether a constructive trust might be imposed to
enforce an oral promise to convey land notwithstanding the statute of fraud, which in
Illinois is done only if the parties stand in a fiduciary relationship. See 91 N.E.2d 419,
423 (Ill. 1950); see also Farmer City State Bank, 487 N.E.2d at 762-64 (considering
guarantors invocation of an informal fiduciary relationship as a basis for a duty in a
negligence claim against a bank for alleged errors in preparing a guarantee agreement
as well as the basis for a constructive fraud claim).
338. Many cases have rejected claims by borrowers against banks to recover a loss
because the banks allegedly failed to warn about, or misrepresented, the risks in a
transaction for which the banks provided financing. See Dugan v. First Nat'l Bank,
606 P.2d 1009, 1015 (Kan. 1980) (stating that existence of a fiduciary relationship is
normally a question of fact, but holding that there was no such relationship as a
matter of law between bank and borrower where bank did not act as financial
advisor); Brae Asset Fund, L.P. v. Adam, 661 A.2d 1137, 1140 (Me. 1995) (holding
that no confidential relationship existed between retired accountant and bank who
had shared business interests); Ed Schory & Sons, Inc. v. Society Nat'l Bank, 662
N.E.2d 1074, 1082 (Ohio 1996) (stating that "advice given by a creditor to a debtor in
a commercial context in which the parties deal at arms' length, each protecting his or
her respective interests, is insufficient to create a fiduciary relationship"); Indermill v.
United Sav., 451 N.E.2d 538, 541 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the bank was not
in a confidential relationship with the buyers who borrowed money from it). Some
cases reject what are in essence claims of negligent misrepresentation against auditors
or accountants not employed by the plaintiff. See Standard Chartered PLC v. Price
Waterhouse, 945 P.2d 317, 334-36 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (finding no fiduciary
relationship between auditor and firm that relied upon its reports because plaintiff
could have sought information elsewhere). Some cases reject what are in essence
wrongful termination claims. See Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int'l Transp.
Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 595-97 (Tex. 1992).
339. See Gergen, Cautionary, supra note 220, at 1249-58 (tracing the development
of the tort of bad faith breach in Texas, which descended from the concept of a
confidential relationship). For a more sympathetic account of this line of cases, see
Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy, and
the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. 897, 897-980. Courts often define the
category of contracts for which bad faith breach is a tort as those involving special
relationships of trust and confidence. Scholars understand these cases as creating an
independent tort of bad faith breach. Whether a contract is in the category involving
special trust and confidence is an issue for the judge.
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fiduciary relationship. Some limitations can apply only to confidential
relations.3° While it leaves some injustices uncovered, -"' we can live
with a categorical rule that strangers doing business together one time
cannot stand in a confidential relationship. Usually people do not
trust strangers in the same way they trust close family and friends. It
is not unheard of for there to be an informal understanding between
340. Separating the concepts clarifies the issue when we ask what obligations a
fiduciary has in dealing with his principle outside his capacity as a fiduciary. The
questions then are whether the lawyer stands in a confidential relationship and when
obligations attach. A lawyer may drive a hard bargain in negotiating a fee with a new
client, for example, because he is not at that moment acting as a fiduciary or a
confidant. A lawyer should also have the ability to deal at arms' length with a client
in matters outside the scope of his representation so long as his client is aware that
they are dealing at arms' length and that the lawyer does not exploit information
gained through the representation.
New York cases on the obligations of a publisher to an author illustrate the virtue
of particularizing the content of fiduciary obligation. Early New York cases
characterized the relation between composer and publisher as fiduciary in nature to
allow the composer to sue for infringement when a publisher would not. See Manning
v. Miller Music Corp., 174 F. Supp. 192, 195-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). They would also
allow a composer to sue a publisher for infringement. See Nelson v. Mills Music, Inc.,
278 A.D. 311,312 (N.Y. App. Div. 1951). Later cases recognize that a publisher is not
under a fiduciary duty in all dealings with the author. The leading case is Van
Valkenburgh, Nooger & Neville, Inc v. Hayden Publ'g Co., 281 N.E.2d 142 (N.Y
1972), which allowed a contract claim against a publisher for failure to use his best
efforts in promoting a book, but held that there is no tort claim because the relation is
not fiduciary. See id. at 145; see also Mellencamp v. Riva Music Ltd., 698 F. Supp.
1154, 1159-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that the conventional publisher-author
arrangement is not a fiduciary relationship per se).
Separating the concepts also makes it possible to analogize an informal fiduciary
relationship to an implied-in-fact contract. An informal fiduciary relationship is
simply an implied-in-fact contract of agency. The analogy suggests that the jury
should play a circumscribed role in finding informal fiduciary relationships. The
question that the judge should put to the jury is whether the parties had an apparent
understanding that one party would act on the behalf of the other or advise the other.
See First Nat'l Bank of Meeker v. Theos, 794 P.2d 1055, 1061-62 (Colo. 1990)
(requiring such an instruction).
341. See Zimpel v. Trawick, 679 F. Supp. 1502, 1503-04 (W.D. Ark. 1988). The
defendant bought the plaintiffs mineral rights at a bargain price because he knew,
and the plaintiff did not, that a productive well had been drilled on an adjoining
property. See id. The court found there was a duty to disclose because the plaintiff
was unsophisticated, old, and infirm (she negotiated on oxygen), the land was 300
miles away, and the defendant had made vague statements about how poorly the oil
business was in the area. See id. at 1510-11. Alan Strudler makes this case the
centerpiece of an argument that nondisclosure is best explained from a deontological
perspective, to wit it protects "advantages bargainers deserve for bringing valuable
information to the bargaining table." Alan Strudler, Moral Compl-rity in the Law of
Nondisclosure, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 337, 340 (1997). His rationalization of Zimpel is
cutesy: he says the case poses a moral paradox because while the plaintiff had a right
not to be taken advantage of, the defendant had a right to exploit the information he
obtained lawfully. See id. at 379-84. According to Strudler, the defendant should lose
because the defendant created this moral paradox. See id. The defendant could have
avoided his unfair advantage had he demanded that the plaintiff's able brother be
present during the negotiations. See id
1999]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
strangers that one will act as the other's agent in a business deal.Mz
Further, it is sensible to limit the concept of abuse of a confidential
relationship to exploitation of trust for personal gain because a person
who exploits the trust of family or friends to profit himself behaves
worse than a person who inadvertently causes an economic injury to
family or friends. 3
This limitation can be imposed in two ways. One way is to limit the
remedies for abuse of a confidential relationship to rescission and
restitution or to estoppel. The other way is to allow the recovery of
losses but to define the wrofhg in a manner that requires that the
wrongdoer have sought personal gain from his alleged misconduct.3
It is too late and probably a mistake to eliminate the tort remedy of
compensatory damages for breach of a fiduciary duty.
A downside to limiting the scope of the concept of abuse of a
confidential relationship and separating it from the concept of
informal fiduciary duty is that some cases will fall through the cracks
thereby opened in the law. A recurring case of this sort involves
clergymen who prey sexually upon members of their congregation.
Several courts have held this to be a breach of fiduciary duty or an
abuse of a confidential relationshipm4 It is odd to describe the priest's
sin as exploiting trust for personal gain. Certainly restitution is an
inadequate remedy. The relationship of priest to parishioner is not
that of a family member or friend, though neither is it a business
342. Jones v. Runfi, Leroy, Coffin & Matthews, Chartered, 873 P.2d 861 (Idaho
1994), illustrates how a one-time relationship can be an informal fiduciary
relationship. The defendant, an attorney, represented a venture that borrowed
money from the plaintiff. See id. at 864. The plaintiff gave the funds to the attorney to
hold until certain conditions were met, one being the assignment of a partnership
interest as security. See id. The attorney negligently directed that the funds be
disbursed though this condition was not met. See id. The plaintiff-lender sued the
attorney after the borrower defaulted and the security turned out to be non-existent.
See id. at 865.
343. For a case finding neglect of the interests of another to be abuse of a
confidential relationship, see Lowery v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 592 So. 2d 79, 82
(Miss. 1991). The Lowery court found evidence to possibly hold the bank negligent
when it failed to either procure life insurance or advise the debtor that he needed to
do so.
344. See Barger v. McCoy Hillard & Parks, 488 S.E.2d 215, 224 (N.C. 1997)
(holding that in order to maintain claim for constructive fraud the plaintiff must show
that the defendant exploited the plaintiffs trust to benefit himself).
345. See Davis v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 852 P.2d 640, 646
(Mont. 1993) (stating that breach of a fiduciary duty by a priest depends upon the
existence of a "special relationship" with the congregation member); F.G. v.
MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 704 (N.J. 1997) (noting many cases of breach of fiduciary
duty and stating oddly that "[ujnlike an action for clergy malpractice, an action for
breach of fiduciary duty does not require establishing a standard of care and its
breach. Establishing a fiduciary duty essentially requires proof that a parishioner
trusted and sought counseling from the pastor. A violation of that trust constitutes a
breach of the duty." (quotation omitted)); see also Nally v. Grace Community
Church, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303, 307-08 (Ct. App. 1984) (allowing the plaintiff to prevail
instead on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress).
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relationship. Nor is the priest a fiduciary in the sense of being a
person who acts on behalf of or advises his congregation, though he is
expected to be personally disinterested. Judges might deal with
recurrent cases like these by creating another category of fiduciary-
like relationships to cover people in positions where they are
supposed to serve others in a disinterested fashion without acting on
another person's behalf or providing advice (the teacher-student
relationship also could be put in this category).
Unusual cases will undoubtedly continue to fall through the cracks.
In Wilson v. IBP, Inc.,34 an employer hired a nurse to coordinate
medical treatment of employees for workplace injuries. -  The
plaintiff claimed that the nurse violated a fiduciary duty or abused a
confidential relationship when she falsely told a physician, who had
prescribed bed-rest, that the employee continued normal activities at
home. The nurse did this, it was alleged, to induce the physician to
say that the employee could return to light workY9 Thus, the
relationship did not fit into the mold of a fiduciary relationship.o Nor
can the relationship be classified as a confidential relationship if such
a relationship must be grounded outside the workplace. As tried, the
case is not very interesting because the plaintiff alleged and the jury
found that the nurse lied about his condition.35 It is only a case of
over-pleading. The case is interesting if we assume that the nurse
negligently misrepresented the employee's condition. The employee
could not sue for misrepresentation because he did not rely on the
misrepresentation. He could still sue, however, for tortious
interference with his benefits if the benefits were not paid by his
employer1 2 But, there is something to be said for analyzing the case
under a heading that emphasizes the special relationship of trust and
confidence that may exist between an injured person and a healer.
The answer to the objection that limiting the scope of the doctrine
may leave some injustices unrequited is that the limitations only serve
to delineate the cases in which it is for the jury, and not the judge, to
decide what is inappropriate conduct. Outside the context of
confidential relationships a judge might still decide conduct is
inappropriate under the general principles of prima facie tort and
unjust enrichment. Within confidential relationships, the duty
346. 558 N.W.2d 132 (Iowa 1996).
347. See id. at 136.
348. See id-
349. See i&L at 143.
350. See iUL
351. See id at 141. This was covered by a slander claim. See id. at 139. The jury
awarded $4000 in actual damages and $15,000,000 in punitive damages, which was
reduced by the trial judge to $100,000 in punitive damages. See id. at 136.
352. Generally, an agent is privileged to interfere in the contracts of his principal so
long as his actions are not motivated by self-interest. See Gergen, Tortious
Interference, supra note 7, at 1197.
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imposed can then be understood as being similar to the duty of
reasonable care in negligence. It is not wrong per se to profit from
dealings with kith and kin or vulnerable others who trust us, just as it
is not wrong per se to act in a way that foreseeably harms others. But
it is wrong enough to put the issue of the morality of the conduct to
the jury.
CONCLUSION
A famous old British negligence case has a nice description of the
morality of negligence law:
The liability for negligence... is no doubt based upon a
general public sentiment of moral wrong doing for which the
offender must pay. But acts or omissions which any moral
code would censure cannot in a practical world be treated so
as to give a right to every person injured by them to demand
relief... The rule that you are to love your neighbour
becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the
lawyer's question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted
reply.353
By this description, negligence law is neither a system of social
engineering nor an expression of abstract moral principles. It is an
expression of ordinary morality. In the United States, the bedrock
principle in negligence can be put this way: if a person acts in a way
that foreseeably physically harms his neighbor or his neighbor's
property, and if the appropriateness of his conduct is at all in doubt,
then his neighbors will decide whether he should pay for the harm he
caused. The statement also reminds us that people are judged under
the standards of ordinary morality only in some spheres of their lives,
and that the boundaries of those spheres is itself a "lawyer's
question." This is not to imply that ordinary morality does not
influence the law in other spheres. Of course it does, but judges have
other concerns in mind that mediate the influence of ordinary
morality.354
The doctrine of abuse of a confidential relationship, at least as it
once was understood, could be described in the same way: the
doctrine is based upon general public sentiment of fairness that will
not permit the offender to deal unfairly with others. But sharp
dealings, which any moral code would censure, cannot in a practical
353. See Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1932 App. Cas. 562, 580 (appeal taken from
Scot.).
354. Cardozo exemplifies a judge who strove to ground decisions on contemporary
morality while working within the framework of the law. See Powell, supra note 305,
at 22-24. Powell concludes the essay on a skeptical note for he observes that
"Cardozo assumed the existence of a [shared] moral tradition, within the legal
profession and in society generally." Id. at 26. Powell thinks society has lost sight of
that moral tradition, if it ever existed.
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world be treated so as to give a right to demand relief to every person
who feels sorely treated. The rule that you are to deal fairly with
others becomes in law that you are to deal fairly with family and
friends who trust you by not trying to profit from their weakness. The
doctrine is changing as courts respond to efforts to stretch it. In this
tug of war we are in danger of losing sight of the important principle
that it is a question of ordinary morality how one should deal with
close family and friends.
Commercial law now stands at a crossroad because of the shift in
contract law from rules to standards, along with the emergence of
non-categorical standards of conduct and obligation in tort and
restitution. One path courts might take is to give juries much the
same power in administering these standards that they have in
administering the law of negligence. On this path, the legal morality
of the marketplace will become more nearly an expression of ordinary
morality. Fear of the jury and dislike of legal uncertainty may impel
courts down a different path. Judges may embrace rules that reach
recurrent immoralities and reject or cut back doctrines that make it
possible to reach unusual ones. On this path, the gap will grow
between legal morality and ordinary morality. There is no right or
wrong path. How could there be when what lies in balance is the
desire to do what is just in the immediate case and the desire that the
law be certain? My view is that courts should blaze a path somewhere
between these two. On this path we would recognize that rules are
the dominant but not the exclusive measures of the law's morality in
the marketplace. We would also encourage and enable judges to
decide what is just in cases that are not reducible to rules.
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